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The political and economic pressures for transformation in South Africa have been 
documented in an array of policies, pieces of legislation, regulatory and statutory 
frameworks, and also in governance codes for both public and private companies. 
Specifically for the mining industry, the Mining Charter comprises of transformation 
targets and measurement criteria that are presented in a scorecard to be achieved 
by the mining industry by 2014. Additionally, the King reports on governance have 
specific requirements that listed companies must meet in terms of employment 
equity and demographic representation to achieve board diversity and independent 
boards. The aim of this study was to report on the board transformation status in the 
mining industry, as well as the progress that has been made towards meeting 
transformation targets. The 2011 annual reports were used to capture profiles and 
composition of board of directors in Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listed 
mining companies. Interviews were used to gain insight on the transformation status, 
initiatives undertaken and challenges of transformation in the mining industry. The 
research findings from the analysis of board members demographic and career 
profiles shows that little has been achieved to ensure equal representation and 
diversity on the boards of directors. Further analysis of the status of transformation 
by JSE listed mining companies to realise transformation, shows that transformation 
in the mining industry is still a major challenge. Whilst some initiatives have been 
undertaken and some progress has been made, this study reveals that the barriers 
to transformation in the South African mining industry are racial issues and tensions 
based on colour, the lack of skills caused by the education system, a war for talent, a 
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 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY CHAPTER 1  
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Early in 2009, Julius Malema, as the president of the African National Congress 
Youth League (ANCYL) at that time, called for the nationalisation of mines due to a 
lack of transformation in the South African mining industry (Ngungunyane, 2010). His 
arguments were based on the need for ANC strategy to fulfil the Freedom Charter’s 
objectives that the people shall share in the country’s wealth (Roelf, 2010). He also 
outlined that the economic gains of mineral exploitation were benefiting shareholders 
in the industry whilst the surrounding community representing the disadvantaged 
groups, were still living in poverty (Boyle, 2010; Mining Report Q3, 2010; Roelf, 
2010; Spoken, 2009; Wessels, 2009). Although the ANC government rejected this 
proposal at their national elective conference in Mangaung in December 2012, the 
call for nationalisation caused uproar in the industry and further fuelled the debate 
about the lack of transformation in the mining industry. Further to the call for the 
nationalisation of mines, consecutive national strikes followed which also led to the 
tragic events at Marikana, which resulted in the loss of 37 lives during unprotected 
(wild cat) strikes for higher wages. The Mining Charter Impact Assessment which 
was completed in 2009 revealed the intransigence of the mining industry to 
transform based on statistics that indicate that less than 10% of mining companies 
were submitting EE plans and reports. In addition, there are concerns about the 
continued white male domination in mining management structures, including up to 
the boards of directors of mining companies (CEE Annual Report, 2012). This raises 
questions about whether the drivers or elements of the Mining Charter are 
progressing as anticipated.  
Following the Freedom Charter’s objectives, the Mining Charter was developed by 
the government to drive transformation as a key focus in the mining industry until 
2014 (DME, 2004; Mining Charter, 2004). The vision of the Mining Charter is to 
redress economic inequalities through black ownership, management representation 
and skills development (Republic of South Africa, 2002). In order to ensure 
representations of Historically Disadvantaged South Africans (HDSAs) across all 
management levels and on the board, the Employment Equity (EE) scorecard, as an 
element of the Mining Charter, is instrumental in prescribing targets and reporting on 
2 
transformation in the South African mining industry (CEE Annual Report, 2011). 
Given that statistics indicate that less than 5% of management positions, especially 
at top management level, were held by HDSAs in 2011 (CEE Annual Report, 2011), 
public outcry and government scrutiny could be expected. 
Indeed, during a summit held by government, business and labour representatives, a 
lack of transformation was recognised as the key limitation of the Mining Charter 
(Sapa, 2010). With an agenda to develop a strategy to position South Africa’s mining 
industry for sustainable growth, job creation and meaningful transformation, the 
summit identified skills development as the principal limitation of competitiveness 
(DME, 2010). 
The aim of this research is to provide insight into the current transformation status in 
the South African mining industry with reference to achieving EE scorecard targets. 
The focus is specifically on the representation of HDSAs, particularly at the level of 
the board of director of JSE listed mining companies. As a point of departure, the 
research methods analysed the board composition and profiles of directors 
appointed to the boards of mining companies. It scrutinised the demographic profiles 
and career experience of these directors. It also reviewed board size, positions 
represented at board level and the criteria followed for the appointment of directors 
to the board. The research further reports on the progress made in attending to 
transformation targets. This is reviewed from insights of participants from the mining 
industry who oversee transformation in their companies. The purpose is to 
investigate progress made, challenges experienced and barriers to transformation by 
mining companies listed on the JSE.  
The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to conferring the aims of the study, 
problem statement, purpose of the study, research objectives, limitations of the 
research, delimitations and chapter sequence. 
1.2 AIM OF THE STUDY 
The aim of the study was to evaluate compliance to the EE scorecard targets in the 
mining industry as set out by the government in 1994, emphasised by the Chamber 
of Mines in 2004, and formalised by the Mining Charter in 2004 and 2009. The aim 
was subdivided to firstly investigate the transformation status in terms of board 
representation by HDSAs and EE scorecard targets attainment in the South African 
3 
mining industry. This was achieved through an analysis of the board composition 
and profiles of the boards of directors of JSE listed companies in the mining industry 
category. The board member’s profiles were described according to demographic 
profiles and career backgrounds. Demographic profiles were presented by race, 
gender, nationality and age whilst the career backgrounds were examined through 
an analysis of qualifications and career experience. Qualification fields and tertiary 
levels were also reviewed, whilst career experience considered the experience 
serving at board level, mining experience and experience on the current board. The 
board composition reflected the size of the board, the positions represented at board 
level as well as the criteria for board appointments. Secondly, transformation 
challenges experienced and initiatives undertaken in this industry were outlined with 
the purpose of identifying barriers to transformation in the mining industry. 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Despite set goals, guidelines, legislation and documented statutory frameworks, 
transformation and EE scorecard target attainment seem to remain a challenge in 
the South African mining industry. The mining industry is characterised by a skills 
shortage, lack of relevant qualifications and experience from HDSAs required to 
occupy leadership positions in top management (Landelahni, 2010; Mpofu, 2010). 
Despite the mining industry’s BEE target of filling at least 40% of top management 
positions with HDSA, this target had not materialised by 2009 (Shabangu, 2010). In 
fact, statistics revealed that less than 5% of the management composition in the 
mining industry was represented by the previously disadvantaged groups. Statistics 
thus highlight that transformation is lacking in the mining industry (Sapa, 2010). As a 
result, this industry has been subjected to vicious national mining strikes, as well as 
calls for and debates about the nationalisation of mines. Furthermore, the Mining 
Charter Impact Assessment, completed in 2009, which aims to track the progress on 
the transformation status of the nine elements of the scorecard, found that in terms 
of the EE scorecard, there was low participation by HDSAs to serve on the board of 
directors, executive management and senior management levels. This was also 
confirmed by the 10th, 11th and 12th Commission for Employment Equity reports. 
The most recent report presented by this commission was for the years 2012/2013. 
In their reports, this commission found that HDSAs still remain in lower management 
functions, particularly at senior and board-of-director level, with just about 17.5% 
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representation across all industries and 20.5% in the mining industry (CEE Annual 
Report, 2012). Thus, the slow progression in the mining industry in terms of 
transformation and compliance to the EE scorecard serves as a major discourse in 
today’s economic and political agenda.  
1.4 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of the study was to assess the progress made and to identify barriers to 
transformation in the South African mining industry with reference to the EE 
scorecard target achievement. The study presupposed that certain demographics, 
qualifications, career experience and backgrounds were considered as necessary 
and desirable in order for the HDSA candidates to enter the mining industry and to 
be represented across all levels of management. Therefore, the results of the study 
also highlighted the profiles of the directors in the South African mining industry that 
are considered as favourable for entering this industry. This analysis of the barriers 
to transformation was seen as a vehicle to providing meaningful recommendations to 
the mining industry towards addressing the challenges faced with transformation. 
1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The primary objective of the study was to describe the current status of 
transformation in the mining industry. Also considered were the initiatives undertaken 
and challenges experienced in meeting EE scorecard targets. In order to do this, the 
following objectives were set: 
1. To investigate board members’ profiles and the board composition of JSE 
listed companies in the South African mining industry. 
2. To report on the criteria employed to appoint members serving on the boards 
of mining companies listed on the JSE. 
3. To report on the progress towards, and determine the current status of 
transformation within the South African mining industry, measured against EE 
scorecard targets. 
4. To investigate the current challenges experienced and initiatives undertaken in 
this industry, in terms of transformation. 
5. To identify barriers to transformation in the mining industry. 
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1.6 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS  
The results of the study are limited to the mining industry and cannot be generalised 
to other industries. However, future research might be extended to other industries in 
order to compare transformation trends. Due to nature of the study that required data 
to be collected by means of annual reports and interviews, some limitations were 
experienced when a few of the companies did not have websites from which the 
annual reports could be electronically downloaded. In these cases, the companies 
were requested to post hard copies, but none of the companies were able to post 
hard copies of their annual reports. Cost and time limitations were also seen as 
limitations. It was costly to visit the mines to perform interviews. Additionally the 
desired respondents in the mining industry had limited time available to partake in 
the study. Also due to the fact that transformation is a sensitive issue in South Africa, 
there was still some reluctance to participate in the interviews. The study was also 
done during the intense national strikes in the mining industry which resulted in most 
companies being reluctant to participate in the study, however, some saw it as an 
opportunity to defend their companies and provide the real facts regarding the issues 
being faced by the mining industry. 
1.7 DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
A delimitation worth noting is that whilst other aspects of the Mining Charter and 
scorecard are important, its progress was not entirely measured, i.e. ownership and 
control, procurement, improving housing and living standards, human resources 
development, beneficiation and reporting, and other similar aspects, fall outside the 
scope of the study. The second chapter, however, reviewed some of these issues in 
order to provide contextual background. Lastly, in the mining industry, terminology 
relating to the board of directors and top management are used interchangeably and 
are commonly intertwined, resulting in a perplexity in the usage of the terms. As a 




1.8 CHAPTER SEQUENCE 
In order to meet the set objectives of the study, this dissertation is made up of the 
following series of chapters.  
 
Chapter 1: Background to the study 
Chapter 1 provides the background and rationale of the study. It does so by 
reviewing the aim of the study and the purpose of the study. It provides a description 
of the problem statement and finally the research objectives. It also covers research 
questions, limitations and delimitations of the study. 
 
Chapter 2: The development of the EE scorecard targets for the South African 
mining industry and its progress 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review on transformation and the development of the 
EE scorecard. This review explains transformation targets and scorecard and 
measurement criterion. 
 
Chapter 3: Corporate governance and the board of directors 
Chapter 3 provides a scholarly review of the board of directors as a focal governance 
mechanism. It reviews the dominant theories of corporate governance globally and 
locally and provides a comprehensive literature on the local best practice 
governance systems, board composition, board diversity and board profiles. 
 
Chapter 4: Research design and methodology 
Chapter 4 deals with the design of the methodology applied in the research. It 
applies the research methods of both qualitative and quantitative research in the 
design. It also covers the type of qualitative and quantitative research used. It 
describes the unit of analysis used, the population, and the sample used and finally 
how data was analysed and reported.  
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Chapter 5: A review of the South African Mining Companies Boards 
Chapter 5 deals with the interpretation of data and the presentation of results and 
findings in Phase 1 of the research by means of quantitative analysis. 
 
Chapter 6: Initiatives undertaken and challenges experienced in transforming 
the South African mining industry 
Chapter 6 deals with the interpretation of data and the presentation of results and 
findings in Phase 2 of the research by means of qualitative analysis. 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion, summary and recommendations 
Chapter 7 ends with conclusions, summary and recommendations for future 
research. 
1.9 CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter is to give a justification for the study and to provide a 
roadmap of the dissertation. This chapter provides an overview of the rationale and 
aim of the study. The problem statement with regard to transformation concerns in 
the South African mining industry is made, followed by the purpose of the study and 
justifies the progression of the study. The research objectives are set and the 
research limitations and delimitations of the study concludes this chapter together 
with a chapter overview of the dissertation.   
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 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EE SCORECARD CHAPTER 2  
TARGETS FOR THE SA MINING INDUSTRY AND ITS PROGRESS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, The Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) announced that “Only 37 per 
cent of mining companies have developed EE plans, while a lesser number of 
companies have published these plans”. The report furthermore stated that “No 
evidence of EE reports (either audited or unaudited) were submitted to the DMR. 
These findings demonstrate the intransigence and lack of commitment by the 
industry to transform (DME, 2009:10).”  
In this literature chapter, transformation was identified as one of the key challenges 
facing the mining industry. This chapter will review the current status of adherence to 
EE scorecard targets within the mining industry by means of a literature review. 
Firstly, this chapter will provide an overview of the South African mining industry. 
This discussion pertains to issues related to the historical and political background of 
the mining industry; the mineral reserves extracted by this country; its economic 
contribution; active mining companies; and the main industry role players. The main 
industry role players reviewed are the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR), the 
Chamber of Mines, National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the South African 
Mining Development Association (SAMDA). Attention will also be paid to the 
operational relevance to enforce transformation in the mining industry.  
In view of the fact that the debates regarding the nationalisation of mines were 
influenced by a lack of transformation in the mining industry, the discourse in this 
chapter will cover the transformation agenda, its links to the constitution and how it 
influenced the development of the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) strategy. 
The inception of the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) Act is 
also conversed together with its beneficiaries, i.e. the Historically Disadvantaged 
South Africans (HDSAs).  
The transformation laws governing the mining industry, namely, The Skills 
Development Act No 55, of 1998; the Employment Equity Act No 97, of 1998; The 
BEE Act No 53 of 2003; and the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development 
Act 28 of 2002 will be consecutively discussed as they were developed as 
mandatory regulatory and statutory frameworks toward transforming the HDSA 
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arena. The literature review will also cover a detailed discourse of the general 
objectives of the BBBEE Act which gave birth to the development of the Broad-
Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter for the mining industry, i.e. the Mining 
Charter. The Mining Charter provides the foundation of the scorecard against which 
individual companies are measured. Both the 2002 and 2010 Mining Charters will be 
discussed. This discussion will be followed by a review of the 2004 and 2010 Mining 
Scorecard as measurement criteria for the Mining Charters. 
2.2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MINING INDUSTRY 
The following sections provide an overview of the South African mining industry. 
Specific focus will be directed to the historical and political background of this 
industry, mineral reserves extracted by this industry, economic impact of the mining 
industry, the mining companies operating in the mining industry and the main 
industry role players. Finally, key challenges facing the mining industry will be 
discussed.  
2.2.1 The historical and political background of the South African mining 
industry 
The development of the mining industry was influenced by several events in the 
history of South Africa which warrant a brief historic and political overview. The initial 
explosion of mining in South Africa was led by the discovery of the first diamond at 
the Orange River in 1867, followed by the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 
1886. These mineral discoveries and the development of mining led to the high 
demand for industrial support which resulted in the mining industry becoming a key 
economic contributor by 1886 (Project IQ, 2011).  
Given the national importance of the mining industry, this industry was also 
subjected to the laws and priorities of the government of the day. For example, in 
1948 the National Party with its more Afrikaner-based following came into power 
under the presidency of D.F. Malan. Under the new president, a new regime was 
formed that conceived and implemented the policy of apartheid [racial discrimination 
was already present in SA at the time (Rungan, Cawood & Minnitt, 2005:736)]. This 
policy used race to restrict black people from participating in major economic 
industries, and the mining industry was not excluded. The restrictions were based on 
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the types of employment black people could partake in, the places they could reside, 
the standard of education they could obtain, etc. (Rungan et al., 2005).  
By the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the economy of South Africa was incarnated 
by a small number of large mining groups called mining finance houses (Malherbe & 
Segal, 2001). These companies were characterised by pyramid of control structures 
which protected the interests, values and management control of the white labour 
force. These structures were aligned to the key apartheid policy elements which 
were strengthening the white working class, such as the emasculation of black 
labour, the oppression of women, state patronage to advance group interests, the 
forming of corporations in the major economic industries, and the development of 
mining houses as an instrument of capital allocation (Malherbe & Segal, 2001). 
These conditions resulted in black people being a source of cheap labour, whilst 
being methodically subjected to domineering legal and directorial obstacles. This 
also prevented their attainment of pursuing their entrepreneurial advancement goals 
(Okechokwu, 2004:4). 
The ANC’s victory in the first democratic election in 1994 saw the collapse of 
apartheid. The new regime aimed to redress the economic imbalances through the 
launch of BEE. Corporate restructuring began whereby mining houses were changed 
into focused mining companies through the shedding of their non-core industrial 
holdings. This change incorporated the consolidation of ownership through minority 
takeovers, the transfer of primary listings (and group head offices) offshore, as well 
as the requisition of South African assets by foreign nationals (DME, 2004). This 
restructuring was implemented to achieve the BEE policy and the empowerment of 
the HDSA.  
However, in 2010 the DME reported that the mining industry was still characterised 
by gender inequality, was racially and ethnically defined and was untransformed 
(DME, 2010). On the other hand, the ANC government, BEE and black capitalism 
have been criticised for unethical practices that are benefiting a chosen few who are 
influential politicians or who benefit from strong political contacts (Mokoena, 
2006:37). The ANC leadership was also accused of moving towards capitalism, i.e. 
being politicians during the sunlight hours and board members at night-time 
(Mokoena, 2006:38). Indeed, allegations of self-enrichment, rather than 
empowerment, have been made in the criticism of BEE implementation initiatives 
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(Rungan et al., 2005). This is evident in current topical concerns about corruption, 
ineptitude, self-enrichment and the call for the nationalisation of mines.  
Indubitably, the South African political and historical background is linked to, and 
continues to determine the future of the mining industry. Table 2.1, below, 
summarises the historical and the political background of the South African mining 
industry according to key historical events, political dispensation, mining legislation 
and its impact on the mining industry. 
Table  2.1:  Historical and political background of the SA mining industry. 





Arrival of the Dutch 
colonialists in South 
Africa. 
Establishment of Dutch 
colonies. 
Mining not yet operational N.A. 
1820 British arrival at the Cape 
(Conflict between the 
Dutch and British 
evolved). 
Establishment of the 
British colonies. 
Roman/Dutch Law N.A. 
1867 Discovery of diamonds in 
the Orange River. 
High demand for 
industrial support. 
Industrial capitalism and 
globalization of the South 
African economy. 
Import and export of 
mining products began. 
1886 Discovery of gold on the 
Witwatersrand. 
A further influx by the 
British to SA led to two 
colonial factions, 
confrontations, hostilities 
and power struggles that 
led to the Anglo-Boer War 
1899-1902. 
Roman Dutch Law Influx of fortune seekers 
from all over the world to 
find fortune in gold. 
Mining claims established 
on an individual scale. 
Establishment of mining 
communities. 
1899-1902 The Anglo-Boer War Signing of the peace 
treaty in 1902 
Roman Dutch Law Pass laws determining 
where blacks could work, 
live and travel. 
1910 The establishment of the 
Union of South Africa. 
Revolution of South Africa 
as a mining country. 
Transvaal mining laws 
Colonialism 
Capitalism 
Pass laws determining 
where blacks could work, 






The National Party 
elected into government. 
Racial discrimination 
based on race and 
gender in major economic 
industries. 
Restriction of black 
people and women to 
participate in major 
economic industries. 
The apartheid policy 
Mines, works and 
machinery regulations 
Development of mining 
finance companies. 
Pyramid of control 
structures which 
protected the interest and 
control of the white labour 
force. 
19th and 20th centuries Mining finance houses 
established. 
Management control of 
white labour and 
emasculation of black 
labour force of the mining 
industry. 
Mines, works and 
machinery regulations 
Mining Titles Registration 
Act 16 of 1967- regulates 
the registration of mining 
titles and other rights 
connected with 
prospecting and mining 
Development of a small 
number of mining 
companies and ownership 
of mines given to white 
supremacy. 
1955 Uprising of the ANC party. Draft of the freedom 
charter. 
Mines and Works Act Call for the nationalisation 
of mines, banks and other 
monopolies. 
1956 Racial discrimination in 
employment. 
Skilled jobs for whites 
only and semi- or 
unskilled jobs for black 
workers. 
Mines and Work Act Growth of the mining 
industry. 
Contribution to GDP/ 
employment/ role players. 
12 
1970 Gold production, 67% of 
the world production. 
Skilled jobs for whites 
only and semi- or 
unskilled jobs for black 
workers. 
Mining Titles Registration 
Act 16 of 1967- regulates 
the registration of mining 
titles and other rights 
connected with 
prospecting and mining 
Mining Rights Act 20 of 
1967- deals with the 
issues of unwrought 
precious metals 
Occupational Diseases in 
Mines and Works Act 78 
of 193- deals with the 
compensation for 
diseases contracted by 
persons employed in 
mines and works 
Growth of the mining 
industry. 
 
SA classified as a mining 
country. 
 
Mining rights and 
registration were allowed 
for the white elite. 
1994 ANC won the first 
democratic elections. 
Corporate restructuring Minerals Act 50 of 1991 
(GG 13253, 1; 22 May 
1991) – regulated the 
mining industry until May 
2004 
Constitution Act 108 of 
1996 (GG 17678,1; 18 
December 1986 
Mining finances houses 
changed into focused 
mining companies. 
 
Birth of transformative 
laws to be enforced in the 
mining industry. 
1995- present Development of BEE Employment equity, 
Affirmative Action and 
empowerment of HDSAs. 
EE Act 55 of 1998 (GG 
19730,1; 19 October 
1998) – achieved equity 
in the workplace by 
eliminating unfair 
discrimination. Also 
adopts affirmative action 
measures. 
BBBEE ACT 53 of 2003 
(GG 25899, 1; 9 January 
2004) – establish a 
legislative framework for 
the promotion of Black 
Economic Empowerment 
MPRDA ACT 2002 (GG 
23922, 1;10 October 
2002- Transferred mineral 
rights from private holders 
to government as 
guardians of peoples of 
SA and makes special 
provisions to 
accommodate HDP’s 
Antitrust legislation and 
government officials 
sitting on executive 
boards. 
 
The progress for 
transformation is 
regulated by the Mining 
Charter. Scorecard 
targets are developed for 
achievement by 2014. 
Source: Own source 
2.2.2 Mineral reserves 
The mining reserves in South Africa include manganese, chromium, platinum group 
metals, gold, vanadium and alumino-silicates (SA Info, 2011). Of the world’s total 
mineral reserves, South Africa holds 90% of platinum metals, 80% of manganese, 
73% of chrome, 45% of vanadium and 41% of gold (Mining Report Q3, 2010). Other 
significant minerals found in South Africa include ilmenite, palladium, rutile and 
zirconium (SA Info, 2011).  
South Africa is the leading global producer of chrome, manganese, platinum, 
vanadium, and vermiculite. It holds the second position in producing ilmenite, 
palladium, rutile and zirconium (Projects IQ, 2011). Over 40% of the global gold 
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reserves are found on the Witwatersrand, and more than 80% of the iron ore is 
exploited in the Sishen and Thabazimbi areas. The Witbank and Ermelo areas are 
known for producing platinum (Project IQ, 2011). The country is thus a rich resource 
of mining produce and the contribution of these resources has a significant economic 
impact on the South African mining industry. 
2.2.3 Economic impact of the South African mining industry 
Classified as a minerals-based economy (Cawood, 2004), South Africa is notorious 
as a wealth trove which possesses a considerable amount of mineral capital, and 
produces an exceptionally large quantity of the world’s minerals (Segal & Malherbe, 
2002). The South African mining industry is a very important export industry with 
international recognition (Coetzee, 2010). For the past 132 years, the mining industry 
has led to the development of industries that either use mineral extracts or supply 
the mining sector (Chamber of Mines, 2010:3). The mining industry is also a major 
provider of jobs for the country’s citizens, carrying approximately 1,013,600 jobs 
amounting to 16% of the total national employment (Mining Report Q3, 2010; 
Projects IQ, 2011). It also contributes 18% of gross investment (10% directly), and 
nearly 30% of capital inflows into the economy through the financial account of the 
balance of payments. In addition, approximately a third of the market capitalisation of 
the JSE, 93% of the country’s power generating capacity, and about 30% of the 
country’s liquid fuel supply (Chamber of Mines, 2010) derives from the mining 
industry.  
The South African mining industry is considered as the key fiscal sector in the 
economy of South Africa (Shabangu, 2010) as it contributes an average of 20% of 
the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Projects IQ, 2011; StatsSA, 2011) of 
which about 50% is contributed directly. The mining industry in South Africa also 
produces income beyond 330 billion Rand and is the largest contributor by value to 
BEE in the economy (Projects IQ, 2011). The value of completed BEE transactions 
by 2009 was “between 10% to 20% of direct corporate tax receipts (R33 billion in 
2008, R10.5 billion in 2009)” (Chamber of Mines, 2010). This has resulted in South 
Africa becoming an attractive proposition for foreign investments. Although China 
overtook South Africa as the world largest gold producer in 2007, the mining industry 
is still critical to South Africa’s wealth and economy (Chamber of Mines, 2007; 
Coetzee, 2010; DME, 2009) as well as the world economy (Callaghan & Campbell, 
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2009). Whilst the industry has reached its maturity phase with mineral exploitation 
decreasing over the years due to the depletion of reserves, and the combined 
disturbances of power shortages and labour disputes, the Business Monitor 
International (BMI, 2009) has predicted that this industry will accomplish a value of 
US$37.38bn by 2014. In essence, South Africa still depends on mining activities to 
create prosperity that could contribute to employment, economic advancement and 
good quality infrastructure (Swart, 2003). 
2.2.4 Mining companies 
In 2010, a total of 54 mining companies were listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange, (JSE) whilst the number of private and other companies is not known 
(Coetzee, 2010). In 2011, the number of mining companies listed on the JSE 
amounted to 59 (JSE, 2012). The enterprises in the mining industry are divided into 
four groups namely Large (turnover exceeding R39 000 000), Medium (turnover 
between R10 000 000 and R39 000 000), Small (turnover between R4 000 000 and 
R10 000 000) and Micro (less than R4 000 000 turnover) (StatsSA, 2009).  
The leading mining companies include BHP Billiton, Anglo American, Impala 
Platinum, Anglogold Ashanti, Anglo Platinum, Goldfields, Sasol, Harmony and 
Kumba. These nine corporations represent over 95% of the total market 
capitalisation of all listed mining companies. Other medium and small enterprises 
include Petmin, Aquarius Platinum, Uranium One, Wesizwe, Platmin and Great 
Basin Gold to mention a few, account for the remaining 5% of total market 
capitalisation.  
2.2.5 Mining industry role players 
The main role players in the mining industry are the Department of Mineral 
Resources (DMR), the Chamber of Mines, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) 
and the South African Mining Development Association (SAMDA). 
• Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) 
The Department of Mineral Resources, previously known as the Department of 
Minerals and Energy, is an independent department which is responsible for 
overseeing the formulation and implementation of policy, with the goal of ensuring 
that the country’s mineral resources are used optimally (DME, 2010). Headed by 
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Minister Susan Shabangu, this department aims to achieve set transformation 
targets and mining industry developments (DMR, 2010). The Minister is 
responsible for reviewing the transformation progress in the mining sector every 
five years and this resulted in the Mining Charter impact assessment that was 
conducted in 2009. 
• The Chamber of Mines 
The Chamber of Mines acts as an advocacy body with a goal of creating an 
environment in which the mining industry will be able to deliver, timeously and 
cost-effectively, sufficient, appropriately skilled employees, who are trainable for 
advancement and deployment (Chamber of Mines, 2010). It also monitors 
industry adherence to the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act of 
2002 and the Mining Charter (Shabangu, 2010).  
In the role of advocate, the Chamber is required to act as custodian of the 
monitoring of transformation and sustainability progress on an annual basis as 
one of its key objectives. In order to govern this, the Chamber develops a 
sustainability and transformation report that outlines the mining industry’s 
commitment to skills development and transformation. The report also includes 
transformation targets in conjunction with those of the Mining Charter. It 
furthermore specifies that the industry has to meet objectives by contributing to 
the development of the National Skills Development Strategy (NSDS) and 
satisfying the requirements of the Mining Qualifications Authority (MQA). Other 
objectives include: workers’ participation in different Adult Basic Education 
Training (ABET) programmes (approximately 7 000 workers per annum), workers 
finishing different leadership and apprenticeship programmes (approximately 800 
workers per annum) and aiding HDSAs to enter “formal employment in the mining 
industry through skills development by issuing a Workplace Skills Plan to the 
Mining Qualifications Authority (MQA) on an annual basis” (Chamber of Mines, 
2007:13). All these activities aim to ensure compliance with the Mining Charter 





• National Union of Mine Workers (NUM) 
NUM is the leading union of mine workers in South Africa. It was founded in 1982 
and is affiliated with Congress of the South African Trade Unions (COSATU). 
NUM defines itself in terms of the concept of social movement trade unionism 
(Fafuli, 2012). This union has the overall aim of improving the lives of 
mineworkers and has been instrumental in transforming the mining industry with 
regards to the conversion of hostels into family units and single units. The 
mandate of NUM is to defend the rights of employees at the workplace, drive and 
monitor the training and skills development, take up grievances, protect 
employees against unfair labour practices, and bargain to improve salaries and 
working conditions (NUM, 2013). NUM supports affirmative action strategies that 
seek to empower black people into senior positions and that contribute to the 
struggle for non-racialism, racial inequality and gender domination in the mining, 
energy and construction industry (NUM, 2013).  
• South African Mining Development Association (SAMDA) 
SAMDA is a non-profit organisation that was established in 2000 to represent the 
interests of junior and BEE mining companies. SAMDA advocates for 
transformation and compliance with national transformation objectives in the 
mining sector (SAMDA, 2011). It is insistent on transformation and continues to 
lobby for developmental policy objectives in the sector through the existing 
channels available to it (SAMDA, 2011). SAMDA has been involved in the draft of 
the Minerals Bill and participated in the drawing up of the charter on 
empowerment of HDSAs. This commission drafted the agreement between the 
government and the mining sector on time frames and quotas to allow the 
objectives of the Mining Charter to be met. Amongst other things, SAMDA also 
takes responsibility for developing capital markets for junior companies. 
The above role players share the goal of transforming the mining industry; however, 
these players together with mining companies are faced with many challenges which 
will be discussed in the next section. 
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2.3 KEY CHALLENGES FACING THE MINING INDUSTRY 
Similar to any other industry, the mining companies and industry role players 
mentioned above, also face several challenges. According to Limpitlaw, Aken, 
Lodewijks and Viljoen (2005) the general challenges faced in the mining industry are 
risk issues of mine health and safety, and the depletion of resources. Research by 
Limpitlaw et al. (2005) revealed numerous other challenges faced by the mining 
industry, namely, rehabilitation, greenhouse gases, good governance, disclosure 
policies and access to information, artisanal and small-scale mining, capacity 
building, conflict management, human rights, dialogue and partnership facilitation, 
legacies of the past and closure, standards, guidelines and monitoring, general 
environmental issues, size and speed of project development, gender inequality, 
corruption, empowerment of civil society, social and environmental responsibility of 
business, impacts and benefits at community level, institution building and regulatory 
framework, social mitigation, economic diversification, and poverty alleviation.  
In 2011, Frontier Market Intelligence revealed that the central challenge facing the 
mining industry is transformation, pointing out that the South African government is 
undoubtedly taking a more strict position relative to regulation and enforcement in 
this industry. This was confirmed, not only by the amendment of the 2002 Mining 
Charter, but also by the statement that non-conformity could amount to adequate 
motivation for government to annul a company’s mining rights (DMR, 2009). 
Although the various challenges within this industry are acknowledged, this study will 
focus on the challenges of transformation. 
2.3.1 Transformation challenges 
With reference to transformation, BEE target compliance is a main challenge. One of 
the major concerns is to see HDSAs occupying leadership positions in top 
management (Landelahni, 2010; Mpofu, 2010). The mining industry is characterised 
by a skills shortage and a lack of relevant qualifications and experience from 
previously disadvantaged groups which will allow them to meaningfully participate in 
this industry. As a result, the mining industry’s BEE target of filling at least 40% of 
the top management positions with previously disadvantaged candidates did not 
materialize in 2009 (Shabangu, 2010). Further to these issues, are concerns about 
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the government’s failure to attend to BEE in an appropriate manner. Leon (2011) 
argued that a “type of a narrow BEE was promoted, resulting in the enrichment of 
well-connected few”, rather than a wider group of the targeted population groups. 
The call for the nationalisation of mines by the ANCYL due to a lack of 
transformation in the South African mining industry (Ngungunyane, 2010), on the 
other hand, does not provide clarity on how wealth distribution and transformation 
will be implemented (Coetzee, 2010). Key challenges of transformation to be 
discussed in this section are the, skills shortage of HDSAs, low management 
representation by HDSAs, the call for the nationalisation of mines and foreign 
investment uncertainties. 
 
• Skills shortage of HDSA  
A skills shortage has constantly been a limiting factor for HDSAs to participate in 
the mainstream economy (Schoeman, 2010). It is argued that a historical 
prevalence of uneducated, unqualified, and inexperienced semi-skilled HDSAs 
construct them unprepared to deal with the ever rapidly varying demands of the 
open industry marketplace (Mokoena, 2006:23). The DMR has also identified the 
HDSAs’ lack of skills as a strong limitation to the Mining Charter implementation 
(DMR, 2010). Mining companies have defended the deficient conformance 
related to the shortage of suitable black candidates, enabling them to target only 
a few (Rungan et al., 2005).  What makes skills shortage not to improve was 
justified by ineffective leadership for driving transformation, inability to identify and 
manage a talent pool, broad transformation legislation and failure to acknowledge 
transformation (Esterhuyse, 2003). Engdahl and Hauki (2001) presents a view 
that skilled black South Africans are not only few, but are skewed. These 
candidates are often paid more money than their white counterparts and as a 
result of their demand, they engage in job hopping (war for talent).  However it 
was discovered that many black people leave organisations out of frustration due 
to feelings of alienation, distrust in their abilities and difficulties to reach their full 




• Low management representation by HDSAs 
The increment of HDSA representation at top, senior and middle management is 
the biggest employment equity challenge facing the mining industry (CEE Annual 
Report, 2012). According to the CEE Annual report (2012:45) the key trends that 
have been observed since 2002 was that the domination of the whites in top 
management have remained static at an average 73% level. Where else, the 
percentage of HDSA at top management level has remained unstable and not 
increasing. It was also observed that race and gender are still major aspects that 
determine where a person sits in the hierarchy of the organisation. The 13th 
edition of the CEE showed that from a base of 81.5% in 2002, whites constituted 
72.6% of top management. It also shows that Blacks held 12.3% of top 
management positions in 2012, compared to 10% in 2002, indicating that there 
has been 2% improvement in ten years. The similar trend was observed in the 
Coloured group as they occupied 4.6% of top management positions in 2012, 
compared to 3.4% in 2002.  Indians also increased to 7.3% in 2012, from 5% in 
2002 (CEE Annual Report, 2012). 
• The call for the nationalisation of mines 
Coetzee (2010) defines nationalisation as an operation of transferring an industry 
or assets into the ownership of the national government to achieve political and 
economic growth. It enables the government to implement democratic control of 
outputs to allow balanced distribution of wealth, consolidation of wealth, and 
development and management of the economy. According to Coetzee (2010:5). 
General reasons in support of nationalisation are: 
• Delivery of infrastructure i.e. the construction of roads, dams, or public 
buildings. 
• Social and economic quality. 
• Resentment of foreign control of major industries. 
• Prevention of unfair exploitation and large-scale labour layoffs. 
• Control of natural monopolies. 
• The rescue or stabilisation of distressed or heavily subsidised companies. 
• To keep the means of generating wealth in public control. 
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• To reduce the power of private capitalists. 
• To allow the profits of business to be shared by the state. 
The call for the nationalisation of mines has been influenced by the lack of 
transformation in the mining industry. This call was made early in 2009 and since 
then the government has established a task committee to research the viability of 
nationalisation based on the experiences of countries where it was implemented 
both successfully and unsuccessfully. Furthermore, the ANCYL arranged a march 
(between 27 and 28 October 2011) that was supported by more than 5 000 
individuals in support of the proposal for the nationalisation of mainstream 
industry. In their memorandum they stated the following agendas to be looked 
into (Mail & Guardian, 2011:3): 
• At least 60% of minerals extracted in South Africa to be beneficiated locally. 
• The provision of education and skills to young people so that they can play a 
meaningful role in the mining sector. 
• An end to import-parity pricing on South African minerals,  
• Involvement in the development of mining communities. 
• Local manufacturing of the supplies required for mining. 
• A cessation of threats of disinvestment by mining capital. 
• Compensation to mining communities suffering from diseases caused by 
mining pollution. 
The ANCYL is concerned that the economic gains of mineral exploitation are 
benefiting shareholders in the industry whilst the HDSAs are still facing poverty. 
Considering the history of South Africa, the call for the nationalisation of mines 
comes from further back than the former ANCYL President, Julius Malema’s call 
in 2009. The nationalisation of major industry players, i.e. the mines, banks and 
monopolies was the initial policy of the ANC that was adopted from the Freedom 
Charter. The drawing up of the Freedom Charter in 1955 was a key political 
turning point in the history of the ANC and persists to dictate its developmental 
planning (Esterhuyse & Nel, 1990:551). The Freedom Charter of 1955 states that: 
“We the people of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know: That 
South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can 
justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of people; That our people have 
21 
been robbed of their birthright to land, liberty, and peace by a government founded on 
injustice and inequality; That our country will never be prosperous or free until all our 
people live in brotherhood, enjoying equal rights and opportunities; That only a 
democratic state, based on the will of people, can secure all their birthright without 
distinction of colour, race, sex, or belief; And therefore, we the people of South Africa, 
black and white, together equals, countrymen, and brothers, adopt this FREEDOM 
CHARTER. And we pledge ourselves to strive together, sparing nothing of our strength 
and courage, until the democratic changes here set out have been won” [Freedom 
Charter 1955 quoted in Peet 2002]  
Sections 4 and 5 of the Freedom Charter, discusses economic rights and land 
reform as measures for social transformation, it states that: 
“The national wealth of our country, the heritage of all South Africans, shall be restored 
to the people; The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and the monopoly 
industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole; All other 
industries and trade shall be controlled to assist the well-being of the people; 
Restriction of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended, and all the land 
redivided amongst those who work it, to banish famine and land hunger; The state 
shall help the peasants with implements, seed, tractors, and dams to save the soil and 
assist the tillers” [ Freedom Charter 1955 quoted in Peet 2002]  
Following the objectives of the 1955 Freedom Charter, Nelson Mandela after his 
release from prison in 1990 stated that “the nationalisation of mines, banks and 
monopolies is the policy of the ANC and a change and modification of our views 
in this regard is unconceivable”. However two years later this thought had 
changed. By February 1992, Mandela discarded the idea of nationalisation after 
attending the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. Mandela was 
accompanied by Thabo Mbeki, Joe Slovo and Walter Sisulu, and together they 
realised that nationalisation was immaterial and ambitious. The ANC was then 
confronted with formulating policy alternatives, namely, introducing antitrust 
legislation and the appointment of government officials on boards of large 
corporations. Antitrust legislation refers to legislation against or in opposition of 
business trusts or combinations; specifically consisting of laws to protect trade 
and commerce from unlawful restraints and monopolies or unfair business 
practices and the appointment of government officials on boards of large 
corporations.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union gave a false impression of nationalisation and 
served as a major reason for the shift from nationalisation to empowerment. This 
is where the concept of BEE was born. Empowerment refers to “the creation of 
opportunities and the delivering process that will contribute to market education 
and economic transformation” (JSE, 2011). 
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The call for the nationalisation of mines by the ANCYL was regenerated and put 
on the ANC 2012 Centenary conference agenda as an item to become 
government policy, to ensure that the Freedom Charter’s objectives are met 
(Rungan et al., 2005). Although the call for the nationalisation of mines was 
rejected at the ANC National conference in Mangaung, December 2012, it had 
some negative consequences in the mining industry and South Africa as a whole. 
A key challenge is the negative effect on foreign investment. 
• Uncertainty among investors 
Malema’s call has opened a debate on the nationalisation of mines which had 
initiated an intense discussion of the future of the mining industry, the economy of 
the country and further escalated uncertainty among investors (Gordhan, 2011). As a 
result, South Africa has become a potential high-risk investment for foreign 
investment (Otto, 2011). The Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan reported on 
Tuesday, 25 October 2011 that mining production in South Africa has declined by 
4% in 2011 compared to Chile’s 12% growth and Australia’s 24% growth due to 
uncertainty in the regulatory environment linked to mining rights, the nationalisation 
debate and inefficiencies in the rail system (Gordhan, 2011). The authoritative Fraser 
Institute Report also revealed that South Africa fell to the sixty-seventh (67) position 
out of 79 mining countries in terms of the attractiveness of its policies. These are the 
views of the mining executives globally (Miningmx, 2011). Amongst these policies 
are the BEE policies. 
All the above challenges concur that transformation is one of the pressing issues 
facing the mining industry. If not addressed properly it can have a negative bearing 
on the future of South Africa.  
In the next section, transformation is discussed at a root level, the reasons for 
development in South Africa, its links to the constitution, and an explanation of the 




2.4 TRANSFORMATION  
In South Africa, the meaning of transformation is uncontested and is marked by 
change (Schoeman, 2010). It basically implies changing institutions to include 
diversity and democracy and ensuring equal rights for all South African citizens. It is 
about the social and economic transformation of the environment of South Africa. 
Thomas and Robertshaw (1998) called for transformation to be defined whilst Levy 
and Merry (1986) viewed transformation as a drastic reshuffling in the change 
process, that requires radical action for change. Selby and Sutherland (2006), as 
well as Engdahl and Hauki (2001)  view transformation as a government structure to 
bring culture change, by instilling new core values, equitable access to resources 
and opportunities and skills (Schoeman, 2010). Engdahl and Hauki (2001) 
recommended that changing mindsets about transformation enable people to 
understand diversity and appreciate and respect one another in organisations. 
Esterhuyse (2003) attributed transformation meaning as a moral obligation to 
remove the legacies of apartheid. Transformation has a further political association 
expressed as a “political, social, and economic change process, with the aim of 
redressing historical imbalances” (Robertshaw, 2006:8). Diversity refers to the 
inclusion of the mixture of individuals that reflects the demographics of the people of 
South Africa in institutions. This change, that requires institutions to include diversity 
and democracy in their operations, was influenced by the results of the democratic 
elections in 1994 which favoured the government of the ANC as the leadership of 
South Africa (Schoeman, 2010).  
The ANC democratic government opened and created expectations among South 
African companies to change structures at institutions of the apartheid regime 
through the act of transmitting corporate social responsibility initiatives to empower 
and develop the HDSA (Arya & Bassi, 2009). The first step was the drafting of the 
constitution of South Africa. This was followed by the founding of processes to meet 
the expectations that would allow the new government to formulate clear and solid 
obtainable transformative projects (Heller & Ntlokonkulu, 2001). This was first 
executed by implementing various programmes to introduce the historically 
disadvantaged people as participators in the economy. The development of the BEE 
policy as the national building strategy (Okechokwu, 2004) was the key policy that 
was formulated. The aim of the BEE policy was to transform the economic status of 
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the historically disadvantaged people (Burger & Jafta, 2006). Selby and Sutherland 
(2006:54) discussed the risks associated with BEE efforts for transformation. Their 
conclusion stated that transformation carries challenges of (1) breaking down the 
psychological contract with existing white employees (2) loss of organisational 
memory due to a lack of commitment or processes to transfer knowledge and skills 
(3) substantial cost to provide incentives (4) increased distrust and racial tensions 
and (5) lack of leadership. The next section reviews the implications of the 
constitution, the meaning of the HDSA and various transformation projects that have 
been implemented. 
2.4.1 The constitution of South Africa 
The constitution of South Africa was extracted from the Freedom Charter’s 
objectives in the realisation of its promise for a non-racial, democratic and unitary 
state (Esterhuyse & Nel, 1990). As an invention of extensive political discussions 
prior and after the foremost democratic elections, the constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa is considered as the highest law (Cawood, 2004). The constitution of 
South Africa (Section 25 Act 108, 1996) states that the government has a 
commitment to restructure the mining industry. It also provides primary columns of 
the mineral policy (Cawood, 2004). Mines have to conform to the constitution and 
common law in performing operational activities with an effort to care for human 
rights (Swart, 2003). The constitution states that the government aims to improve the 
quality of life of all South Africans and promote equality (The Constitution of South 
Africa, 1993). The constitution has a focused goal of transforming the mining industry 
and to promote equality especially for the HDSA (Booyens, 2006). This is clearly 
reflected in the Bill of Rights which states that all citizens are equal. To realize this 
equality, the government aims to inform legislation to protect all the rights of people 
(Cawood, 2004). 
2.4.2 The historically disadvantaged South African (HDSA) 
According to the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act of 2002 
(MPRDA, 2002:12), a historically disadvantaged person in South Africa refers to: 
a) Any person, category of persons or community, disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination before the constitution took effect. 
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b) Any association, whose majority of members are persons contemplated in 
paragraph (a). 
c) Any juristic person other than an association, in which persons contemplated in 
paragraph (a) own and control the majority of the issued capital or members 
interest and are able to control a majority of the members votes. 
The above definition includes both people and companies that have been 
discriminated against (Rungan et al., 2005) and have been prevented from partaking 
in economic activities before the constitution took effect. The above definition is 
similar to the one of the Mining Charter. However, it has been noted that the 
definition of HDSA in the MPRDA Act/Mining Charter differs from the definition of 
HDSA in the BBBEE Act.   
• Mining Charter definition of HDSA 
HDSA refers to the “South African citizens, category of persons or community, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination before the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa came into operation which should be representative of the 
demographics of the country” (Republic of South Africa, 2002).  
• BBBEE Act definition of HDSA 
HDSA refers to “all black people including women, workers, youth, people, living 
with disabilities, people living in rural areas “(Republic of South Africa, 2003) 
The BBBEE Act, by definition, advances the interests of black people exclusively, 
while the definition of the HDSA referred to by the Mining Charter and the MPRDA 
Act refers all who were disadvantaged before the constitution came into effect 
(Rungan et al., 2005). Furthermore, the HDSA term is used synonymously with 
historically disadvantaged persons (HDP), and historically disadvantaged individuals 
(HDI’s) in government policy documents. HDSAs in some instances are referred to 
as designated groups of the Employment Equity which includes black people, 
women (black and white) and disabled individuals. The term black people refers to 
non-white populations (Okechokwu, 2004), namely, Africans, Indians, Coloureds 
(Mokoena, 2006) and Asian people. However policy documents do not clarify if black 
people include black foreign nationals or are exclusive to citizens of South Africa.  
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Rungan et al. (2005) suggested the amendment of the term HDSA to be identical in 
policy documents. For the purposes of this study, the definition by the MPRDA Act of 
2002 has been viewed as applicable to the study and will be adopted. This definition 
suggests that the term HDSA refers to all who were previously disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination in the past, namely, the black people, women (black and white), 
disabled, youth and people living in rural communities.  
2.4.3 Transformation projects 
Transformation was initiated by the introduction of the various programmes, 
including: 
1. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP);  
2. The changing of the education and training curriculums and structures;  
3. Private reinstatement of the private sector to include small, medium and micro 
enterprises (SMME’s) to benefit the black people through ownership of 
businesses; 
4. The development of the Reconciliation Commission as a measure to bring 
peace to all South African citizens from the effects of the apartheid regime;  
5. The introduction of the Growth Employment and Redistribution Programme 
(GEAR) in June 1996; and finally  
6. The enforcement of the implementation of the BBBEE strategy.  
Overall, the goal of transformation is to develop an economy that caters for the 
needs of all South African citizens in a more equitable manner. This objective of 
transformation within the economy was concluded by the release of the BBBEE Act 
in 2003.  
The Department of Trade and Industry finalised the Codes of Good Practice on 
February 9, 2007, “to clarify and ensure consistency in the implementation of the 
socially responsible behaviour in an area of empowerment of HDSA within 
organisations across industry sectors” (Arya & Bassi, 2009:1). The corporate social 
responsibility laws that were approved to govern equity are the Employment Equity 
Act, 1998; the Skills Development Act, 1998; and the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, 2000 (Visser, 2005).  
The main statutory framework that oversees the governance and expedition of 
transformation of the mining industry are the Minerals and Petroleum’s Resources 
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Development Act of 2002 (Kenny & Bezuidenhout, 1999); the Mining Charter 
(discussed in Section 2.6); and the Corporate Governance Frameworks (discussed 
in Chapter 3).  
In the following section applicable regulatory and statutory frameworks for the mining 
industry are discussed. 
2.4.4 MINING INDUSTRY REGULATION AND STATUTORY 
FRAMEWORKS 
In South Africa, the mining industry does not operate in isolation. Moreover, in the 
post-apartheid democratic environment, the commencement of mineral policies and 
various pieces of legislation should also be considered (Cawood, 2004). The 
strategies of the mining companies therefore have to be in compliance with 
governmental regulations, plus they have to accommodate labour relations and still 
achieve business profitability. Various regulatory and statutory frameworks that affect 
the mining industry are discussed below, namely, the Employment Equity Act of 
1998, the Skills Development Act of 1998, the BBE Act of 1996, the BBBEE Act of 
2003, and the Minerals and Petroleum Development Act of 2002. 
2.4.5 The Employment Equity Act, No 97 of 1998  
The main aim of the Employment Equity Act is to obtain equity in the workplace by 
promoting equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment through the 
elimination of unfair discrimination and the implementation of affirmative action 
measures to redress the employment disadvantages experienced by HDSAs 
(Republic of South Africa, 1998). The goal is to ensure their equitable representation 
in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce (Thomas, 2002:237). The 
Employment Equity Act of 1998 necessitates companies taking steps to eliminate 
unfair discrimination, to develop annual employment equity plans (when employing 
more than 50 people) and to submit annual reports to the Department of Labour 
each year (Burger & Jafta, 2006). 
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2.4.6 The Skills Development Act, No 55 of 1998 
The purpose of the Skills Development Act is to “develop the skills of the South 
African workforce and to improve the quality of life of workers and their prospects for 
work. The intention is to improve productivity in the workplace and the 
competitiveness of employers and to promote self-employment” (Petmin, 2009). This 
act strives to ensure the development of skills for the HDSAs in core and 
management functions of companies. 
2.4.7 The Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) Act  
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is an initiative to improve the standard of living 
and to increase the participation of black people in the economy of South Africa to 
achieve the transformation objectives of the government. It is seen as part of South 
Africa’s growth strategy which is associated with growth, development and enterprise 
development rather than the redistribution of wealth. BEE acts as a driver of the 
nation-building strategy and is viewed as fundamental to government’s economic 
plan (Rungan et al., 2005). BEE is defined as the integrated and coherent socio-
economic process that aims to directly contribute to the economic transformation of 
South Africa. This transformation driver has two main objectives, firstly, to increase 
the number of black people that own, manage and control the economy of the 
country, and secondly, to ensure a decrease in income inequalities (Arya & Bassi, 
2009:4). BEE was recognised by the government as an inclusive process which 
means that all organisations are required to participate in this initiative (JSE, 2011). It 
is viewed as a significant profile strategy to achieve the objectives of the 
government.  
BEE as a strategy consists of a policy statement that serves as a governmental 
reference which includes the (1) “formalisation of partnerships and charters with the 
private sector, (2) the usage of the balanced scorecard to track progress made, and 
(3) legalising acts that allows the formalisation of the codes and guidelines and the 
(4) establishment of the Advisory Council” (DTI, 2006:5).   
One of the focused drivers of the BEE process was the development of the Broad-
Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003.  
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2.4.8 The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) Act No 53 of 
2003 
The BBBEE Act acts as an intercession by the South African government to address 
the systematic segregation of the majority of South Africans from full sharing in the 
economy” (DTI, 2006: 6). The BBBEE legislation was formalised as a code of 
practice and regulation, namely, Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 
No. 53, 2003. BBBEE is defined as “the economic empowerment of all black people, 
women, workers, youth, people living with disabilities, and people living in rural 
areas, through diverse but integrated socio-economic strategies” (Burger & Jafta, 
2006) which includes:  
1. Promoting economic transformation in order to enable meaningful 
participation in the economy;  
2. Achieving a substantial change in the racial composition of ownership and 
management structures and in the skilled occupations of existing and new 
enterprises;  
3. Increasing the extent to which communities, workers, cooperatives, and other 
collective enterprises own and manage existing and new enterprises, and 
increasing their access to economic activities, infrastructure and skills training;  
4. Increasing the extent to which blacks own and manage existing and new 
enterprises and increasing their access to economic activities, infrastructure 
and skills training;  
5. Promoting investment programmes that lead to broad-based and meaningful 
participation in the economy by blacks in order to achieve sustainable 
development and general prosperity;  
6. Empowering rural and local communities by enabling access to economic 
activities, land, infrastructure, ownership, and skills; and  
7. Promoting access to finance for BEE.  
BBBEE will be discussed with reference to the three elements, the six principles 
underlying BBBEE, as well as the core components underlying BBBEE and BBBEE 
scorecards. 
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   The three elements underlying BBBEE 2.4.8.1
According to the DTI (2004) there are three elements that underlie BEE. These 
elements stipulate that BEE is a balanced broad-based strategy, an inclusive 
process and serves as a national growth strategy for the highest forms of good 
corporate governance. 
• BBBEE is broad-based. 
The BBBEE process aims to increase de-racialisation of the South African 
economy and to “fast track the re-entry of the HDSA communities in the 
mainstream of the economy” (DTI, 2004:7). Broad-based refers to obtaining a 
balanced strategy that tackles ownership, management, employment equity, skills 
development, preferential procurement, enterprise development and other areas 
of the BEE scorecard. 
• BBBEE is an inclusive process. 
This element advocates that every entity, private or public should participate in 
achieving the goals of BBBEE. This strategy should span across participators in 
all sectors of the economy. 
• BBBEE is part of South Africa’s growth strategy which must be associated 
with highest standards of good governance. 
The focus of this element is not just about redistribution of wealth, but the BBBEE 
process must ensure growth, expansion and venture development. Finally, 
BBBEE must be associated with the highest standards of corporate practice. 
  The six key principles for executing BBBEE 2.4.8.2
The key principles for executing BBBEE are recorded in the DTI (2004) statement 
policy. The elements are required to: 
1. Be measurable. 
2. Have sound economic principle. 
3. Have substance over form. 
4. Be comparable. 
5. Be reliable. 
6. Be complete and timely. 
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   The three core components of BBBEE 2.4.8.3
The three core components driving the implementation of BBBEE are categorised as 
direct empowerment, indirect empowerment and human resources development. 
Robertshaw (2006:24) reports that direct empowerment is measured by ownership, 
management indicators, and control of business and assets by black persons. 
Burger and Jafta (2006) report that management is measured by the number of 
black persons and other groups of HDSA representation in executive management, 
such as representation on the board of directors and board committees. Indirect 
empowerment is measured by preferential procurement, enterprise development and 
residual elements indicators. Lastly, the human resources development component 
is measured by employment equity and skills development indicators pertaining to 
black people. Table 2.2 shows the components of BBBEE: 
Table  2.2: The core components of the BBBEE 
Component Beneficiary 
1. Direct Empowerment 
Equity holders, executives, and other owners and 
managers of economic resources 
2. Indirect Empowerment 
Suppliers, communities and other relevant 
stakeholders 
3. Human Resources Development Employees and job seekers 
Source: Adapted from DTI (2004:12) 
 
   BBBEE Codes of Good Practice  2.4.8.4
The Codes of Good Practice are applicable to all industries that are active in the 
economy. They provide transformation standards, detailed targets, the proposed way 
of achieving targets and performance measures all tied to an official authentication 
procedure (Arya & Bassi, 2009). The reason for existence of the Codes of Good 
Practice is to aid and inform the state and private entities of the execution of the 
BBBEE Act. These Codes of Good Practice provide standards and procedures that 
would drive and move forward the execution of the BBBEE in a significant and 
sustainable manner (DTI, 2004).  
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The Codes of Good Practice are discussed below: 
Ownership - means that the HDSA should be allowed to own, manage and control 
enterprises.  
Management control - recommends that the practice of BEE should enable HDSAs 
to have management stakes in the businesses that contribute to the country’s 
economic development. This means that ownership of assets and enterprises by 
HDSAs must be a domineering benefit providing evidence for authentic participation 
in decision making at board level, executive management and operational levels. 
HDSAs should also be allowed to take risks (DTI, 2004:125). Since one of the 
transformation objectives of management control is representation of HDSAs on the 
board and executive management, the key principles of management control are:  
• the individual must be a member of the governing body i.e. responsible for policy 
formulation, strategic planning, or planning, directing and coordinating the 
policies and the activities of the enterprise,  
• the individual must be a member having an equity interest in the equity of an 
enterprise, such as being a shareholder of a company limited by shareholding or 
a shareholder in a cooperative society,  
• be a member of a close corporation,  
• a partner in a partnership,  
• a beneficiary in a trading trust, or  
• be the sole proprietor in a sole proprietorship.  
In any of the above scenarios it is also expected that the individual must have voting 
rights that are expressed as a percentage of the votes to which the member is 
entitled, over the total number of votes to which all members of that enterprise are 
entitled at meetings held by the enterprise. 
The management of black control can be calculated as the weighted proportion of 
HDSAs represented on the governing body of the enterprise. Different weightings will 
apply to non-executives and executive representatives, based on operational 
decision-making capabilities. A full-time or executive manager is a representative 
who participates in the day-to-day management of the enterprise’s affairs and gives 
continuous attention to the affairs of the enterprise. A non-executive manager does 
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not undertake any day-to-day operational affairs and their duties are of an 
intermittent nature, performed at periodic management meetings. 
Table 2.3, below, shows that HDSA representation, other than a black female, in a 
CEO/ Financial Officer or Chairman position will normally be allocated 2 points, 
whereas a black female CEO appointment will be allocated 3 points. For a non-
Executive Chairman position, a normal allocation will be 1 point but for black females 
this will be increased to 1.5 points. For positions, such as non-Executive Directors 
represented by an HDSA, a 0.5 point is allocated, whilst for a black female 
representation 0.75 points is allocated. This indicates that black women 
representation will be granted a 50% increase. This implies that female black 
representation in executive positions is deemed important by the government as it 
has higher ratings. 
Table  2.3:  Governing body positions at executive level 
Governing body position Allocation Black women allocation 
Chief Executive Officer/ Chief Financial Officer/ Chief Operating 
Officer/ Chairman 
2.00 3.00 
Other executive members of the governing body 
Non-Executive Chairman 
1.00 1.5 
Non-Executive members of the governing body 0.5 0.75 
Source: Adapted from DTI (2004:12) 
 
Employment equity - this scorecard refers to initiatives utilised to attain equity in the 
workplace by (1) promoting equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment 
through the removal of inequitable discrimination, and (2) implementing affirmative 
action measures to equalise the disadvantages in the employment experienced by 
HDSAs in order to ensure their equitable account in all occupational categories and 
levels in the workplace. Companies are required to abide by the requirements of the 
Employment Equity Act. The Employment Equity Act aims to enforce participation of 
HDSAs in the running, professional and executive decision-making activities of the 
companies employing them (DTI, 2004). 
Skills development - in the perspective of the BEE Act, it refers to the development 
of focal competencies and technical skills of HDSAs to exercise their practice in the 
mainstream of the economy (DTI, 2004).  
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Preferential procurement - this is a measure intended to expand market entrance 
for entities, in order to incorporate them into the majority of the economy. This 
implies that the HDSA will indirectly benefit from this as private and public entities 
are forced to use HDSA businesses (DTI, 2004). 
Enterprise development - the BBBEE Act aims to promote the participation of 
HDSAs in economic activities through offering considerable support for enterprise 
development, especially to women black entrepreneurs, cooperatives and 
designated groups. The government perceives that sustainable small, micro, and 
medium enterprises (SMME) will create employment and improve the economy of 
the country. 
Socio economic development - refers to the improvement of social and economic 
status of HDSAs by eliminating poverty, providing integrated educational 
programmes, and provision of healthcare. 
2.4.9 The Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002  
Mineral resources are acknowledged as state resources and are governed by the 
Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002 (MPRDA). The MPRDA 
has replaced the Minerals Act, 1991 (DME, 2004). The Minerals Act of 1991 had 
secured mineral rights in private individuals consisting of the previously advantaged 
South Africans (DMR, 2009:20). The MPRDA was effected by the obvious new 
political dispensation after 1994 that included: 
• a change in politics driven by reconciliation and peace negotiations,  
• the globalisation of the South African mining industry with the free trade of 
mineral resources to the global arena, and  
• the beginning of sustainable development as a complete system to substitute the 
environmental management approach (Cawood, 2004) with a view to promoting 
mineral investment in South Africa.  
This regulatory framework has vested the “custodianship of mineral rights to the 
state” (DMR, 2009:20) and aims to be globally competitive with efficient 
administration (Cawood, 2004). In general the MPRDA monitors and documents the 
transformation of national mineral and mining policies (Van der Zwan & Nel, 2010). 
These policies aim to “redress the results of the past based on race, gender or other 
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disability of HDSA in the minerals and petroleum’s industry, related industries and in 
the value chain of such industries” (Republic of South Africa, 2002:10) . 
The MPRDA states that the mining sector has the duty to guarantee that mining 
exploitation of minerals shall benefit the economy, adhere to corporate social 
responsibility issues, safety, health, skills development and provision of employment 
opportunities to the HDSA (Chamber of Mines, 2007). Mineral rights and ownership 
are at the core of the MPRDA (Cawood, 2004). The Act tackles numerous matters 
including (1) transformation of the minerals and mining industry, (2) promotion of 
equitable access to South Africa’s mineral resources, (3) promotion of investment in 
exploration, (4) mining and mineral beneficiation, (5) socio-economic development of 
South Africa, and (5) environmental sustainability of the mining industry (DME, 
2004:1). 
In presenting the events that led to the shaping of the legislation related to minerals 
and petroleum, Cawood (2004: 54) reports that the MPRDA has incorporated some 
of the clauses of the ANC’s Freedom Charter of 1955. It also included the objectives 
of the RDP programme in 1994 which articulated that the previous system of mineral 
rights prevented the ultimate development of mining and essential use of urban land. 
The manifesto stressed the taking back of private mineral rights by the new 
government (Cawood, 2004). The MPRDA has also taken into account the 
constitutional claim of acts to administer and preside over employment equity and 
the empowerment of HDSAs. 
The MPRDA steering committee further took into consideration the 1998 White 
Paper on the Minerals and Mining Policy for South Africa. In this policy the 
committee looked at BEE policy instruments (MPRDA, 2002), namely: 
• Promotion of small-scale mining through a special licensing arrangement. 
• Access for small-scale miners to government information and technical expertise, 
as well as government facilitating access to finance. 
• Engineering a wider spread of ownership in the mineral sector focusing on BEE 
and the promotion of employee share-ownership schemes. 
• People issues, such as improving the health and safety of workers, human 
resources development through appropriate education and training programmes, 
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representation of all South Africans in the appointment of staff, on-mine housing 
and living conditions of workers, preserving mining employment, and  
• The introduction of social plans, which are aimed to benefit the wider economy.  
The MPRDA has a commitment to execute the following strategies: (MPRDA, 
2002:18-19) 
• Changing the ownership of mineral rights to a system where they are exclusively 
state owned. 
• Applying pressure on industry to beneficiate within South Africa’s borders. 
• Forcing mining companies to consider the social welfare of affected people 
working on and living near mining operations as part of the project’s feasibility 
study. 
• Stimulating growth in the small-scale mining industry through easy access to 
mineral resources and information about them. 
Each mining company should develop the following plans to achieve the above 
objectives of the MPRDA, namely, the Exploration plan (work plan), Financial plan, 
Mining Plan, Social Plan, Labour Plan, Environmental Plan, Empowerment Plan and 
the Marketing Plan (Cawood, 2004: 58). 
2.5 SECTOR TRANSFORMATION CHARTERS 
In order to meet the objectives of the BBBEE, several sector transformation charters 
were developed, specifically to accommodate all industry sectors that have a 
significant impact in the economy. The key empowerment charters are the Mining 
Charter, the Petroleum and Liquid Fuel Charters, the Maritime Charter, the Tourism 
Charter, the Financial Services Charter, the ICT Charter, and the Healthcare 
Improvement Charter. All these charters have their specific performance indicators. 
For the purposes of this study, this literature review will focus on the Mining Charter. 
2.5.1 The 2002 Mining Charter  
The 2002 Mining Charter is among the key empowerment charters developed by the 
government, and was informed by transformation concerns (Shabangu, 2010). The 
2002 Mining Charter refers to the “Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment 
Charter for the South African mining and minerals industry (DMR, 2010: v). The 
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Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter for the mining industry is 
concerned with increasing prospects for HDSAs in the mining industry through: the 
ownership of the South African mining industry, the management of mining projects, 
employment by the South African mining industry, worker and community 
participation in the South African mining industry, and sharing the benefits arising 
from the mining industry (Cawood, 2004:56). 
The vision of the 2002 Mining Charter was to facilitate transformation, growth and 
development in the mining industry (Mining Charter, 2004). The purpose of the 2002 
Mining Charter is to facilitate the mining industry to comply with the Broad-Based 
Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter (Fauconnier & Mathur-Helm, 2008). 
However, the shortage and deficiency of relevant skills has been identified as the 
strongest limitation to entering the mining industry (Mining Charter, 2004). 
   Motivation for the 2002 Mining Charter 2.5.1.1
The motivation for the establishment of the 2002 Mining Charter is influenced by the 
following factors (Petmin, 2009): 
• The history of South Africa, which resulted in blacks, mining communities and 
women being largely excluded from participating in the mainstream of the 
economy. In response to the formal mining industry intent on adopting a proactive 
strategy of change to foster and encourage BEE and transformation at all the 
tiers of ownership, management, skills development, employment equity, 
procurement and rural development. 
• The imperative of redressing historical and social inequalities as stated by the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, in, among other things, Section 9 on 
equality (and unfair discrimination) in the Bill of Rights. 
• The policy objective stated in the MPRDA to expand opportunities for HDSA to 
enter the mining and minerals industry or benefit from the exploitation of the 
nation’s mineral resources. 
• The scarcity of relevant skills identified as one of the barriers to entry into the 
mining sector by HDSAs.  
• The slow progress made with employment equity in the mining industry 
compared with other industries, and  
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• Government’s recognition that women, mining communities, and black people 
were excluded from partaking in mining activities.  
   Objectives of the 2002 Mining Charter 2.5.1.2
The overall goal of the 2002 Mining Charter is to develop a strong viable mining 
industry that will benefit all South African citizens and promote fair admission to the 
nation’s minerals to all. The main objectives of the 2002 Mining Charter is to 
(Cawood, 2004:57; DME, 2004): 
• Promote equitable access to the nation’s mineral resources to all the people of 
South Africa; 
• Substantially and meaningfully expand opportunities for HDSAs, including 
women, to enter the mining and mineral industry and to benefit from the 
exploitation of the nation’s mineral resources, 
• Utilise the existing skills base for the empowerment of HDSAs, 
• Expand the skills base of HDSAs in order to serve the community, 
• Promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of mining 
communities and the major labour sending areas, and  
• Beneficiation of South Africa’s mineral commodities. 
In order to achieve these objectives, the mining scorecard was developed as an 
instrument to measure performance with its own targets for individual companies. 
The 2004 Mining Scorecard is reviewed in Section 2.7 together with the revised 2010 
Mining Scorecard. In the section below the 2002 Mining Charter impact assessment 
that was completed in 2009, will be discussed. This assessment was done to check 
the progress made after the development of the 2002 Mining Charter. 
   The 2002 Mining Charter Impact Assessment completed in 2009 2.5.1.3
The following findings were presented from the Mining Charter Impact Assessment 
released to the public in 2010. These conclusions were based on the assessment 
that was done by the Minister of Mineral Resources to evaluate the progress made 
by the industry in complying with the requirements of the 2002 Mining Charter and 
the 2004 Mining Scorecard (DME, 2009:4-16): 
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• HDSA’s in Management (including Women in mining): 
The mining companies are frequently appointing HDSAs in support functions 
disparate to core business appointments and executive management positions. 
The core business positions and executive management positions within mining 
companies are occupied by white South Africans (men and women) segregating 
the HDSAs. Minister Susan Shabangu called for the clarification of the meaning 
of HDSA, as a result of this finding. 
• Women participation in mining 
The results disclose that only 26% of mining companies have conformed to the 
10% women (all-encompassing white women) involvement in mining companies. 
In fact, the standard rate of women participation is 6%. In general, women are 
employed in support functions with less than 1% occupying core management 
and executive management positions. Minister Shabangu also highlighted that it 
should be noted that most core management and executive management 
positions represented by HDSAs were occupied by white females.  
• Talent pool identification and fast tracking 
About 83% of mining companies have not identified a talent pool, with only 17% 
fast tracking those recognised for management positions. Employment samples 
in the mining industry reveal that the mainstream HDSA is still employed in 
bottom level positions. The goal of 40% of HDSA partaking in management, as 
stated in the Mining Charter, has proved to be difficult to realise. This weakness is 
supplemented by a report from the Human Rights Commission released on 4 
November 2008 that authenticates these results. The Human Rights Commission 
report describes the lack of conformity by mining companies with the employment 
equity objectives in terms of race and gender representation. Findings from these 
reports are similar to the results of the 9th Employment Equity Commission report 
which emphasised that white South Africans continue to occupy top management 
positions and earn higher salaries than blacks, regardless of skills, qualifications 
and experience in companies. 
The assessment further revealed that “the occurrence of racially discriminatory 
exercises in the mining industry, which impacted harmfully on the progress towards 
the attainment of equitably transformed place of work. The lack of investment in 
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HDSA skills development by the industry has created an inadequate pool of 
expertise necessary to effect meaningful gender and racial representation. As a 
result, retention of a few skilled HDSAs in companies has proven to be a challenge. 
There is evidence that progress on employment equity remains minimal, with most 
mining companies developing equity plans for regulatory compliance purposes” 
(DMR, 2009:9).  
Although the 2002 Mining Charter and scorecard was well received by mining 
executives as a measure to attend to governmental transformation concerns, Tupy 
(2002) noted that the well-intended Mining Charter possibly would be a formula for 
disaster especially for managerial level appointments. He argued that South Africa 
has a shortage of qualified management candidates, and although the government 
was aware of this deficiency, it did not provide clear measurements through its 
scorecard. The mining industry privately viewed that the 2002 Mining Charter 
affected expansions and growth of their businesses in their effort to comply (Tupy, 
2002). 
   The amendment of The Mining Charter in 2010 2.5.1.4
The amendment of the Mining Charter, launched in September 2010, was done by 
the Department of Mineral Resources after the review of the transformation progress 
of the mining industry against the objectives of the Mining Charter (DMR, 2010) that 
were set in 2002. The progress review revealed weaknesses in the execution of the 
elements of the Mining Charter. Indeed, Minister Shabangu reported that the 
transformation progress in the mining industry was “disappointingly slow” 
(Shabangu, 2010). Minister Shabangu further reported that the gender and racial 
distribution of the employees in the mining industry do not reflect the demographics 
and diversity of South Africa. The Minister asserted that this industry is heavily 
dominated by white men and females, particularly in top management positions and 
technical positions. Income disparities were also evident, regardless of skills and 
experiences. Furthermore, there was a lack of devotion to develop HDSAs with core 
and critical skills (Shabangu, 2010).  
The aims following the revised charter were to (1) simplify certain vagueness and 
qualms which subsisted beneath the original 2002 Mining Charter; (2) to provide 
more detailed objectives than the 2002 Mining Charter; (3) to restructure and 
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accelerate accomplishment of its objectives (Schoeman, 2010:1); and (4) ultimately 
hone its usefulness in driving transformation and competitiveness in the mining 
industry. The vision of the 2010 Mining Charter is to facilitate sustainable 
transformation, growth and development of the mining industry (Shabangu, 2010). 
The mission of the 2010 Mining Charter is “To give effect to section 100(2) of the 
MPRDA and section 9 of the constitution” (DMR, 2010: ii).  
The amended 2010 Mining Charter kept all the existing elements, but in addition, 
introduced the concept of the sustainable growth of the mining industry to attain the 
sustainable transformation and advancement (DMR, 2010:i). This is discussed briefly 
in the next paragraph. 
 Sustainable development and growth of the mining industry 2.5.1.5
Due to the fact that mineral resources are being depleted and cannot be naturally 
renewed, the exploitation of resources should accentuate the significance of 
maintaining a balance between the economic benefits and social and environmental 
needs, without compromising the need for upcoming generations to also benefit. 
Each mining company is required to put into practice the requirements of the 
sustainable development guidelines. These guidelines are contained in the 
“Declaration on Strategy for the sustainable growth and meaningful transformation of 
South Africa’s mining industry on 30 June 2010 and in compliance with all relevant 
legislation”. These guidelines contain improvements of the industry’s environmental 
management, and improvements of the industry’s health and safety performance. 
Lastly, the guidelines require the stakeholder’s involvement in improving the 
competence and skills in the national research and development facilities to obtain 
quality, speed, cost effectiveness and integrity of such facilities. Mining companies 
are also required to use these research facilities for the assessment of sections 
across the mining value chain. 
The following section highlights the key differences between the 2002 and 2010 
Mining Charters. 
  Key differences between the Mining Charters of 2002 and 2010 2.5.1.6
The objectives of the 2002 Mining Charter and the amended 2010 Mining Charter 
are the same with the difference of the latter being referred to as “a governmental 
technique to include and ensure sustainable growth and evocative transformation of 
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the mining industry” (DMR, 2010). Other than the introduction of the sustainable 
development item, the key improvement made was the modification of the Mining 
Charter’s measurement instrument, namely, the Mining Scorecard. The modification 
sought to develop more realistic and achievable objectives for mining companies.  
The 2004 Mining Scorecard and the 2010 Mining Scorecard are discussed in the 
next section. 
2.6 THE MINING SCORECARDS 
The Mining Scorecard is regarded as a measurement instrument that provides 
performance criteria for the attainment of the Mining Charter’s objectives. It provides 
mining companies with a structure and a framework to comply with the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002 and the Mining Charter. Like the 
Mining Charters, there are the initial scorecard developed in 2004 and the amended 
scorecard developed in 2010 following the 2002 Mining Charter impact assessment 
completed in 2009. The individual scorecards are discussed below and the key 
differences of the scorecards will end this section. 
2.6.1 The 2004 Mining Scorecard 
The 2004 Mining Scorecard was the first scorecard developed to set transformation 
standards (Cawood, 2004) against which individual companies were measured 
(Fauconnier & Mathur-Helm, 2008). The 2004 Mining Scorecard was informed by the 
elements of the 2002 Mining Charter.  
The 2004 Mining Scorecard was also developed to be in line with the BBBEE Codes 
of Good Practice discussed previously. The scorecard measures the obligation of the 
mining industry at all levels of BEE (Rungan et al., 2005). The Mining Charter 
explains “how to do it” and the Mining scorecard explains “how companies will be 
evaluated” (Rungan et al., 2005:740). The 2004 Mining Scorecard is adapted from 
the Government Gazette, 13 August, 2004. The measurement scorecard is depicted 
in Figure 2.1 below. 
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Source: Adapted from DME (2004) 
Figure  2.1: The Mining Scorecard 
 
   Critique of the 2004 Mining Scorecard 2.6.1.1
Rungan et al. (2005) have raised concerns over the practicability of measurement of 
the 2004 Mining Scorecard by arguing that a yes or no does not provide detail or 
explanations about meeting the requirement and targets. They argued that it was 
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unsuitable as a measurement scale. Rungan et al. (2005) advised the redraft of the 
scorecard to indicate and provide direction to the mining industry of exactly what was 
expected and achieved. The amendment of the Mining Charter in 2010 provided 
more measurable items, scales and targets. The amended mining scorecard is 
discussed next  
2.6.2 The Amended 2010 Mining Scorecard 
The amended 2010 Mining Scorecard serves to supplement the amended Mining 
Charter of 2010. Furthermore, this scorecard was developed to improve clarity on 
the requirements of the scorecard (Miningmix, 2011). Figure 2.4 represents the 





Source: Adapted from DMR (2009) 
Figure  2.2:  Amended 2010 Mining Scorecard 
 
   The employment equity scorecard 2.6.2.1
Diversity and equal representation of race, gender, age, ethnicity, and so on, at all 
employment levels are considered as channels for social solidity, transformation and 
performance in any South African organisation. The Mining Charter’s compliance to 
employment equity standards is measured by the company’s ability to establish a 
plan to achieve an HDSA demographic representation of at least 40% of HDSA 
participation, particularly in the top management category (DMR, 2010:3). These 
categories are necessary and inextricably linked to day-to-day operations or skills 
that enhance the performance of a company and are in scarce supply. Employment 
categories could include artisans, engineers, professionals (i.e. recognised by a 
professional body), and specialists (e.g. surveyor, safety specialist, geologist, 
metallurgist, winding engine driver, environmentalists, technologists, technicians, 
and persons with mining specific qualifications or licenses). An employee must be 
placed in the category that best resembles his/her job. Table 2.4 below represents 
the scoreboard used to calculate targets obtained. Table 2.5 calculates percentage 
points for HDSAs at different management levels. 
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Table  2.4: The scoreboard used to calculate targets obtained 




Male Female Male Female Male Female Female Male 
Top 
management                0   
Senior 
management                0   
Middle 
Management               0   
Junior 
Management               0   
Core & Critical 
Skills (1)               0   
Total of the 
above 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Adapted from DMR (2009) 
 

















2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Max. 
Top 
management  0 0 
 
20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 3 
Senior 
management  0 0 
 
20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 4 
Middle 
Management 0 0 
 
30% 35% 40% 40% 40% 3 
Junior 
Management 0 0 
 
40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 1 
Core and 
Critical Skills 0 0 
 
15% 20% 30% 35% 40% 5 
TOTAL 0 0 
 
          16 
Source: Adapted from DMR (2009) 
 
For Table 2.5, one point will be deducted for every 0.5% below target. Further to the 
above requirements, the mining companies should spot and fast track their current 
talent pools to give them experience of high quality exposure through career 
pathway curriculum development or programmes. In addition, each company has to 
publish its employment equity plan for both lower and top management levels 
(Cawood, 2004) and report its progress in meeting its set objectives on an annual 
basis. Lastly, each company has to establish a plan to achieve the target of 10% for 
the participation of women in mining within five years of the formulation of plans to 
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ensure higher levels of inclusiveness and the advancement of women (Republic of 
South Africa, 2002).  
   Human resources development scorecard 2.6.2.2
Human resources development represents a significant contribution to social 
transformation and continued growth in a company. The mining industry must 
achieve the following objectives by 2014 (DMR, 2010:3): 
• Apply and provide a certain percentage of annual payroll (as per applicable 
legislation) in required skills development activities that are contemplative of 
demographics (excluding compulsory skills levy), and  
• Offer support for the national research that is based on development initiatives 
and recommendations or solutions in exploration, mining processing, technology 
efficient use (energy and water use in mining), beneficiation and environmental 
conservation and rehabilitation. 
• Year 2010 Target = 3%  
• Year 2011 Target = 3.5%  
• Year 2012 Target = 4%  
• Year 2013 Target = 4.5% 
• Year 2014 Target = 5%  
The mining industry is required to present a skills audit in which the skills 
development plan is featured. Some of the long-term goal requirements are to grant 
scholarships and bursaries that support mining education. For the immediate goals, 
the mining industry is required to provide entrepreneurship programmes and provide 
literacy and numeracy as part of adult education (Cawood, 2004). Table 2.6 (below) 
is used as a scorecard to calculate total HRD expenditure, excluding the mandatory 
skills development levy. It is calculated in million Rands. 
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Table  2.6: Total HRD expenditure (excluding mandatory skills development levy) in R million 
Expenditure items 
African Coloured Indian 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
a) Learnership              
b) Artisans and apprentices             
c) ABET Training              
d) Other training initiatives              
e) Bursaries and scholarships             
f) Transfer of skills and capacity 
building of mine communities             
g) Other school support & post 
matric programmes             
h) Support for South African based 
research and development 
initiatives             
i) Total HRD expenditure  
  (R million) (A) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Adapted from DMR (2009) 
   Mine community development scorecard 2.6.2.3
It is generally known that mining activities are typically situated in remote and under-
developed areas of the country (Shabangu, 2010). Mining communities are often 
neglected by the mining companies. As a result, there are tensions between these 
communities and mining companies regarding the welfare of communities and 
mineworkers (Shabangu, 2010). The 2010 Mining Charter requires that the mining 
industry contributes meaningfully towards developing communities in terms of size 
and impact. The mining industry should adhere to the conditions of the social licence 
to operate in those communities and prepare plans for community development 
(Cawood, 2004). Mining stakeholders should: 
• Review global best practices in terms of policies, principles and guidelines. The 
principles require mining companies to be devoted to ethnographic discussions 
and consultations through concerted efforts before engaging with mining projects, 
development and implementation.  
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• Perform a needs assessment on the community to establish their developmental 
focus areas. In their projects, the mining companies should establish projects to 
match the needs for community development and these details should be 
incorporated in their Integrated Development Plans. 
   Housing and living conditions scorecard 2.6.2.4
The mineworkers should be given respect and human dignity by improving their 
housing and living conditions with the view to increasing home ownership schemes 
(Cawood, 2004). This act will accelerate transformation and increase the productivity 
of mineworkers (Shabangu, 2010). The scorecard states that the mining industry 
should be able to execute development plans to improve the housing and living 
conditions of mineworkers by the following activities: 
• Convert or upgrade hostels into family units by 2014. 
• Attain the occupancy rate of one person per room by 2014. 
• Facilitate home ownership options for all mine employees in consultation with 
organised labour by 2014. 
Research offered by Danasereau (2010:88) revealed that when family housing is 
established at the mines, it results in the creation of permanent communities in 
underdeveloped areas. If this is not done properly, if could be detrimental to workers, 
the environment and lead to the disruption of traditional communities. 
   Procurement and Enterprise Development scorecard 2.6.2.5
This scorecard promotes the purchase of locally made goods and services from BEE 
entities by companies in the mining industry. This goal is promoted with a view to 
developing partnerships with HDSA ventures (Cawood, 2004). This action promotes 
transformation, allows prospects to increase growth in the economy, contributes to 
employment creation and finally expands the capacity for market access of local 
capital goods and services. The procurement from BEE entities should be in 
agreement with the following criteria: (DMR, 2010:2). 
• Purchase of at least 40% of capital goods from BEE entities by 2014. 
• Ensure that multinational suppliers of capital goods annually contribute at least 
0.5 per cent of the annual income generated from local mining companies into a 
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social development fund towards the socio-economic development of local 
communities. This should be in place by 2010. 
• Purchase 70 per cent of services and 50 per cent of consumer goods from BEE 
entities by 2014. 
 Ownership mining scorecard 2.6.2.6
The mining assets ownership has shown little change in the transfer of rights and 
ownership. It is prevailed by the racial and gender disparity. Shabangu (2010) 
reports that the racial ownership pattern of mining assets has mainly remained 
untransformed, BEE ownership was aimed at 15 per cent against 8.9 per cent 
achieved. The ownership scorecard seeks to provide the means for HDSAs to 
participate in the economy through the following initiatives (DMR, 2010:1): 
• Achieve a minimum target of 26 per cent ownership (Cawood, 2004) to enable 
meaningful economic participation of HDSAs by 2014 as compared to 40 per cent 
set in the first draft of the Mining Charter of 2002 (Shabangu, 2010). 
• The only offsetting permissible under the ownership element is against the value 
of beneficiation, as provided for by Section 26 of the MPRDA and elaborated in 
the mineral beneficiation framework. 
   Beneficiation scorecard 2.6.2.7
The beneficiation scorecard aims to convert the comparative advantage in mineral 
resources inheritance into a competitive advantage to improve industrialisation. As a 
result mining companies are required to ensure local beneficiation of mineral 
products by submitting to the requirements of the MPRDA Section 26 mineral 
beneficiation strategy (DMR, 2010). Mining companies may compensate the value of 
the level of beneficiation achieved by the company against a portion of its HDSA 
ownership requirements not exceeding 11 per cent. 
   Reporting mining scorecard 2.6.2.8
The reporting scorecard is the monitoring and evaluation scorecard. The mining 
industry must report on its echelon of conformity to the Mining Charter on a yearly 
basis with reference to the MPRDA Section 28(2) (c). Such acts will be evaluated by 
the Department of Minerals and Energy on an annual basis (DMR, 2010) and formal 
assessments will be performed every five years. 
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2.6.3 Key differences between the Mining scorecards of 2004 and 2010 
The key differences between the 2004 and 2010 mining scorecards are the 
modifications to the measurement items. The 2010 Mining Scorecard has provided 
more measurable items, which are evaluated against a clearly defined set of criteria, 
compared to the 2004 Mining Scorecard which used a yes/no to provide 
conformance feedback. 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
Certainly, the regulations, statutory framework and the mining scorecards have 
provided an abundance of transformation goals that are expected from mining 
companies. Compliance targets are reflected in the 2004 and 2010 Mining 
Scorecards. These are in line with the objectives of the Mining Charter, the Chamber 
of Mines and the Minerals and Petroleum’s Resources Development Act of 2002.  
This literature study revealed that the mining industry is still faced with challenges in 
response to conformance with the requirements of the Mining Scorecard. The lack of 
conformance, specifically to the EE scorecard, was motivated by numerous factors, 
such as the lack of skills, experience and qualifications of HDSAs preventing them 
from occupying leadership or executive management positions, the unrealistic 
expectations of the initial 2004 Mining Scorecard, and the vagueness of the 2004 
Mining Scorecard. Literature revealed that the term HDSA also needs clarification 
because it was described differently in the Mining Charters and the BBBEE Act. The 
next progress review in conformance to the revised mining scorecard targets will be 
measured by the government in 2014. The results will determine the status of 
transformation in the mining industry. 
In closing, compliance with the charter objectives forms an important goal of 
governance within mining companies. Furthermore, compliance to codes of 
governance is associated with good governance and certainly good governance 
shows that an important part of the economic restructuring and transformation is 
improving the quality and transparency of all economic activity. As a result, EE 
scorecard implementation must be linked with and ensure the highest standards of 
corporate governance to ensure that the quality of corporate boards and governance 
is enhanced.  
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Chapter 3 will include a section on a Framework of Corporate Governance. This 
chapter will give insight on board composition, board diversity and the criteria for the 




 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE BOARD OF CHAPTER 3  
DIRECTORS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Past research and topical areas in board and governance research have focused on 
diverse boards in terms of gender, race and functional background (Carter, Simkins 
& Simpson, 2003; Krus, Morgan & Ginsberg, 2012). Directors of boards are 
responsible for providing strategic direction in the organisation. Therefore, 
understanding how directors are chosen is crucial, as the ones elected provide 
leadership (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988:589). As a result, the choice of directors to 
serve on boards should be carefully implemented. This chapter investigates 
corporate governance in South Africa as a proposed guideline to guide the behaviour 
and practice of organisational boards. The focus is specifically on board composition, 
board diversity, the board appointment process, and HDSA representation on the 
board of directors.  
In the review to follow, corporate governance is contextualised to provide a 
theoretical and a holistic understanding of its relevance, both globally and locally. 
This contextualisation includes the dominant theories on corporate governance and 
key themes that emerged from governance studies regarding board composition. 
Such theories include the agency theory, resource dependence theory, institutional 
theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory and the power perspective theory.  
This review is followed by best practice governance systems whereby the universal 
and local codes on governance are presented. Global governance systems reviewed 
include the Cadbury Report, the Greenbury Report and the Hampel Report. Locally, 
the King codes of governance, namely, the King I, II and III reports are reviewed. 
The final part of the chapter covers the diversity characteristics of boards. It reviews 
board roles, board structure, board composition, the importance of board diversity, 
and the board selection or appointment processes. It is important to note that this 
chapter takes a holistic view on the corporate governance of all organisations, but 
guiding principles will be applied to the mining industry.  
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3.2 CONCEPTUALISATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Corporate governance is regarded as “the system by which companies are directed 
and controlled” (Rossouw, Watt & Malan, 2002:289). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
explain that corporate governance was developed to control managers’ self-interests 
in order to protect owner or shareholder interests. It therefore, serves as a formal 
system of accountability of the board of directors to guard the interests of 
shareholders (Ehlers & Lazenby, 2010). Others add that corporate governance is 
about the formal and informal relationships between the corporate sector and its 
stakeholders and the impact of the corporate sector on society in general (Louw & 
Venter, 2010). Similarly, the IoD (2002) views corporate governance as the “the goal 
of aligning as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society 
through four pillars, i.e. fairness, accountability, responsibility and accountability 
(IoD, 2002). It involves the establishment of structures and processes with 
appropriate checks and balances that enable directors to discharge their legal 
responsibilities and oversee compliance with legislation” (IoD, 2009:6). Per se 
corporate governance concerns “the legal, institutional, and cultural mechanisms that 
help owners and stakeholders to exercise control over corporate insiders and 
management” (Randøy, Thomsen & Oxelheim, 2006:4). This research adopts the 
definition of Rossouw et al. (2002) that defines corporate governance as a system by 
which companies are directed and controlled. The conception of corporate 
governance is explained below in relation to the evolution of theories on corporate 
governance, namely, the agency theory, resource dependence theory, institutional 
theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory and the power perspective theory.  
3.2.1 The agency theory 
The primary theory that dominates corporate governance thinking is the agency 
theory (Daily et al., 2003; Dalton, Daily, Certo & Roengpitya, 2003). This theory can 
be used to structure relations between managers and owners (Yeh & Taylor, 2008), 
following the separation of ownership and control of organisation (Rossouw et al., 
2002). The agency theory views the organisation as an agency, owners as principals 
and managers as agents (Eisenhardt, 1989). It implies that managers would 
maximise the returns of shareholders, provided that the necessary governance 
structures are executed (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). The issue with management 
55 
control was the mistrust by owners (shareholders) that managers (executives) could 
take advantage of the control function of the corporation to serve their own needs 
(Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003). This means an agency loss based on the difficulty 
and high cost for the principal to verify how the agent/manager/executive has 
executed his/her responsibilities (Eisenhardt, 1989). Further, agency loss may be a 
result of issues on risk sharing that appears when the principal and agent have 
dissimilar approaches towards risk. This position views the agents as more risk 
unenthusiastic than the principals. 
Through the Shareholder Activism Act (Daily et al., 2003), the agency theory enables 
shareholders to pursue internal and external systems to dissuade managers’ self-
interest. Internal systems view the board of directors as a fundamental internal 
governance mechanism (Ruigrok, Peck & Tacheva, 2007; Yeh & Taylor, 2008) which 
includes, (1) having a structured board to assume the role of corporate control and 
monitoring (Carter et al., 2003; Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Yeh & Taylor, 2008), (2) 
enhancing strong ownership holdings of shareholders that enable monitoring of the 
board of directors, and (3) putting in place compensation contracts that encourage 
shareholder orientation. Compensation contracts could include senior managers 
obtaining shares at a bargain value to match interests (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). In 
essence, agents are paid employees responsible for the running of the operations of 
the business, and the board of directors are the mechanism to ensure that the paid 
employees (agents) will act in a way that will satisfy shareholders in a control and 
monitoring role (Yeh & Taylor, 2008). 
The limitations of the agency theory include the assumption that the organisation is 
made up of two parties, namely, the principals and agents, whilst it has other parties 
in the environment to consider (Daily et al., 2003; Yeh & Taylor, 2008). Chelladurai 
(2005) supported this view, arguing that an organisation functions in an open system 
that impacts, or is impacted on, by occurrences in the external environment in which 
the organisation functions. Therefore, the board has to be in engagement with the 
external environment to keep the organisation in balance compared to the sole 
monitoring function of the agency theory. These limitations led to the development of 
other theories to describe the liaison between the organisation and the external 
environment, by suggesting that the board includes outside directors. These theories 
56 
include the resource dependence theory, the institutional theory and the stakeholder 
theory (Yeh & Taylor, 2008).   
3.2.2 The resource dependence theory 
The resource dependence theory is regarded as a complementary theory to the 
agency theory. It states that the prosperity of the organisation depends on the ability 
of the organisation to obtain and preserve resources vital for the organisation 
(Randøy et al., 2006; Yeh & Taylor, 2008) from the external environment (Ruigrok et 
al., 2007). This theory provides hypothetical development of the role of directors as 
resources connecting the organisation and its external environment, expanding the 
primary administrative function of control and monitoring (Miller-Millesen, 2003). This 
theory aims to address the argument that the board of directors acts as restrictive 
and peripheral agents of the company and the environment in which it operates. It 
also recommends that directors’ responsibilities are to connect the organisation with 
its external environment, to decrease external uncertainty, obtain access to crucial 
information, to gather resources such as networks and contacts (Randøy, et al., 
2006; Ruigrok et al., 2007) and to represent organisations (Daily, Dalton & 
Rajagopalan, 2003; Mcnulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Yeh & Taylor, 2008). Other 
suggestions were the inclusion of outside directors on the board who also serve as 
executives from financial and legal institutions to provide legal and financial advice to 
the corporate board. These resources are viewed as contributors to organisational 
prosperity and performance (Daily et al., 2003) as it would be less costly if 
companies need to seek external advice. 
3.2.3 The institutional theory 
Complementary to both the agency and resource dependence theory, the 
institutional theory supports the organisation to be in connection with the external 
environment but takes it further. The institutional theory recognises the need for the 
organisation to be aware of the rules, regulations and restrictive organisational 
practices in the environments in which it operates (Lynall, Golden & Hillman, 2003). 
This theory appreciates that universal ways of doing things ultimately become 
acceptable practises that are adopted. In most instances, the organisations will have 
to change their ways and learn to adopt acceptable practices, rules and regulations. 
As such, board roles in institutional theory have evolved due to learned ways of 
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doing things (Miller-Millesen, 2003), such as attending board meetings, conforming 
to rules and regulations that affect the company, completing mandatory paperwork, 
maintaining good financial management systems, and keeping away from conflict of 
interests (Miller-Millesen, 2003; Yeh & Taylor, 2008). These roles further require the 
organisation to adapt to change due to political, and globalisation changes and 
changing rules and regulations thereof.  
A limitation of the institutional theory is that it did not provide reasons why and how 
the organisations were prone to refuse or accept change (Yeh & Taylor, 2008). 
According to Slack and Parent (2006) refusal to accept change derive from the 
resistance of interest groups, high cost of change, and lack of understanding of 
change. In these circumstances, the board would have to come up with other 
strategies to replace, ignore, accept change or negotiate with parties involved (Yeh & 
Taylor, 2008 ). In most instances, government will require organisations to adapt and 
comply with change, as failure to conform to institutional expectations may result in 
punishments, fines, and a loss of government support. As a result, and because of 
resistance to change, the board may just fulfil the mandatory paperwork (Yeh & 
Taylor, 2008) and cosmetically present conformance (Luoma & Goodstein, 1999).  
Similar to the institutional theory, are the internal and external drivers of corporate 
governance, developed by Mensah in 2003. Mensah (2003) reported that external 
drivers of good corporate governance are the laws, rules and initiatives that result in 
competitive performance that discipline the actions of directors or shareholders. 
Internal drivers represent shareholders, boards of directors, management and 
business operations. The internal drivers must be responsive to stakeholder needs 
and their actions must be ethically based. The essence of this view is that the ethical 
behaviour of the internal drivers should allow cooperation with the views and 
objectives of external stakeholders (Mensah, 2003; Young, 2010).  
According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) (2002), 
governments are responsible for encouraging good governance and ensuring 
monitoring thereof. UNECA has highlighted that good corporate governance is 
characterised by the abilities of institutes to (1) have the competence to administer 
resources effectively, (2) be able to formulate, implement, and enforce sound 
policies and regulations, (3) be monitored and be held accountable, and (4) have 
respect for the norms and rules of economic interaction. All these factors will ensure 
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transparency in the private sector and ensure a favourable environment wherein the 
private sector can grow and develop institutional effectiveness (UNECA, 2002; 
Young, 2010). 
3.2.4 The stakeholder theory 
Further to the institutional theory, the stakeholder theory identifies possible 
organisational stakeholders. This theory deems the organisation as a shared body 
that is responsible and accountable to a variety of stakeholders, such as owners or 
shareholders, suppliers, customers, employees, government and local communities 
(West, 2006:434). As a result, organisations have to find a way to meet the needs of 
all stakeholders’ interests (Yeh & Taylor, 2008), and the basic role of the board of 
directors is to recognise, be aware of and meet the needs of each stakeholder 
(Carver, 1997).  
3.2.5 The stewardship theory 
The stewardship theory gained popularity among researchers as an opposing and 
proponent theory to the agency theory. While the agency theory views the managers 
and the board of directors as self-serving and opportunistic, this theory suggests that 
their interests are the same but different from those of shareholders. This theory 
states that managers and the board of directors are also concerned with the strategic 
performance of the business and are dedicated to operate the company’s business 
activities in a manner that increases the performance of the business (Daily et al., 
2003). Managers often possess the motivation to perform and be good stewards for 
the organisation (Barney, 1980; Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Particularly when the 
managers have worked for the organisation for a long time, they are more likely to 
have emotional bonds with the organisation and view its success as a reflection of 
their performance. This implies that the motivation to perform cannot be undermined. 
The stewardship theory also deducts that the structure in which the manager is 
placed plays a critical role, in that it determines whether the manager will be allowed 
to perform (Donaldson, 1985). This structure should facilitate the strategy of the 
business and allow transparent, reliable role expectations and empower top 
management (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). In this regard the stewardship theory 
recommends CEO duality supporting the notion that the CEO and the chairperson 
should be the same person, in order to have clear lines of authority with a focus of 
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authority and the influence of one person. The organisation benefits from this 
arrangement as there will a unity of direction, strong command and control which will 
enhance facilitative and empowering structures for overall effectiveness (Donaldson 
& Davis, 1991).  
3.2.6 The power perspective theory 
The power perspective theory recognises the prospective variance of interests 
between shareholders, directors and managers (Daily et al., 2003). It led to studies 
that investigated the CEO succession and revealed the existence of power 
relationships between the CEO and the board of directors. Studies done by Shen 
and Canella (2003) suggest that CEOs can practise power over the progression 
process by eliminating potential successor candidates. The period of director 
appointment on the board may also have an influence on power relationships 
between the CEO and the board (Daily et al., 2003). This relationship may stem from 
directors that may feel indebted to the CEO as they were appointed at the same 
time, or from fear of contesting the CEO (Monks & Minow, 1991).  
For this study, these theories give the rationale for the existence and roles of the 
board of directors in companies, specifically South African companies, especially 
JSE listed, where the board of directors is seen as a focal governance mechanism. It 
is not only a requirement for companies to have the board of directors and to report 
on their proactive participation, but the board must constitute of appropriate and 
qualified candidates who will act in the best interest on the company. It implies 
directors who will take responsibility and account for the company’s actions or their 
behaviour. This requires the appointment of directors to be a carefully executed task. 
It can therefore be argued that HDSA appointments should comprise of qualified and 
experienced candidates who will act in the best interest of the company. 
Given the notion that the board of directors should act in the best interest of the 
company, the development of the above theories enabled for the development of the 
best practice governance codes which are discussed in the next section. 
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3.3 GLOBAL AND LOCAL BEST PRACTICE GOVERNANCE CODES 
Globally and locally, a range of codes and principles have been developed to guide 
corporate behaviour. The main objectives of most codes are to create best practices 
to guarantee accountability for behaviour; acting with responsibility and being 
transparent to stakeholders; to create and monitor checks and balances in 
organisations; and to create systems whereby risks are recognised and avoided 
(Burger & Goslin, 2005:2). Discussed below are the Cadbury Report, Greenbury 
Report and the Hampel Report which outline a background on global dominant 
corporate governance codes in terms of chronological importance. Locally, the King 
I, II, and III reports denote acceptable corporate practices for South African 
organisations and they are discussed thereafter. 
3.3.1 The Cadbury Report - 1992 
The Cadbury Report formalised corporate governance globally (Gaved, 1998). It 
provides a framework that individual companies could adopt and refer to, in terms of 
good practices based on individual circumstances (Cadbury Committee Report, 
1992). It further provides appropriate measures for good governance. The Cadbury 
Report describes key concepts of governance, namely, transparent and ethical 
financial reporting and auditing. It also highlights the roles of the board, board 
composition, and auditing and reporting values (Steele, 1999). In support of the 
agency theory, it suggested that the role of the chairperson and the chief executive 
officer be separated to improve internal controls (Burger & Gosling, 2005; Reed, 
2000).  
3.3.2 The Greenbury Report - 1995 
The Greenbury Report aims to increase good governance principles following 
unease over directors’ remuneration, directors’ severance packages, despite 
employee job loss and scale down procedures (Burger & Gosling, 2005; Greenbury 
Report, 1995). This transparent report aimed at initialising a code of practice for the 
transparent disclosure of information and remuneration of directors (Steele, 1999). 
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3.3.3 The Hampel Report - 1998 
After the Hampel Committee on Corporate Governance reviewed the Cadbury and 
the Greenbury reports, they produced the Hampel Report as a comprehensive code 
of corporate governance (Burger & Goslin, 2005; Reed, 2000; Steele, 1999). The 
Hampel Report proposes measures for supervising monetary and non-monetary 
threats and controls. The Hampel Report mainly addresses board performance, 
executive director’s roles, the audit, nomination and remuneration committees, 
contracts of directors, remuneration, disclosure of information, conduct of meetings, 
and training of directors (Hampel Report, 1998; Steele, 1999). The Hampel Report 
was incorporated into the London’s Stock Exchange for consideration as a means of 
self-regulation (Burger & Goslin, 2005:3).  
It is of importance to note that South African companies are also governed by codes 
of conduct. As South Africa is considered to be the economic hub of Africa (Vaughn 
& Ryan, 2006; Young, 2010), it is therefore crucial for South African companies to 
conform to standards of good practice. Furthermore, the return of foreign investors, 
after the collapse of apartheid in 1994, commanded transformation of corporate 
compositions to incorporate practices of accountability, transparency, and fairness to 
all stakeholders (Kakabadse & Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; Vaughn & Ryan, 2006). As 
a result, Mervyn King, a retired judge, was appointed in 1994 to establish a 
commission under the guidance of the Institute of Directors (IOD) to draw up 
guidelines for acceptable governance practices for companies in South Africa (West, 
2006). 
3.3.4 The King I Report on Corporate governance - 1994 (King I) 
The King I Report which was issued in November 1994, institutionalised corporate 
governance in South Africa (IoD, 1994) King I was considered revolutionary as it 
promoted an advancement of good governance in the interest of a wide variety of 
stakeholders (Cliffe Dekker Attorneys, 2002). It was the first report to realise a 
comprehensive guide on good corporate governance and went beyond the financial 
and regulatory factors listed in international governance reports (Burger & Goslin, 
2005). It laid out a guide of the codes of conduct for the corporate board, directors 
and different types of organisations. In addition to good corporate practices, King I 
emphasised the need for organisations to encompass national transformational 
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goals, such as supporting affirmative action programmes in their business plans. The 
developments in legislation such as the Labour Relations Act (No. 66 of 1995), Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act (No.75 of 1997), Employment Equity Act (No. 55 of 
1998), the National Environmental Act (No.107 of 1998), and the listing requirements 
of the JSE and the statutory amendments to the Companies Act (No.61 of 1973) 
necessitated the revision of the King I. 
3.3.5 The King II Report on Corporate Governance - 2002 (King II) 
Issued in March 2002, the King II Report was specially developed to incorporate the 
new legislation, global changes in corporate governance practices, developments in 
information technology, as well as the uncertainties in the economy and the political 
landscape (West, 2006). According to Cliffe Dekker Attorneys (2002), the King II 
report embraces the shift away from single bottom line (acting in the interests of 
shareholders) to a triple bottom line, to embrace the three aspects of company’s 
actions, i.e. economic, environmental and social aspects. It recommends an 
organisation to adopt an inclusive approach (Rossouw et al., 2002) and not an 
exclusive approach, by balancing conformance with good governance and the 
company’s performance (IoD, 2002:19). It does so by recommending sustainability 
reporting for all companies and provides guidelines on how to tackle stakeholder 
concerns (West, 2006:487). This integrated sustainability reporting stipulates that 
each company should report no less than once per annum on its social, 
transformation, and ethics policies and practices. Reporting on these topics should 
include amongst other things:  
• non-financial aspects of the business,  
• transformation progress relating to the implementation of the EE and BEE targets 
and HDSA development to executive management positions,  
• human capital development policies,  
• safety and health concerns,  
• organisational ethics,  
• environmental impact, and  
• social investment policies (Cliffe Dekker Attorneys, 2002).  
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The main aim of the King II was to promote improved economic efficiency for the 
company, to appeal to traditional African values (Ubuntu) and to focus on the current 
socio-economic conditions in South Africa (Burger & Gosling, 2005:3; Rossouw et 
al., 2002; West, 2006). As such, it included the seven characteristics of good 
corporate governance, namely, discipline, transparency, independence, 
accountability, responsibility, fairness and social responsibility (IoD, 2002). The key 
parts of King II encompass the board and its directors, risk management, internal 
and external auditing, and integrated sustainability reporting (Burger & Gosling, 
2005). Even though King II is considered to be still relevant, the worldwide economic 
environment, developments in legislation, global changes in corporate governance 
practices, as well as the uncertainty of the economy and the political landscape 
called for the revision of King II (Cliffe Dekker Attorneys, 2002).  
3.3.6 Report on governance for South Africa - 2009 (King III) 
Issued in May 2009, the requirements for the new King III Report were justified 
because of the following reasons: the new companies act which was scheduled to be 
implemented in 2010, the availability of the King committee and subcommittee to 
compile a further report without remuneration, and the demanding forces to comply 
with comprehensive reporting. Similar to King II, King III views corporate governance 
as a requisite for global recognition, foreign capital flows, and domestic economic 
growth. Therefore, companies in South Africa are facing challenges to be relevant 
and to adhere to global governance practices without neglecting their commitment to 
African renaissance (Rossouw et al., 2002: 301). 
The King III requires companies to either comply with the guidelines, or if they don’t 
comply, to explain their actions (IoD, 2009). This enables companies to function in 
their own unique way, without being bound to follow standards, which are considered 
by nature to be inflexible. King III states that the responsibilities of directors and 
management include a duty of care and skill, and fiduciary duty. The key principles 
of the King III are leadership, sustainability and corporate citizenship. It also 
emphasises integrated sustainability and social transformation, two factors which 
assess the impact of business activities on the economic life of the community 
surrounding business activities. It furthermore, comprehensively recommends 
appropriate board structure, composition and board roles. Relating to the study at 
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hand, King III hopes that the appropriate board structure and composition could play 
a role in providing good leadership, sustainability and social transformation in 
communities. 
The global and local best practice codes of conduct reveal the appropriate behaviour 
for governance of companies. Relating to the study at hand, they recommend board 
composition, structures, and reporting. The King Reports of Governance in South 
Africa specifically recognises the need for social transformation and commitment to 
national transformation and sustainability goals. These include adhering to 
Employment Equity plans and uplifting the lives of previously disadvantaged 
individuals.  
The following section characterises the attributes of good governance. 
3.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE 
Burger and Gosling (2005) state that the responsibility for good governance relies on 
the governing team of the organisation displaying responsible leadership. Therefore, 
leaders are challenged to adapt current governance codes to direct company 
strategies in a transparent and accountable manner. The King III Report emphasises 
seven core characteristics of good governance, namely, discipline, transparency, 
independence, accountability, responsibility, fairness, and social responsibility (IoD, 
2002; Young, 2010:140). These characteristics that were initially presented in the 
King II Report are in harmony with what UNECA wishes to achieve. Young (2010) 
furthermore referred to the elements of a sound African code of corporate 
governance as: transparency, accountability, ethical values and development. This is 
in accordance with Rossouw’s (2005) conclusion that good corporate governance 
should essentially have the values of fairness, accountability, responsibility and 
transparency. These values and characteristics provide recommendations for board 
composition, director’s duties, risk management and internal auditing procedures 
(Burger & Goslin, 2005).  
3.4.1 Accountability 
Accountability is the foremost pillar of good governance and depends upon parties 
and individuals who discharge decision-making responsibilities and who execute 
planning that relates to the management of the organisation. Accountability 
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necessitates that mechanisms be put in place and used efficiently to provide 
stakeholders with a platform to assess decisions that have been made by the board 
and its committees (IoD, 2009; Burger & Goslin, 2005). These mechanisms should 
be supported by the board and its committees to act in an accountable manner 
(Rossouw et al., 2002).  
3.4.2 Responsibility 
The characteristics of accountability and responsibility have been understood to be 
linked in the theories of corporate governance and are thus used interchangeably 
(Burger & Goslin, 2005). However, the King III Report distinguishes between these 
two characteristics by describing that with responsibility there should be a remedial 
enforcement or punishment for mismanagement and non-compliance. Thus, 
according to the IoD (2009) responsibility is concerned with the accountability of the 
board of directors who remain accountable to the company and must operate 
responsibly in the best interest of its stakeholders. Rossouw et al. (2002) state that 
operating responsibly implies giving the organisation a clear direction and taking 
care of both tangible and intangible assets of the organisation. Other measures 
include the commitment to respond to criticism and that all individuals are collectively 
responsible for the decisions taken by the organisation (Burger & Gosling, 2005). 
3.4.3 Transparency 
Transparency relates to how a company presents information about itself that is a 
true reflection of the company, whether it is financial and non-financial information. 
Transparency and accuracy of information include aspects such as communication 
with stakeholders, strategy, decision making and decision-making principles, as well 
as reporting on financial and operational performance (Gaved, 1998; Rauter, 2001). 
The ability of the board to communicate with stakeholders on policy decisions, 
elections, selections, and other executive, legislative, judicial matters and other 
business matters is deemed as transparent behaviour (Burger & Goslin, 2005).  
3.4.4 Social responsibility  
A well-governed company expresses a high precedence of ethical behaviour and 
attends to societal concerns. Corporate social responsibility holds that a company 
should recognise the interests of other stakeholders in the company. These 
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stakeholders include communities and environments in which the company operates 
(Burger & Goslin, 2005; IoD, 2002; Naidoo, 2002; Rossouw et al., 2002). Such acts 
are seen in the involvement in social, economic and environmental issues. These 
include paying attention to social issues by adhering to ethical practices, ensuring 
sustainability of natural resources, and environmental protection and conservation; 
and finally, the company displaying non-discriminatory, non-exploitative behaviour 
towards human rights (Burger & Goslin, 2005). 
3.4.5 Independence 
Independence refers to the degree to which mechanisms have been executed to 
prevent possible conflicts of interest between the board of directors and board 
committees (IoD, 2009; Naidoo, 2002; Rauter, 2001). The IoD (2009) highlighted 
specific measures to avoid conflict, such as independent financial accountants, 
authentic procedures for resolving issues, objective judgment, and liberty from 
internal or external pressures (Burger & Goslin, 2005).   
3.4.6 Fairness 
This characteristic requires companies to treat internal and external stakeholders 
equally and with the same amount of respect. The priority should be to create a 
balanced transparent and equitable consideration for all stakeholders’ needs 
(Naidoo, 2002) to enable the progression and growth of the company. Rossouw et 
al. (2002) raised concerns that an unbalanced mixture on the board of directors may 
affect the decision-making ability of the company because of biased information. The 
measurement of fairness can be deduced from the transparent company policies on 
income redistribution, election, appointment and selection processes and equitable 
representation of stakeholders on the board of directors (Burger & Goslin, 2005; IoD, 
2009). 
3.4.7 Discipline 
Discipline entails a commitment by the company’s executive management to 
conform to actions that are unanimously acceptable, accurate and appropriate (IoD, 
2009; Naidoo, 2002). Behaving in such a manner ensures consciousness of and 
devotion to each characteristic of good governance which is reflected in an ethical 
policy (Burger & Goslin, 2005).  
67 
Relating to the study, the characteristics of corporate governance explained above 
could be adopted as director values and attributes in order to enhance good 
leadership. Directors who act in a transparent manner with regards to the company’s 
actions are, for example, characteristics of good governance. 
Understanding how directors are chosen is crucial to understanding corporate 
organisation and governance. The directors elected will affect the strategic direction 
of the firm (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991).  
In the next section, the board of directors is discussed with relevance to board 
composition, size, diversity and the criteria for director selection and appointment. 
3.5 THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
From the holistic background on corporate governance that has been presented, it is 
apparent that the board of directors is a focal governance mechanism and an 
integral part of the governance structure (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Campbell & 
Minguez-Vera, 2008; Malherbe & Segal, 2001). Board roles can be used to 
determine a suitable structure and composition for the board of directors. However, 
scholars of corporate governance have argued that no single theory can be used to 
effectively understand board roles but that a multi-theoretic approach should be used 
(Goodstein, Gautam & Boeker, 1994; Yeh & Taylor, 2008). The complexity lies in the 
uncertainty regarding the board’s existence, namely whether the board’s role is one 
of an effective management control mechanism, or a management tool, or a rubber-
stamp for management initiatives, or as a decision-making authority on issues such 
as hiring and firing of employees, and the compensation of top management (Main, 
O’Reilly & Wade, 1995; Westphal & Zajac, 1995).  
Given such complexities, it is consensual that the primary role of the board of 
directors is to resolve agency conflicts that arise between shareholders and 
managers (Daily et al., 2003) and corporate control and monitoring (Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990; Miller & Triana, 2009; Pearce & Zahra, 1992). Secondary roles 
include, but are not limited to, providing direction, measuring administrative 
performance, deciding on compensation levels, providing guidance, and supplying 
links to other organisations (Hanson & Song, 2000; IoD, 2009; Malherbe & Segal, 
2001). Other roles include the participation in issues of strategy, performance, 
resources, including key board appointments, standards of conduct and the 
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evaluation of performance (Cliffe Dekker Attorneys, 2002; IoD, 2009). Additional 
critical roles of the board of directors are accountability, auditing, as well as relations 
with shareholders (IoD, 2002; Malherbe & Segal, 2001). Boards are also responsible 
for ensuring an optimal board size, demographics and diversity (IoD, 2009).  
Given all these roles, it is indisputable that the knowledge, expertise and capabilities 
of board members to make sound decisions need to be established (Ruigrok et al., 
2007). As such, the board structure, process, composition, and selection of board 
members are of critical importance (Kakabadse, Kakabadse & Kouzmin, 2001).  
To serve the purpose of the study, the next section will focus on board structure, 
board composition, and the board appointment/selection process.  
3.5.1 Board structure 
Board structure has been the main point of discussion since corporate governance 
first received global attention (Goodstein et al., 1994). The term board structure 
covers board organisation, the role of subsidiary boards in holding companies, board 
committees, the formal independence on one-tier and two-tier boards, and the flow 
of information between board structures. However, to date not much theoretical 
research has been done to address the effects of board structure on board 
performance (Linck, Netter & Yang, 2008; Raheja, 2005). To gain insight into board 
structure, the board organisation, board independence, board committees, CEO 
duality and flow of information between board structures will be reviewed. 
   Board organisation 3.5.1.1
The agency theory recommends that companies have a structured board to assume 
the role of corporate control and monitoring (Jensen & Meckiling, 1976). The 
structure of the board can either be unitary (one-tier) or management and 
supervisory (two-tier). A one-tier board is a single board system that consists of 
executive and non-executive directors interrelating in a committee. This approach is 
adopted in some parts of Europe, such as the UK. A two-tier board provides for 
dualism, where one board is responsible for management and another is a separate 
supervisory board (Jungmann, 2006). The supervisory board consists of 
shareholders and labour agents, and their responsibilities are to appoint and 
terminate directors on the management board, to approve annual reports and 
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finances, to network with other stakeholders, and to intervene when the interests of 
shareholders are compromised. Two-tier boards are most evident in the 
Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Denmark (Jungman, 2006). 
The IoD (2009) adopts a recommendation from the agency theory and suggests that 
a suitable description for the structure of the board is a unitary structure. King III 
argues that a unitary structure provides for good interface between board members 
when dealing with strategic planning, performance, allocation of resources, 
standards of conduct and communication with stakeholders (IoD, 2009). This 
structure also ensures that no single person or block of individuals dominate control 
in terms of decision making of the board. This structure ideally consists of a balance 
of power, in other words, a mixture of executive and non-executive directors 
interrelating in a committee as suggested by the resource dependence theory (Daily, 
Dalton & Rajagopalan, 2003; Mcnulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Yeh & Taylor, 2008). At a 
minimum, two executive directors should be appointed, this should include the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Financial Officer/ Director (IoD, 2009:11). In 
addition, the board should have at least two non-executive directors of good quality 
and competence to participate in effective decision making (IoD, 2002). This 
arrangement requires that the majority of positions be held by non-executive 
directors (Basinger & Butler, 1985; IoD, 2009). This is to ensure the guarding of the 
interests of the shareholders, including minority interests (Cliffe Dekker Attorneys, 
2002). This ensures the affirmative interface and diversity of views among individuals 
of diverse expertise, knowledge, skills and background (IoD, 2009; Ruigrok et al., 
2007). 
   Board independence 3.5.1.2
Board independence is motivated by the need to ensure effective monitoring of 
performance (Randøy et al., 2006) and effective facilitation of strategy. This could be 
achieved by a mixture of executive and independent non-executive directors (Carter 
et al., 2003; IoD, 2009; Ruigrok et al., 2007). This mixture produces a best fit for 
financial value, and increases board independence (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Carter 
et al., 2003). For this reason, a distinction on the typology of directors is presented.  
Executive directors are involved in the day-to-day management and running of the 
business and are full-time salaried employees of the company and/or any of its 
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subsidiaries (Benjamin, Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988; Farrel & Hersch, 2005; IoD, 
2009). Non-executive directors are not involved in the day-to-day management of the 
business, are not full-time salaried employees of the company and/or any of its 
subsidiaries, and have no executive responsibilities in the company ( Farrel & 
Hersch, 2005; Hermalin, 1988; IoD, 2009). Independent directors are non-executive 
directors who (1) are not representatives of any shareholders, (2) have not been 
employed by the company of which it currently forms part in any executive capacity 
for the past three financial years, (3) are not members of the immediate family of an 
individual who is, or has been employed by the company in an executive capacity in 
the past three financial years, (4) are not professional advisors to the company, (5) 
are not material suppliers to or customers of the company, (6) have no contractual 
relationship with the company, (7) are free from any business or other relationship 
with the company, (8) do not have a direct or indirect interest in the company, and 
(9) do not receive remuneration which is contingent upon the performance of the 
company (IoD, 2009). 
   CEO duality 3.5.1.3
Further to the case for board independence, is the debate for CEO duality or non-
CEO duality. CEO duality implies that the CEO is also the chairperson of the board. 
There is agreement that one person should not concurrently hold the CEO and board 
chairperson positions (Daily & Dalton, 2003; Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989). The agency theory advocates for non-CEO duality by arguing that the 
interests of shareholders are protected when individual roles of the board are 
separated (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). This theory holds that when there is CEO 
duality, shareholder interests are compromised in favour of management and could 
constitute as agency hammering (Williams, 1985). In support of the agency theory, 
King III states that a distinction needs to be made between the appointment of the 
chairman and the CEO by distinguishing between the roles of the chairman and the 
CEO. The chairman runs the board, whilst the CEO runs the company’s business. 
This arrangement seems to play a role in improving quality controls (Burger & 
Goslin, 2005). In agreement, Anderson and Anthony (1986) argued that separate 
positions are better, as such a structure enables a central point for leadership and 
reduces uncertainty about responsibilities. These views were validated by the 
studies of Rechner and Dalton (1991) when they proved that organisations with CEO 
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duality reported higher financial returns than non-CEO dual organisations. As a 
result, CEO duality remains a debatable aspect of board structure. Given the debate, 
King III concludes that the appointment of one candidate in the positions of both the 
CEO and chairman must be justified formally in writing, and approval must be 
granted for South African companies. 
   Board committees 3.5.1.4
Although board committees vary, the most common committees in a corporate 
setting are the nomination committee, audit committee, risk committee, remuneration 
committee and ethical committee (IoD, 2009). King III suggests that the board has 
the option to delegate other functions to well-structured committees without 
abandoning their responsibilities. As such, board committees with appropriate 
“Terms of References”, may be appointed. It also proposes that the board 
committees should consist only of directors. King III recommends that nomination 
committees only consist of non-executive directors of whom the majority must be 
independent. As a requirement, the chairman of such committees ought to be an 
independent non-executive director. Directors, who are not members of a committee, 
may attend meetings to gain information. Such directors, would however, not be 
entitled to a vote. The board is responsible for evaluating directors, its committees 
and the individual directors every year.  
   The flow of information between board structures  3.5.1.5
According to the IoD (2009) the board should have valuable information at their 
disposal in order to effectively assume their board roles. Delegations should be a 
formal process approved by the board and there should be an official and formalised 
process for appointing directors. Decision making should be based on the inputs 
from the balance of independent and non-independent directors. The board has the 
right to eliminate the CEO as the executive director, without the decision being 
endorsed by the shareholders. 
3.5.2 Board composition 
Board composition is the responsibility of shareholders and directors (IoD, 2009) and 
plays an important role in board effectiveness (Raheja, 2005). The term board 
composition is used interchangeably with board characteristics (Carter et al., 2003) 
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and refers to the size of the board, the mix of different directors’ demographics 
(insider/outsider, male/female, foreign/local) and the degree of affiliations directors 
have with corporations (Basinger & Butler, 1985; Carter et al., 2003; Kakabadse et 
al., 2001). Board composition also includes the independence of individual directors, 
number and functions of board committees and the relative activism of the board in 
strategic direction (Baysinger & Butler, 1985:102). Other research found the main 
variables of board composition as the percentage of outside directors on the board, 
the ownership positions of inside directors, the board committee structure and the 
number of meetings held annually (Carter et al., 2003). Board diversity has also 
been acknowledged as an emerging facet in board composition (Carter et al., 2010). 
This is influenced by the larger demands for diversity on corporate boards and the 
universal acceptance of diversity proposals (Daily & Dalton, 2003; Robinson & 
Dechant, 1997). Kosnik (1990) however suggests that diversity fragments the board 
and provides inside directors with greater control.  
The section below focuses only on board size and board diversity as components of 
board composition. 
   Board size 3.5.2.1
The ideal size of the board has long been debated by scholars and corporate 
governance specialists (Raheja, 2005; Yeh & Taylor, 2008). As stated previously, 
board members can be broadly classified into three categories, the CEO, inside 
directors and outside directors. Miller-Millesen (2003) argues that the size of the 
board should be sufficient to prevent managerial dominion. This is in support of the 
agency theory that regards the board’s role to manage relationships between 
shareholders and managers. However, justifications for both large and small boards 
have been made. Most theorists argue that the higher the requirement for connection 
to external resources, the larger the board should be. This recognition was 
supported by Goodstein et al. (1994) when they re-affirmed that a large board has 
the ability to connect the organisation to its external resources, and could reduce 
external uncertainties. Furthermore, empirical studies by Zahra and Pearce (1989) 
revealed that companies with larger board sizes had higher financial returns than 
companies with smaller ones. However, in defence of small board sizes, an 
argument is made that large boards are weak, fragmented, are faced by team 
challenges, are less participative and cohesive and unlikely to reach consensus 
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(Goodstein et al., 1994; Herman, 1981). Communication challenges reduce effective 
board contribution (Goodstein et al., 1994). Other studies in favour of small board 
sizes suggested that small boards enhance organisational financial performance 
(Daily, Certo & Dalton, 1999; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996) and are conducive for 
efficient decision making (Randøy et al., 2006). Given the research available on 
board size, Raheja (2005) concluded that board size remains contentious and that 
the relative size of the board will depend on the type of the firm. This view is 
congruent to the recommendations made by the King III Report. 
   Board diversity 3.5.2.2
Literally, the term diversity refers to differences (Arfken, Bellar & Helms, 2004). By 
definition, Arfken et al. (2004:179) state that diversity is reflected by age, physical 
appearance, culture, job function or experience, disability, ethnicity, personal style, 
gender and religion. Furthermore, in recent times differences in organisations have 
been increasingly appreciated as part of strategic direction (Daily & Dalton, 2003; 
Kahn, 2002). In terms of corporate organisations, Carter et al. (2003) define board 
diversity as the percentage of females, previously disadvantaged, and foreign 
nationals on the board of directors, and a highly visible effort to demonstrate the 
absence of discrimination (Erhardt, Werbel & Shrader, 2003:102). The most common 
criticism regarding board diversity state that it leads to longer, less efficient board 
meetings, and there are larger prospects for ambiguities, misunderstandings and 
decision errors (Randøy et al., 2006). Nonetheless, it is accepted that diversity 
unifies directors from diverse backgrounds on corporate boards, and that directors 
with diverse backgrounds create fresh ideas and come up with different opinions. 
Yet, Strauss (2002) argued that alternative or minority board representation is a very 
susceptible and sensitive topic. This author is of the opinion that the board’s make-
up and mindset hinder diversity, as some board members fear diversity. Additionally, 
there is a debate about diversity being the right thing to do, or that it enhances 
shareholder value (Carter et al., 2003).  
Traditionally, board diversity referred only to task-related attributes such as 
educational, functional background, and board tenure (Golden & Zajac, 2001; 
Goodstein et al., 1994). According to Ruigrok et al. (2007), board diversity is moving 
from task-related attributes to other significant attributes of board diversity (i.e. 
relations-related aspects) such as the race, age, and ethnicity of directors (Burke, 
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1997; Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003). Nationality is also increasingly 
becoming a major aspect of board diversity (Ruigrok, Owtscharov & Greve, 2005) 
along with gender diversity (Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004; Ruigrok et al., 2007). As a 
result, there have been calls to consider various diversity attributes on the board 
simultaneously (Erhardt et al., 2003; Jackson, Joshi & Erhardt, 2003) with the 
argument being that task-related attributes do not inform all aspects of diversity. 
Additionally, relations-oriented aspects can contribute to the effectual roles of 
directors on corporate boards (Hillman, Cannella & Harris, 2002), i.e. to connect 
organisations with its external environment as per the resource-dependence 
perspective. In the call for multiple diversity attributes simultaneously (Jackson et al., 
2003), there is a need to regard the director as a “bundle of attributes” (Carpenter, 
Geletkanycz & Sanders 2004), but also to study the interaction between different 
aspects of their personal characteristics to examine their cumulative impact on the 
board (Ruigrok et al., 2007). From this background, this review accepts the 
classification of Jackson (2002) of board diversity attributes as task-related and 
relations-oriented attributes. Relations-oriented attributes relate to age, gender and 
nationality whilst educational background, functional background, and board tenure 
are task-oriented diversity attributes. Added to the relations-oriented attributes is the 
race aspect of board diversity (Carter et al., 2003; Ruigrok et al., 2007).  
In relation to the study at hand, it would be interesting to show the relations-oriented 
attributes of diversity and task-related attributes of diversity on the board of directors 
of JSE listed mining companies. In JSE listed mining companies board size, different 
director demographics and board diversity are of critical importance. Specifically, 
director demographics and board diversity are not only a governance concern, but 
are monitored as part of the national transformation goals. The EE scorecard 
requires a 40% representation of HDSAs on the board of directors of each listed 
mining company by 2014.  
 
Relations-oriented attributes of board diversity 
As discussed above, literature has classified board diversity as relations oriented 
and task oriented. This section focuses on the literature about relations-oriented 
attributes in more detail. 
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• Gender  
Although females are increasingly being appointed as directors on the boards 
(Burke, 1997; Erhardt et al., 2003; Farrel & Hersch, 2005), frequent reflection of 
male domination on corporate boards still exists (Miller & Triana, 2009; Simpson, 
Carter & D’Souza, 2010). A study done on board diversity in 2010 in the United 
States revealed that 72.9 per cent of all corporate seats were held by white men 
(Krus et al., 2012). Likewise, earlier studies done in 2009 in specifically, the South 
African mining environment, reflect more or less the same statistics (DME, 2009). 
Widespread remarks on ‘glass ceiling’, a prevention of women rising above 
certain positions has been frequently reported as the rationale for the dominance 
of white men on boards of directors (Daily et al., 1999; Karr, 1991; Powell & 
Butterfield, 1994). Burke (1997) also recognises the existence of a flawed board 
selection process that includes too much dependence on the “old boys’ network”. 
This has raised concerns about corporate governance composition, given the 
global recognition of the value in diversity, and the increased interest in the 
presence of women on corporate boards (Scherer, 1997). Furthermore, gender 
issues on boards have been insufficiently researched (Burke, 2003). Other areas 
of concern are disparities of income and growth prospects between males and 
women who are serving on the boards (Conyon & Mallin, 1997). Added are 
reports of sex bias, stereotyping and tokenism on boards where women serve 
(Erhardt et al., 2003). Difficulties finding qualified women, few board vacancies 
and inadequate previous board experience have been used to justify low minority 
representation on the board.  
On the other hand, Daily et al. (1999) differ and suggest that the pool of women 
with the ability and knowledge to serve on boards is larger than that reported, and 
accessibility and availability cannot be used as a defence (Sweetman, 1996). 
Although, the empirical studies of Pearce and Zahra (1991) revealed that high 
board representation of women led to more debates and more conflict, Ruigrok et 
al. (2007) argues that female representation on the board does not only bring 
different ideas but different skills, insight, principles, norms and understanding to 
the board.  
Female board representation also improves the reputation of the company 
(Burke, 2003). It, furthermore, improves creativity and innovation, enhances 
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effective problem solving, and ensures effective corporate leadership and global 
relationships (Carter et al., 2003). Another aspect that favours the progression of 
women on boards is that having them on boards makes practical sense (Daily et 
al., 1999; Sweetman, 1996). This thinking recognises that women account for 
60% of total purchases. They, therefore, have a better understanding of the 
marketplace (Carter et al., 2003) and can provide strategic input on female 
product or market issues (Burke, 2003). This strategic input increases creativity 
and innovation in the organisation (Miller & Triana, 2009).  
An issue that needs consideration as explained by Wahid (2010) is that gender 
diversity improves performance when it is viewed as a strategic effort, however, 
no results are realised if gender diversity is implemented to respond to external 
demands or regulation. 
• Race 
To date, no significant empirical studies have been reported regarding effects of 
racial (cultural) diversity on the board of directors except those that identify race 
as one of the considerable aspects of diversity (Erhardt et al., 2003; Miller & 
Triana, 2009; Wahid, 2010). However, Miller and Triana (2009) state that racial 
minority, in other words, non-white males, continue to struggle to enter the 
boardroom. This dominance of white men on the board of director’s surfaces 
recurrently on board diversity studies (Krus et al., 2012). Similar to gender 
diversity, there is a reliance on the “old boys’ network”, and there is also a 
consensual view that minorities experience work difficulties compared to white 
males (Davidson, 2002). This is due to the higher expectation and qualifications 
that are needed from individuals, other than the “old boys’ network”, who have to 
outperform their white male counterparts to be promoted to the next level (Erhardt 
et al., 2003). Similar to gender diversity, scholars have reported that racial 
diversity is an important resource to understanding the organisation’s multiracial 
customer base (Richard, 2000). Additionally, racial diversity increases the number 
of ideas, promotes creativity and innovation (Miller & Triana, 2009:760). Most 
boards of the South African mining industry are reportedly still racially and 
ethnically defined (Shabangu, 2009). This representation is dominantly from the 
“old boys’ network”. 
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• Age  
The average age of the director serving on the board is unknown due to limited 
research available on this attribute. Nonetheless, boards remain occupied by 
aging white men (Krus et al., 2012; Strauss, 2002). Once more, the “old boys’ 
network” is used as a metaphor to describe the dominance of aging white men on 
the board of directors which hinder age diversity (Burke, 1997). Arfken et al. 
(2004:184) argue that diversity is not only required in gender and cultural 
composition, but also in age, educational experience, background, status, and 
income level. It is assumed that the benefits of age diversity could result in 
additional/new knowledge and opinions, innovative ideas, improved strategic 
planning and even additional diversity (Carter et al., 2003; Daily et al., 1999).  
However its impact on organisational performance is yet to be researched 
(Wahid, 2010). 
• Nationality diversity 
Nationality diversity, in this context, refers to the amount of representation from 
foreign nationals on the board of directors. Ruigrok et al. (2007) state that a 
foreigner’s entrance to the board of directors brings different views, skills and 
knowledge, values, norms and understanding to the board. Conversely, being 
trapped in a minority position on a board, a foreigner might not generally make 
effectual contributions to the board (Westphal & Milton, 2000). Due to a lack of 
previous international research on the effect of nationality diversity on the board 
(Ruigrok et al., 2007), not much information is available. Though several 
recommendations have been made to improve board independence by the 
inclusion of foreigners on the board to erode the “old boys’ network” and ‘to 
improve transparency in serving shareholders (Randøy et al., 2006). 
Director diversity in terms of gender, race, age and nationality seems a rather 
slow progress internationally. This is no different from the report of Minister Susan 
Shabangu regarding South African mining companies. Thus, the change in board 
composition does not only enhance the diversity of corporate compositions but on 
the other hand, fulfils the Employment Equity scorecard goals of the 
representation of demographics in all levels of the company, including the board. 
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The gap that exists in the above literature study is whether board diversity 
attributes increase the performance of a firm. 
Task-oriented attributes of board diversity 
It is no use appointing directors on the board without the relevant background, 
qualifications, experience and ability to provide direction to the company. Task-
oriented attributes of board diversity ensure that relevant candidates serve on the 
board. These attributes are functional background, educational background and 
board tenure. 
• Functional background  
Functional background diversity refers to director background heterogeneity in 
areas of director expertise and specialisation (Wahid, 2010). According to Ruigrok 
et al. (2007) the main source of functional background diversity is reflected by the 
presence of outside directors on the board. Thus, boards with a high ratio of 
outside directors are assumed to represent higher degrees of board diversity in 
terms of functional, educational and industry experience, as outside directors 
differ from inside directors in terms of skills, knowledge and contacts (Ruigrok et 
al., 2007). Functional background diversity increases innovation and creativity on 
the board due to diverse human capital (Bantel & Jackson, 1989) and is 
accordingly deemed a significant diversity attribute (Arfken et al., 2004:184). 
Functional diversity also plays a critical role in complex issues that require skill-
set diversity, such as strategic and partnership deals (Wahid, 2010). Consistently 
over the years, the prime rationale for being selected to partake in board 
membership is having a business background (Daily et al., 1999; Kesner, 1988; 
Lear, 1994). Other desired backgrounds include the legal and finance 
backgrounds. 
• Educational background  
Similar to the functional background, the importance of diversity in the 
educational background on the board of directors has been recognised as critical 
for effectual monitoring (Arfken et al., 2004; Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Campbell & 
Minguez-Vera, 2008). Similar to functional background, a business qualification is 
still one of the primary criteria for being invited for board participation (Daily et al., 
1999; Hillman et al., 2002). This criterion is supported by research of Daily et al. 
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(1999) and Hillman et al. (2002) and Ruigrok et al. (2007). The study of Wiersema 
and Bantel (1992) furthermore, recognises some benefits of diversity in education 
level and specialisation (Daily et al., 1999). Therefore, the importance of 
educational diversity can be motivated (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). 
• Board tenure 
Board experience as a form of diversity is acknowledged by several scholars 
because of its ability to enhance quality improved board decisions (Arfken et al., 
2004; Wahid, 2010). According to Wahid (2010) boards with higher tenure are 
more performance sensitive and are more effective in CEO selection due to 
access to a wider network of resources, talent pool and increased independence. 
Board tenure is also a considerable criterion for the board appointment process. 
The average tenure of board experience is unknown, yet King III suggests that it 
should not exceed five years. 
The task- and relations-oriented attributes of diversity need to be jointly considered 
for effective board performance. This requires the careful appointment and search 
for directors who have a number of these attributes.  
3.5.3 Board selection process 
The selection process is of critical importance to ensure that the most suitable 
directors are chosen to serve on the board. This section reviews the literature on the 
board appointment process and director selection criteria for serving on the board. 
 Board appointments process 3.5.3.1
Board appointment processes vary worldwide, therefore this section will consider the 
recommended board appointment practice in the South African context. It is 
important to understand how directors are chosen in order to understand the 
corporate organisation and governance (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988). Previously, 
the selection of the board of directors has been the sole function of the CEO (Burke, 
1997; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988). As corporate governance progressed the use of 
nomination committees became popular and is still widely used (Conyon & Mallin, 
1997; Krus et al., 2012; The Cadbury Report, 1992). The nomination committee 
process includes director identification, evaluation, nomination and election (Burke, 
2007; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). Nomination committees clarify how directors are to 
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be appointed and assist the main board in this process (Conyon & Mallin, 1997; The 
Cadbury Report, 1992).  
Conversely, King III does not recommend nomination committees. It recommends for 
the board of directors to assume the responsibility for the appointment of directors, 
CEO, chairperson (independent non-executive director), company secretary, the risk 
audit committee; as well as the appointment of the information and technology 
officer, and ensuring sustainability reporting and the overall management of such 
structures. It also recommends that the appointment term of any executive director 
should not exceed five years. However, if nomination committees are preferred, 
these committees should be used to assist in consideration for re-election (IoD, 
2002; IoD, 2009). The board member may continue serving on the board, provided 
they are high performing, and are suitable for re-election. Furthermore, executive 
management positions should be differentiated, so that there are clearly defined 
responsibilities to certify a balance of power and authority. The process of board 
appointments and selection should be official and transparent and should involve 
every member of the board. 
 Board appointment criteria 3.5.3.2
Corporate governance reformers argue for the board of directors to be selected 
based on their abilities to endorse managerial decisions, monitor strategy 
implementation, and mete out rewards and penalties on the basis of managerial 
performance (Basinger & Butler, 1985). Previous studies revealed that the 
characteristics for attaining directorship include a strong track record, business 
networks, an understanding of the business arena and an advanced education. 
These characteristics should be coupled with skills such as leadership qualities, 
objectivity, diplomacy and tact, communication competence, intelligence and integrity 
(Burke, 1997; Gillies, 1992; Mattis, 1993). Surprisingly, studies of Sethi, Swanson, 
and Harrigan (1981) on women directors revealed that different criteria are used for 
the appointment of women directors. Their results indicate that prominent women 
leaders with national and international reputations and those who had extended 
family ties and social relationships with members of the board were selected. 
Moreover, they were only selected as token appointments to satisfy affirmative 
action requirements (Burke, 1997). Against this background a suggestion is made for 
each country to establish its own selection criteria policy (Krus et al., 2012).  
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3.6 CONCLUSION 
Organisations, in general, and the board of directors in particular, as a focal 
governance mechanism, will increasingly have to attend to diversity on the board 
along aspects of race, age, gender, nationality, and so on. This requires the careful 
assessment of board make-up, board composition and the selection criteria for 
directors to serve on the board. The aim of this literature review was to improve the 
understanding of acceptable practice, specifically concerning the composition of the 
board of directors. This review provides evidence that representation from HDSAs on 
the board is not only a local concern but a global concern, too. Evidence was found 
that literature does not address the challenges and initiatives experienced by 
organisations to appoint directors to reflect diversity. At the same time, the effects of 
board diversity on board performance have not proved considerable gains for 
organisations. It is however, hoped that the research at hand will critically evaluate 
and report on the composition of boards in the South African mining industry. With 
an objective to understanding initiatives undertaken and challenges experienced to 
appoint diverse groups in terms of diversity attributes set out above. On the other 
hand, it assists with meeting the objectives of the EE scorecard. A diagram 




Figure 3.1: The literature review process 
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DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Black Economic Empowerment is defined as an integrated and coherent socio-
economic process that aims to empower and advance historically disadvantaged 
South Africans in order to assume responsibilities in management and core positions 
in the mainstream industries to contribute directly to the economic transformation of 
South Africa. 
 
Board of directors is a governing body comprised of a group of elected members 
whose members (directors) are elected normally by the shareholders of an 
organisation generally at an annual general meeting or AGM to govern the 
organisation and look after the shareholder interests.  
 
Board composition refers to, the size of the board; the mix of different directors’ 
demographics (insider/outsider, male/female, foreign/local) and the degree of 
affiliations directors have with corporations. 
 
Board diversity is the varying director demographics on the board of directors. It 
can be demonstrated by a percentage of females, minorities or previously 
disadvantaged and foreign nationals on the board of directors 
 
Board structure is how the board is organised in terms of size, board committees, 
decision making and the flow of information among board members. 
 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) refers to the socio-
economic empowerment of all black people, women, workers, youth, people living 
with disabilities, and people living in rural areas, through diverse but integrated 




Chairman is the highest standing executive on the board of directors whose primary 
role is to ensure that the board is effective in its task of setting and implementing the 
company’s direction and strategy (IoD, 2009). 
 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is a top executive responsible for the company’s 
overall operations and performance.  
 
Corporate governance is a formal system of accountability of the board of directors 
to guard the interests of shareholders. It involves the establishment of structures and 
processes with appropriate checks and balances that enable directors to discharge 
their legal responsibilities and oversee compliance with legislation (IoD, 2009:6) 
 
Diversity refers to the inclusion of the mixture of individuals in institutions that 
reflects the demographics of the people of a population. It can be reflected by age, 
physical appearance, culture, job function or experience, disability, ethnicity, 
personal style, gender and religion in an organizational context. 
 
Employment Equity scorecard is the scorecard that contains criteria for 
presentation of the HDSA on all the levels of an organisation.  
 
Executive Director is the director that is a full-time salaried employee of an 
organisation. He or she has a specified decision-making role as the director of 
marketing, finance, operations, human resources etc.  
 
Historically Disadvantaged South Africans refers to black people, women (black 
and white), youth, people living with disabilities, people living in rural areas, 




Independent Non-Executive Director is a director that is not full-time salaried 
employee of an organisation. He or she has not been involved with the company or 
any of its subsidiaries for the past 5 years. This director is not from any business or 
other relationship which could be seen materially to interfere with the individual’s 
capacity to act in an independent manner. 
 
Mining Charter is a broad-based socio-economic empowerment charter for the 
South African mining industry. 
 
Mining scorecard is a measurement criterion that is designed to facilitate the 
application of the Mining Charter in terms of the Minerals and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act of 2002. It also allocates scores to the progress of individual 
companies in terms of the nine elements of the Mining Charter. 
 
Non-Executive Director is a director that is not a full-time salaried employee of the 
organisation and is not involved in the day-to-day management of the organisation.  
 
Transformation refers to political, social, and economic change processes, with the 
aim of redressing historical imbalances. It implies changing institutions to include 









 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY CHAPTER 4  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main aim of research is not only to solve a specific problem, but also to identify 
gaps in knowledge, verify current knowledge and indicate past failures and 
limitations (Kumar, 2005). This chapter reports on the design of the methodology in 
an attempt to meet the objectives of the study at hand. Research design is defined 
by Mouton (2001:4) as the “blueprint of how the researcher intends conducting the 
research”. It is a road map specifying the methods and procedures for collecting and 
analysing collected data and reporting findings (Creswell, 2003; Zikmund, 2003). It is 
a complete research process of conceptualising a problem, writing research 
questions, collecting data, investigation, interpretation and report inscription (Emory 
& Cooper, 1991), including terms for enhancing the study’s integrity through ethical 
considerations (Polit & Beck, 2008). In this chapter, the research problem is stated 
and methods and procedures that are used to conduct this research in Phase 1 and 
Phase 2 are presented. The type of research chosen which forms part of the 
research design is also presented. It will also include the selected population, the 
unit of analysis, research methods adopted and information on how data was 
processed and analysed. It also justifies the methods of analysis applied in this 
research. This chapter will be concluded by reviewing ethical considerations and 
presenting a table summarising the research and methodology design. 
4.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM  
It is generally accepted that the nature of the research problem determines the type 
of research to be adopted (Creswell, 2003). The research problem in this study was 
identified as the non-adherence of South African mining companies to conform to the 
EE scorecard targets. Evidence supporting this statement is illustrated by the low 
representation of HDSAs on board level. This notion is furthermore supported by 
reports of the slow progress of transformation in the mining industry as discussed in 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
A research problem further informs research objectives in which the research 
problem will be solved. The following research objectives were set in order to realise 
the main aim of this study, in other words, to provide insight into the current 
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transformation status in the South African mining industry with reference to EE 
scorecard targets and board representation of HDSAs.  
4.2.1 Objectives of the study 
The five main objectives of this study are: 
1. To investigate board member’s profiles and the board composition of JSE 
listed companies in the South African mining industry. 
2. To report on the criteria employed to appoint members serving on boards of 
mining companies listed on the JSE. 
3. To report on the progress towards and determine the current status of 
transformation within the South African mining industry measured against EE 
scorecard targets. 
4. To investigate current challenges experienced and initiatives undertaken in 
this industry in terms of transformation. 
5. To identify barriers to transformation in the mining industry. 
Typically, the research problem, objectives and questions can give insight into the 
type of research design to be chosen. The following section explains the different 
types of research design available, as well as descriptions of the type of research 
relevant for the study at hand. 
4.3 TYPES OF RESEARCH 
Generally, research can either be exploratory, descriptive or causal. Exploratory 
research is conducted to clarify and define the nature of the problem, which could 
arise from a lack of basic information. Descriptive research is used to describe 
characteristics of certain groups and estimate the proportion of people in a 
population who behave in a certain way to make specific predictions (Cant, Gerber-
Nel, Nel & Kotze, 2003), it can be quantitative or qualitative in nature. Causal 
research is research conducted to identify cause-and-effect relationships among 
variables when the research problem has been narrowly identified.  
In this study, both descriptive and exploratory researches are adopted and are 
discussed next.  
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4.3.1 Descriptive research 
In an attempt to describe the profiles of the board members and board composition, 
this study uses the descriptive research technique. Descriptive research involves 
describing a phenomenon as it exists without manipulation or control of any 
elements involved in the phenomenon (Page & Meyer, 2000:22). Descriptive 
research also describes the specific details of a position, situation, participants or 
phenomenon. It thus uses description as a tool to organise data into patterns that 
emerge during analysis .In essence, the researcher reports on and interprets the 
experiences of others (Page & Meyer, 2000:22).  
There are two types of descriptive research, that is, the longitudinal study and the 
cross-sectional study (Gilbert & Churchill, 2001). Longitudinal study involves time 
series analyses that make recurring measurements on the same individuals that 
permit monitoring of actions. The cross-sectional study of descriptive research 
involves a study to make measurements at a particular point in time (Churchill, 
2001). For the purposes of the study, the cross-sectional study was selected for 
analysis of the state of board composition and board member’s profiles during 2011 
in the South African mining industry. Although this study considered previous 
compliance the scope of the study is to report on a specific period, given the time 
and resources limitation. The period under investigation, that is, 2011 was informed 
by the availability of published annual reports at the time of analysis. 
4.3.2 Exploratory research 
Exploratory research is adopted for investigating the status of transformation in the 
South African mining industry, initiatives undertaken, challenges experienced, criteria 
employed for appointing board members and barriers faced with transformation. 
Exploratory research is conducted to clarify and define the nature of the problem, 
which could arise from a lack of basic information. It is hoped that information will be 
gained through structured personal interviews with the appropriate respondents in 
the mining industry. The study was therefore broken down into two phases in relation 
to the methodological choices taken, and are discussed next.  
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4.4 RESEARCH METHODS 
Research method indicates the research process and tools and procedures to be 
used to collect and analyse data. Research methods can either be quantitative, 
qualitative or mixed methods (both quantitative and qualitative). In this research, a 
mixed method approach is pursued as data was obtained from annual reports and by 
means of structured interviews. This means that both quantitative and qualitative 
research methods were undertaken. Quantitative research is defined as the 
“research that places greater value upon information that can be numerically 
manipulated in a meaningful way, and this is the traditional scientific approach to 
research” (Page & Meyer, 2000:17). Data gathered by means of annual reports was 
used to capture the profiles of the directors on the board and board composition and 
was quantified during data analysis. 
On the other hand, qualitative research is defined as a research focused on words 
and feelings; its research data is not “subjected to quantification and refers to an 
understanding of concepts” (Cant et al., 2003:4). According to Visagie (2012) 
qualitative research has three dimensions, it is: 
• Descriptive in nature (what happened). 
• Concerned with process (what happened over time) and  
• Interpretive (what was the meaning to people of what happened). 
Interviews were used as a second phase of research to get insight on the EE 
scorecard target achievements, progress and barriers to transformation from 
executives in the mining industry. 
4.5 POPULATION SAMPLING 
Population refers to all objects from which the information can be gathered. The 
population selected for the study includes all the mining companies within South 
Africa as well as directors of those listed companies. The mining industry was 
chosen for analysis because it is considered as the major provider of employment for 
South African citizens. This industry is also associated with a lack of transformation 
as described in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.  
A population parameter was imposed, to limit the population to include all 59 mining 
companies that were listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) during 
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2011. This decision was taken as each listed mining company is required to submit 
an annual report with information suitable for further analysis aligned to the research 
objectives and questions. These companies also report on transformation and 
sustainability on an annual basis as part of the listing requirement. Additionally, listed 
companies are also required to fulfil the objectives of the Mining Charter and comply 
with the EE scorecard by submitting an employment equity plan on an annual basis. 
This sample frame offers an accessible sample and it could be argued that listed 
companies are considered to be the leaders in the mining industry and adherence to 
the Mining Charter, the MPRDA Act and the Mining Scorecard creates a sound 
source of information. 
As mentioned earlier, this research is comprised of two phases. During Phase 1 
annual reports were gathered as sources of information. All 59 listed companies will 
be included in this phase. Phase 2 of the research comprises of ten interviews with 
directors who are mainly responsible for transformation or Human Resources related 
issues. These participants were chosen by means of purposive sampling. Purposive 
sampling is a non-probability sampling technique whereby the researcher makes 
judgement on persons to be selected for data collection. In this research instance, it 
was important to obtain information from participants who monitor and oversee 
transformation in mining companies. These individuals are usually Human 
Resources executives or heads of transformation in mining companies. It was also 
important for the researcher to carefully select participant in different company sizes, 
e.g. to obtain different views from individuals from large to micro companies. 
4.6 UNITS OF ANALYSIS 
A unit of analysis refers to the source of information. In qualitative terms, it’s a basic 
entity of text to be classified during content analysis (Graham, 2012). Two units of 
analysis are used in the research following the mixed method approach adopted.  
The first unit of analysis constituted of the 2011 annual reports of the mining 
companies listed on the JSE. Annual reports were used to gain information about 
board members’ profiles and the board compositions. This information will assist in 
achieving the first objective of this study, namely, to investigate the board of director 
profiles and board composition of companies in the mining industry.  
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The second unit of analysis constituted of Human Resources Executive Directors of 
the companies in the mining industry who are responsible for human resources, 
employment equity and transformation in those companies. Information was gained 
through interviews based on individual insights and experiences in respective 
companies in terms of EE scorecard implementation. These units of analysis will 
contribute to achieving the last four objectives of the study, namely, to report on the 
progress towards and determine the current status of transformation within the South 
African mining industry, to investigate current challenges and initiatives experienced 
in this industry in terms of transformation, and to identify barriers to transformation in 
the mining industry in terms of the EE scorecard targets.  
4.7 DATA COLLECTION 
Data is a recorded measure of a certain phenomenon (Zikmund, 2003). Although the 
most usual method for gathering data is using surveys or questionnaires; interviews, 
telephonic conversations and observations could also be used (Maree, 2007:55). In 
this research, two types of data was collected, namely, narrative of data collected 
from the 2011 annual reports (Phase 1) and transcribed interviews (Phase 2).  
4.7.1 Phase 1: Annual reports 
Concerning narrative data, the JSE and Bureau van Dijk (Orbis database) supplied a 
database of all companies that were listed on the JSE during 2011. According to the 
databases supplied by the JSE and Bureau van Dijk, a total number of 59 mining 
companies were listed on the JSE during 2011. Only 56 mining companies produced 
2011 annual reports and they were included in the research. The other three 
companies were excluded from the research due to the finding that two of these 
three companies last published their annual reports in 2010, and the other one 
company did not have a website from which an annual report could be sourced. 
However, for these three companies, a request for the 2011 annual reports was 
made telephonically to the secretaries of the company and they confirmed that the 
companies had not produced the 2011 report at that time. By the end of October 
2012, these companies had not produced these annual reports and were thus 
eliminated from the study. Each mining company’s annual reports listed on the JSE 




4.7.2 Phase 2: Transcribed interviews 
Interviewed participants varied in terms of their positions, but were mainly members 
of executive or senior management who oversee transformation, sustainability, 
human resources, people management or employment equity for the entire 
company. See Appendix A for the interview schedule. 
A letter requesting an interview appointment was sent to each respondent, followed 
by a telephonic follow-up. See Appendix B for a letter in request for the interview. 
Foster (2004:230) suggests for interviews to be conducted at the respondent’s area 
of work to reduce fragmentation and enhance contextual richness. As such, 
interviews were conducted at the premises of the respondents.  
A formulated semi-structured interview guide was used to facilitate interviews and 
gain insight about transformational issues experienced by the respondents. This 
interview guide was formulated using the objectives of the study as the guiding 
principle. Interviews were selected as a method for data collection because it permits 
for deeper questioning into the individual experiences. The method also provides the 
researcher with the opportunity to probe answers and allow respondents to explain, 
build on or elaborate their responses (Saunders et al., 2012). Using semi-structured 
interviews allows the researcher to have a list of themes and key questions to be 
asked. Some questions may be omitted, or the order of the questions re-arranged 
given the organisational context and the flow of the interview (Saunders et al., 2012). 
A semi-structured interview guide allowed the researcher to formulate questions that 
may have arisen during the interviews. It also allowed participants to express their 
views and experiences in their own words (Esterberg, 2002). A total of ten interviews 
were conducted. Given the schedules of executives in the mining industry, each 
interview was scheduled for approximately 45 minutes and a questionnaire was sent 
to respondents beforehand, so they could familiarise themselves with the questions. 
Appendix C contains the questionnaire distributed. Each interview was recorded 
using a technical recording device. After the interview was concluded, each interview 




4.8 DATA ANALYSIS AND PROCESSING  
Due to the two types of data collected, data analysis was conducted through both 
qualitative and quantitative content analysis. Content analysis is described by White 
and Marsh (2006: 22) as a “systematic, rigorous approach to analysing documents 
obtained or generated in the course of research”. It is further expressed as a family 
of analytic approaches ranging from intuitive, interpretive analyses to systematic, 
strict textual analyses (Rosengren, 1981). Content analysis method may be used 
with either qualitative or quantitative data, or with either inductive or deductive 
content analysis (Elo & Kyngas, 2007:107). 
4.8.1  Inductive content analysis 
Inductive content analysis is used in cases where there are no previous studies 
dealing with the phenomenon or when it is fragmented. Graham (2012) states that 
qualitative content analysis is mainly inductive, grounding the examination of topics 
and themes, as well as the inferences drawn from them, in the data. 
4.8.2  Deductive content analysis 
Deductive content analysis is used when the aim of the research is to test previous 
theory in a different situation or to compare categories at different time periods. 
Graham (2012) also states that quantitative content analysis is deductive, when 
findings are intended to test hypotheses or to address questions generated from 
theories or previous empirical research.  
For qualitative data analysis, inductive coding was used as codes were generated 
during the coding process. In the next section, both qualitative and quantitative 
content analysis as adopted, are explained and justified.  
4.8.3 Phase 1: Quantitative content analysis 
For the first unit of analysis, namely, annual reports, quantitative content analysis 
was used to analyse the profiles of board members and the board compositions. 
Quantitative content analysis is defined by Weber (1990) as a way to count manifest 
textual elements; an aspect of this method that is often criticised is missing 
syntactical and semantic information embedded in the text. It is considered to be a 
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quantitative method as it entails creating themes and then counting the number of 
instances in which they are used in text or image (Graham, 2012). 
Quantitative content analysis was conducted from the information of the board of 
director’s content pages of the annual reports. Data on the profiles of the board of 
directors was captured in a Microsoft Excel spread sheet. These profiles were of 
directors who are serving in the board in several capacities, for example, the CEO, 
Chairperson, Chief Operating Officer, Financial Directors, Executive Directors, Non- 
Executive Directors, Lead Independent Non-Executive Directors and Independent 
Non-Executive Directors. The board member’s profiles were analysed according to 
demographic profiles and career backgrounds. Demographic profiles considered the 
age, race, gender and nationality of the directors, whilst the career backgrounds 
considered their qualifications, mining experience and board experience and the 
number of years they have been with the company. The board composition 
considered the size of the board, the positions represented at board level, as well as 
the criteria for designating Directors as Executive, Non-executive or Independent 
Non-Executive Directors.  
   Data capturing 4.8.3.1
All annual reports were first loaded into a researcher’s folder on the desktop. Data 
was captured electronically from the annual reports into Microsoft Excel before it was 
loaded into SPSS for analysis. 
   Data editing 4.8.3.2
According to Blumberg, Cooper and Schindler (2011:492), data editing is considered 
as the foremost step in data analysis for detecting errors and omissions and, if 
possible, to confirm that the minimum data quality standards were met. The data of 
director’s profiles was carefully examined and edited with the aim of detecting, 
reducing and fixing errors and other incoherencies. Checks were done on the Excel 
spread sheets and SPSS to ensure that numerical values assigned to each director 
and the information on each director was accurate and applicable. This process was 
necessary to ensure that the data was clean and validated, thus correct and 
meaningful. Basic statistics like frequencies and means, as well as maximum and 




All the steps mentioned above referred to data processing of information in the 
annual reports. The next step explains how data was analysed during Phase 1. 
   Data analysis 4.8.3.3
Data analysis was conducted through statistical analysis in terms of descriptive 
statistics. Descriptive statistics enclose the portrayal of the data acquired for a 
detailed group of individual units of analysis (Welman, Kruger & Mitchell, 2009: 231). 
Hallebone and Priest (2009) gathered that general descriptive statistics adopted in 
most research studies are frequency tables and variation tables. As presented in the 
results, frequency counts, express how often a particular characteristic occurs. 
These statistics also provide a number of board members and percentages 
belonging to each category of the variable tested. To meaningfully summarise the 
demographics and backgrounds of board members, graphs and tables were used to 
present frequency counts in a rational and logical manner.  
 Reliability and validity for quantitative research (Phase 1) 4.8.3.4
Cooper and Schindler (2008:289) define validity as the extent to which a test 
measures what the researcher actually wishes it to measure, whilst reliability refers 
to the accuracy and precision of a measurement procedure. Reliability dictates 
whether data collection techniques and methodical procedures would generate 
consistent results if they were repeated on another event or by a different researcher 
(Saunders et al., 2012). This section discusses validity and reliability for quantitative 
data analysis. Reliability and validity for qualitative research (phase 2) is discussed 
in section 4.8.4.4. 
 Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008:102) affirm that the annual reports are reliable 
sources of information for business researchers which can be found from company 
websites or specialist websites. Data extracted from the annual reports is considered 
secondary data as it is published by companies and provided to the JSE as part of 
the listing requirement. Also this data has been validated in the Orbis database of 
Bureau van Dijk. This data is presumed valid and reliable as biographical data of 
directors and board compositions are able to be verified and validated. Also, data 
collection method and methodical procedures would produce reliable and consistent 
findings if they were duplicated another year or by a different researcher.  
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4.8.4 Phase 2: Qualitative content analysis  
Qualitative content analysis was used to analyse the data of transcribed interviews 
for the second unit of analysis. Qualitative content analysis is defined as a research 
method for subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic 
classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns (Hsieh & 
Shannon, 2005). 
It can also be described as an approach of empirical, methodological controlled 
analysis of texts within their contexts of communication, following content analytic 
rules and step-by-step models, without rash quantification (Mayring, 2000). Others 
define qualitative research as any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort 
that takes a volume of qualitative material and attempts to identify core consistencies 
and meanings (Patton, 2002:453). 
The researcher has adopted the first definition of the study at hand, as text 
transcribed data was subjectively interpreted by a process of coding and identifying 
themes and patterns for EE scorecard implementation for mining companies.  
The next discussion reviews the approach followed for qualitative content analysis. 
   Approaches to qualitative content analysis 4.8.4.1
Hsieh and Shannon (2005) presented the three approaches to qualitative content 
analysis, namely, conventional, directed or summative. Although these three 
approaches are used to interpret meaning from the context of data, they differ in 
coding schemes, origins of codes, and threats of trustworthiness. Using conventional 
approach means that coding categories are derived directly from text data. A direct 
approach means that analysis of data begins with a theory or relevant research 
findings as guides to initial codes. A summative approach entails counting and 
comparing keywords or paragraphs followed by the interpretation of the underlying 
context. According to Weber (1990) the specific type of content analysis approach 
selected by the researcher differs with the hypothetical and substantive interests of 
the researcher and the problem investigated. This study will use a summative 
approach meaning that codes names and categories will emerge from the data and 
keywords or paragraphs will be counted and compared followed by the interpretation 
of the underlying context.  
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   Process of qualitative content analysis 4.8.4.2
Whether using inductive or deductive approach, Elo and Kyngas (2007) 
recommended a three stage process of analysis of qualitative content analysis 
namely; preparation, organising and reporting the analysing process and the results. 
Preparation involves selecting the unit of analysis, deciding what to analyse in detail 
and sampling considerations. The organising phase includes making sense of the 
data and to learn what is happening, and to make sense of everything. Dey (1993) 
notes that the researcher must ask the following questions when reading the data, 
Who is telling? Where is this happening? When did it happen? What is happening 
and why? The last step involves data analysis using deductive or inductive 
approach. The following diagram presents the three stages used in the qualitative 
content analysis used in the study. 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Elo & Kyngas (2008) 





   Process of coding 4.8.4.3
As a point of departure, data from audio files was transcribed into written texts. 
Interviews were transcribed verbatim and typed in a Microsoft Word document. 
These documents were prepared to be analysed with the creation of a transferable 
folder with the necessary subfolders on the C:/ drive on the researcher’s computer to 
allow for easy transfer. Each document was edited and pseudonyms were created. 
All grammar and spelling was checked. Editing was checked for auto-coding, in 
order to ensure that questions and answers follow closely on one another. The 
demographic information such as venue, date and company details were formatted 
in capitals to allow for auto coding. The margins were changed to suit the recent 
Atlas.ti version (For Atlas.ti 7.x). Spacing and font size were checked. A descriptive 
file name for the documents was entered and each of the edited files was saved 
under a new descriptive name in the folder and changed into a rich text format 
(RTF).Transcribed interview data, as well as each company’s annual report was 
imported into Atlas.ti. Atlas.ti is a qualitative data analysis software package that 
offers support involving the interpretation of text. “It has the capacity to deal with 
large amounts of text, as well as the management of annotations, concepts and 
complex structures, including conceptual relationships that emerge in the process of 
interpretation” (Muhr, 1991:349). These transcripts and annual reports were inserted 
as primary documents in hermeneutic units. Therefore, Atlas.ti software was used to 
code data, retrieve text, efficient unification of codes, generating network views to 
create developing code visualisations and their relationships to each other. 
All transcripts were studied and specific relevant texts from data were selected. 
Texts were unitised and the thoughts were highlighted and categorized. Categories 
were identified and coded according to issues of relevance to research questions. 
Categories and coding scheme were developed from rich texts and conclusions from 
the coded data were made (Graham, 2012). The above step consisted of creating 
logic of identified categories by exploring dimensions of categories, identifying 
relations between categories, revealing patterns, and testing categories against a full 
range of data (Bradley, 1993). Thus, qualitative content analysis is descriptive, 
systematic and replicable (Graham, 2012). A comprehensive electronic data analysis 




Chapter 6 reports on some verbatim data extracts that are used, for example, 
(10:5:59) means primary document 10, quotation number 5 and line 59. 
4.8.4.4 Reliability and validity for qualitative research (Phase 2) 
In the perspective of qualitative research, validity is described as the ability of the 
researcher to gain access to the participants’ insight and experience, and whether 
they are able to deduce the participants’ intended meaning (Saunders et al., 
2007:319). Reliability is concerned with the ability of the measuring instrument to 
generate consistent findings at different times and under varying conditions (Cooper 
& Schindler, 2008:292-293). Miles and Huberman (1994) offer a view that validity 
and reliability depends on the ability of the researcher who is conducting the 
interviews whilst recording them, to possess the following behaviours or skills:  
a) be familiar with the subject and the field of research,  
b) have a multidisciplinary knowledge,  
c) good research and interviewing skills.  
During the course of this research, the author attempted to establish validity and 
reliability by rich descriptions, comprehensive analysis, and peer review.  
According to Saunders et al. (2012) others have formulated new terms to 
accommodate qualitative research by substituting reliability and validity with 
“measures of trustworthiness”. These measures include dependability, credibility, 
transferability and conformability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The following definitions 
are offered by Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008:294). 
Dependability refers to “the researcher’s responsibility for offering information to the 
reader, that the research process has been logical, traceable, and documented. All 
these activities establish the trustworthiness of research”. All interview audios and 
transcribed interview data are made available on the CD as an annexure. Hard 
copies of signed ethical consent forms were also scanned and saved as part of 
documentary evidence. 
Credibility refers to the key questions to ask from your research when evaluating 
your research which are: whether you are familiar with the topic and whether the 
data is sufficient to merit your claims? Whether you have made strong logical links 
between observations and your categories? Whether any other research can, on the 
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basis of your materials, come relatively close to your interpretations or agree with 
your claims? The data obtained from interviews were linked to the research 
objectives and research questions. It was also relevant and contained solid and rich 
descriptions. Professional peer review and consultation were sought during the 
process of coding, analysis and final report writing to assist the judgment of the 
researcher. Professional peer review and consultation ensured that content and face 
validity of coding process was observed. During this process, research objectives 
were in cognisant. 
Transferability is concerned with the researcher’s responsibility to show the degree 
of similarity between the research or parts of it, and other research, in order to 
establish some form of connection between the current research and previous 
results. Transferability is thus not about replication, but rather whether some sort of 
similarity could be found in other research contexts. As stated above, the analysis of 
data was provided through rich and solid descriptions to satisfy the concerns for 
transferability. 
Conformability refers to the ideas that the data and interpretations of an inquiry are 
not just imagination. Conformability is about linking findings and interpretations to the 
data in ways that can be easily understood by others. In order to ensure 
conformability, the requirement for transparency will be met. Primary documents of 
original transcripts, complete electronic assessment trace of coding, code families, 
memos, and networks will be made available to augment the dependence in the 
conformability of data. 
4.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Ethical clearance approval was obtained from the Department of Business 
Management Research Ethics Committee, see Appendix D. The participants 
selected for the interview process were sent the ethics consent form, together with 
the invitation letter to participate in the study. A brief background and objectives of 
the study were explained. Respondents were furthermore informed that their 
participation is voluntary, their identities will be treated with confidentiality and results 
of the study can be made available to them on request. Confidentiality contracts 
were reached with each company which participated in the study. Consent for the 
results of individual viewpoints to be published was received, but all the participants 
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requested the anonymity of their individual identities. All ethical considerations 
required for this type of study were met.    
4.10 PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS 
The last step of the research process is to present the findings of the research by 
interpreting the results of the data analysed. Chapter 5 and 6 deal with the 
interpretation of data, the presentation of results and findings by means of both 
qualitative and quantitative analysis. 
4.11 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided an overview of the research design and methodology for the 
study. The research problem was stated along with the research objectives. Both 
qualitative and quantitative designs were seen as most appropriate in addressing the 
objectives of the study. It was then decided that the research process would be 
conducted in two phases. In terms of data gathering and processing, both qualitative 
and quantitative approaches were followed. Similarly, for data analysis, both 
qualitative and quantitative content analyses were conducted. Information on how 
data was analysed and ethical considerations concludes this chapter.  
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Table  4.1: Data analysis  
Research objective (s) Population sampling Unit of analysis Data collection Data analysis 
To investigate board members 
profiles and board composition of 
listed companies in the South 
African mining industry. 
JSE listed mining companies Annual reports 
 















Download online from 
company websites, or 
obtain directly from 
mining companies or 
JSE 
Microsoft Excel/SPSS 
To report on the criteria employed 
to appoint members serving on 
boards of mining companies listed 
on the JSE. 
2. Board composition 
-Size of the executive team 
-Positions represented on board 
level 
-Criteria used for board 
appointments, i.e. executive, non-
executive and independent non-
executive  




Atlas.ti- Content analysis 
To report on the progress towards 
and determine the current status 
of transformation within the South 
African mining industry measured 
against EE scorecard targets  




Atlas.ti- Content analysis 
 
JSE Reporting Annual 
Reports 
To investigate current challenges 
experienced and initiatives 
undertaken in this industry in 
terms of transformation. 
10 Directors of JSE listed 
mining companies 




Atlas.ti- Content analysis 
To investigate barriers to 
transformation in the mining 
industry 
10 Directors of JSE listed 
mining companies 








 REVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICAN MINING COMPANY CHAPTER 5  
BOARDS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reports on the findings of the analysis of data by presenting the results 
of the first phase of the research. Phase 1 of the research sought to address the first 
objective of this study, namely to investigate the board member’s profiles and the 
board composition of JSE listed companies in the South African mining industry. The 
board composition analysis is presented in the form of board size and positions 
represented on board level. Board members’ profiles were analysed according to 
demographic profiles and career backgrounds. The demographic profiles of the 
directors are presented according to race, gender, nationality and age. The career 
backgrounds are presented in the form of educational background and career 
experience. The educational background considers the qualification type and 
qualification levels. The career background considers board experience, mining 
experience and years of experience on the current board as shown in Figure 5.1. 
 
Figure  5.1: Summary of statistical analysis 
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For the analysis of Phase 1, descriptive statistics using frequencies and cross-
tabulations was used to report the findings. Descriptive statistics describe the board 
composition and the profiles of board members of mining companies listed on the 
JSE during 2011. The purpose of cross-tabulations was to compare variables 
against a selected defined category. IBM SPSS 22 and Microsoft Excel 2007 were 
used to perform statistical analysis and to tabulate graphs, charts and tables. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, a data analysis process was followed for data 
cleaning and validation.  
5.2 PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
The data comprised of 56 mining companies listed on the JSE during 2011. Each 
company’s board composition, as well as the profiles of 506 directors was recorded. 
Data was recorded in the following variable names in Excel and SPSS: 
a) Name of the company 
b) Title, name and surname of each director 
c) Race, gender, nationality and age per director 
d) Position of the director in the company 
e) Qualification of each director (e.g. B.Sc: Electrical Engineering) 
f) Qualification level of each director (e.g. Undergraduate or postgraduate) 
g) Qualification field of each director (e.g. Commerce or Science) 
h) Functional background per director (e.g. Finance or Mining) 
i) Board experience in years per director 
j) Mining experience in years 
k) Years of experience on the current board per director 
The following positions were represented across all boards as reported in the annual 
reports: Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Executive Chairman (EC), Deputy Chairman 
(DC), Company Secretary (CS), Financial Director (FD), Executive Director (ED), 
Non-Executive Director (NED), Independent Non-Executive Director (INED) and 
Lead Independent Non-Executive Director (LINED). Some of these positions were 
denoted in different titles but were subsequently reclassified as reported in Table 5.1.  
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Table  5.1: Positions with similar meaning 
Chairperson 
Chairman 
= Executive Chairman (including female 
or males) 
Managing Director = Chief Executive Officer 
Chief Financial Officer 
Finance Director 
= Financial Director 
Independent Director = Independent Non-Executive Director 
Inside Director = Executive Director 
Outside Director = Non-Executive Director 
 
 
Companies in the mining industry can be classified into size by means of their 
turnover (JSE, 2009). The StatsSA (2009) has classified companies in the mining 
industry into four categories namely Large (turnover exceeding R39 000 000), 
Medium (turnover between R10 000 000 and R39 000 000), Small (turnover between 
R4 000 000 and R10 000 000) and Micro (less than R4 000 000 turnover).  
Although the researcher tried to adopt the classification criteria of StatsSA to classify 
JSE listed companies. However, the process was discarded as more than 98% of 
companies were classified in the “large” category. Instead, this research employed 
the turnover or revenue figures shown in Table 5.2 below. 
Table  5.2: Classification of mining companies to size using turnover 
Industry size Turnover 
Mega ≥30 000 000 000 
Large 1 000 000 0000 ≥29 999 000 000 
Medium 500 000 000 ≥ 999 999 000 
Small 100 000 000 ≥ 499 999 000 
Micro ≤ 99 999 000 
For the purpose of this research, Table 5.2 above, shows that JSE listed companies 
in the South African mining industry were classified into five categories. A company 
with a turnover exceeding 30 billion was classified as a mega company, a company 
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with a turnover between 1 billion and 29 billion was classified as a large company, a 
company with a turnover between 500 million and 999 million was classified as a 
medium company, a company with a turnover between 100 million and 499 million 
was classified a small company, and lastly a company of turnover of less than 99 
million was classified as a micro company.   
The process of classifying JSE listed mining companies to size, showed that five 
companies were classified under the mega category, whilst 23 companies were 
classified under the large category, only six companies were classified in the 
medium category, 11 companies in the small category and another 11 companies in 
the micro category as shown in Table 5.3.  
Table  5.3: Number of mining companies in each industry category 






The next section depicts the statistics of board composition of JSE listed mining 
companies in 2011.  
5.3 BOARD COMPOSITION OF MINING COMPANIES LISTED ON THE 
JSE IN 2011 
Board composition analysis is presented in the form of board size and positions 
represented on board level. Criteria for board appointments are covered in Phase 2 
of data analysis reporting (Chapter 6). Table 5.4 lists each company in a classified 
category, it also provides the turnover for the 2011 financial year, positions 
represented on board level and the board size. Table 5.5 provides a cumulative 





Table  5.4: Board size and positions represented on board level per company 




            
Anglo American Platinum 51 584 000 000 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 6 1 14 
AngloGold Ashanti 47 849 000 000 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 8 0 11 
BHP Billiton 482 803 470 000 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 10 0 13 
Goldfields 41 877 000 000 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 10 0 13 
Impala Platinum 33 132 000 000 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 7 1 14 
Total  5 0 5 1 4 1 1 5 41 2 65 
Large 
companies 
            
African Rainbow Minerals 15 357 000 000 1 1 0 0 1 0 5 1 8 0 17 
Anglo American PLC 6 000 000 000 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 7 1 0 11 
Aquarius Platinum 4 596 032 100 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 4 
Assore 10 000 000 000 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 4 0 9 
Coal of Africa 1 758 892 050 1 0 1 1 2 0 1 3 3 0 12 
Diamond Corp 4 140 756 000 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 6 
DRDGOLD 2 565 000 000 1 0 1 0 1 1 2 1 2 0 9 
Exxaro 21 305 000 000 1 1 0 0 1 0 3 6 0 0 12 
GoldOne 1 259 600 000 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 5 0 0 8 
Goliath Gold 1 250 537 268 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 6 
Harmony 12 000 000 000 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 11 1 16 
Lonmin 13 600 000 000 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 6 0 11 
Merafe Resources 2 426 755 000 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 8 0 12 
Mvelaphanda Group 1 886 000 000 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 5 
Northam Platinum 3 571 048 000 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 6 2 13 
Omnia Holdings 9 368 000 000 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 6 0 11 
Optimum Coal 5 289 000 000 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 4 4 0 12 
Palabora Mining 
Company 
9 092 000 000 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 6 0 1 10 
RandGold & Exploration 
company Limited 
1 826 000 000 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 5 
Resource Generation 8 274 500 000 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 5 
Royal Bafokeng Platinum 2 974 900 000 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 5 0 10 
Sentula Mining 2 402 375 000 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 4 0 8 
Tawana Resources 1 167 069 490 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 6 
Total  19 2 20 4 17 4 24 47 77 4 218 
Medium 
companies 
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Company Turnover (2011) CEO EC NEC DC FD CS ED NED INED LINED Board 
size 
Afrimat 854 500 000 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 3 2 0 10 
Eastern Platinum Limited 761 512 650 1 0 1 0 1 0 5 0 0 0 8 
Pan African Resource 730 297 760 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 7 
Petmin 641 467 000 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 3 3 1 12 
Transhex 657 998 000 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 6 
Wescoal 557 598 179 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 6 
Total  6 1 5 2 6 0 9 10 9 1 49 
Small 
companies 
            
Bauba Platinum 410 000 000 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 3 1 9 
Firestone Energy Ltd 390 150 560 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 5 
Great Basin Gold 162 271 000 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 0 8 
Hwange Colliery 107 895 986 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 4 0 9 
Infrassors 239 400 000 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 8 
Kumba Iron Ore 485 530 000 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 4 0 10 
Miranda Mineral Holdings 268 000 000 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 4 0 8 
Rockwell Diamonds 294 578 686 1 1 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 7 
Simmer & Jack Mines 104 510 000 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 5 
South African Coal 
Mining 
374 338 000 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 5 
Thabex Limited 409 011 000 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 2 0 7 
Total  8 3 8 0 6 1 9 23 21 2 81 
Micro companies              
Chrometco 15 371 000 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 4 
JCI Limited 17 450 000 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 6 
Jubilee Platinum 5 503 000 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 6 
Keaton Energy Holdings 35 200 000 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 3 2 0 10 
Platfields Limited 19 707 461 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 1 0 7 
SACoil Limited 35 143 119 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 8 
Sallies 56 071 000 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 7 
Sephaku Holdings 5 759 678 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 5 1 2 12 
Village Main Reef 17 552 000 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 3 4 0 11 
Wesizwe -393 000 000 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 6 2 0 12 
Wits Gold 24 645 363 1 0 1 1 1 0 3 0 3 0 10 
Total  9 1 9 2 10 0 14 24 21 3 93 
Grand Total  47 7 47 9 43 6 57 109 169 12 506 




Table  5.5 :  Cumulative industry distribution of positions represented on board level 
Industry 
category 
Positions represented on board level 
CEO EC NEC DC FD CS ED NED INED LINED Total % 
Mega 7.7% 0.0% 7.7% 1.5% 6.2% 1.5% 1.5% 7.7% 63.1% 3.1% 100.0% 
Large 8.7% 0.9% 9.2% 1.8% 7.8% 1.8% 11.0% 21.6% 35.3% 1.8% 100.0% 
Medium 12.2% 2.0% 10.2% 4.1% 12.2% 0.0% 18.4% 20.4% 18.4% 2.0% 100.0% 
Small 9.9% 3.7% 9.9% 0.0% 7.4% 1.2% 11.1% 28.4% 25.9% 2.5% 100.0% 
Micro 9.7% 1.1% 9.7% 2.2% 10.8% 0.0% 15.1% 25.8% 22.6% 3.2% 100.0% 




The agency theory and the King Report recommend for companies to have a 
structured board to assume the role of corporate control and monitoring (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). All mining companies in the study followed a structured one-tier 
single board system that consists of a balance of power; a mixture of executive and 
non-executive directors interrelating in a committee. 
To illustrate board independence, Table 5.5 shows how positions are distributed in 
each industry category. Board independence is reflected by a mixture of independent 
and non-executive independent directors to produce best fit for financial value 
(Carter et al., 2003; IoD, 2009; Ruigrok et al., 2007). Table 5.5 shows that the 
majority (33.4%) of positions were held by independent non-executive directors, 
followed by non-executive directors (21.5%). It also shows that in mega companies 
the majority of positions were held by independent non-executive directors (63.1% of 
board composition). In large companies the majority of positions were held by 
independent non-executive directors with a 35.3% representation. In medium 
companies the majority of positions were held by non-executive directors (20.4%) 
followed by executive directors and independent non-executive director each with an 
18.4% representation. In small companies the majority of positions were held by 
non-executive directors (28.4%) followed by independent non-executive directors 
with 25.9%. In micro companies, the majority of positions were held by non-
executive directors (25.8%) followed by independent non-executive director with a 
representation of 22.6%. This shows a balance of power on the boards of JSE listed 




The literature review in Chapter 3 demonstrated that there is general agreement that 
one person should not concurrently hold the CEO and board chairperson positions 
(Daily & Dalton, 2003; IoD, 1994; IoD, 2009; Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989). All the mining companies made a distinction between the CEO and 
chairman position. However, it was concerning that nine companies did not have a 
CEO, one company did not have a chairman, 13 companies did not have a financial 
director and 50 companies did not have a company secretary on their board. It was 
also an important finding that 47 out 54 (87%) of chairman positions were non-
executive, whilst seven (13%) of chairman positions were executive. 
Table  5.6:  Cumulative summary of board size in each industry category 
Industry size Minimum Maximum Mean 
Mega 11 14 13 
Large 4 17 9 
Medium 6 12 8 
Small 5 10 7 
Micro 4 12 8 




Table 5.6 provides a consolidated view of board sizes in all categories. Board size is 
calculated by the total number of directors serving on the board. According to the 
results tabulated in Table 5.6 in mega companies, the board with the most board 
members had 14 members and the board with the lowest number had 11 members. 
Thus, the average board size in a mega company was 13 members. In large 
companies the largest board had 17 members, whilst the smallest board had four 
members. The average board size in a large company was nine members. In 
medium companies the largest board had 12 members and the smallest board had 
six members. The average board size in medium companies was eight members. In 
small companies the largest board had 10 members and the smallest board had five 
members. The average board size in a small company was seven members. In 
micro companies the largest board had 12 members and the smallest board had only 
four directors. The average board size in micro companies was eight members.  
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Using the mean scores, it is thus deduced from Table 5.6 that on average a board of 
a mining company has a minimum of seven directors and a maximum of 13 
directors. On average, the board size in a JSE listed mining company has nine 
members. 
Studies of Zahra and Pearce (1989) revealed that companies with larger board sizes 
had higher financial returns than companies with smaller ones. In contrary, other 
studies suggested that small boards enhance organisational financial performance 
(Daily et al., 1999; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996) and are conducive for efficiency in 
decision making (Randøy et al., 2006). Cumulative results of board size in the mining 
industry show there is a correlation between board size and financial performance, 
as that the largest board size was found in a mega company with a mean of 13. The 
second largest board size was found in a large company with a mean of 9. The 
smallest board size was found in a small company with a mean of 7. The second 
smallest board size was found in a micro company with a mean of 8. 
5.4 PROFILES OF DIRECTORS ON THE BOARD 
Firstly, the demographical presentation of board members from mega to micro 
companies is presented in terms of race, gender and nationality. Also, the 
demographical statistical analysis of different director positions is included. Lastly, 
cumulative statistics of demographics, age, educational and functional background of 
director positions are presented. 
The five racial groups were recorded as Asian, Black, Coloured, Indian and White. 
The Black race includes foreigners in Africa and does not include Indians, Asians 
and Coloureds. The Chinese ethnic group was categorised under the Asian racial 
group. Nationality can either be South African, Foreign or Dual. Those with dual 
nationality hold both South African and British citizenship. The racial characters can 
be described as follows: 
A = Asian 
B = Black 
C = Coloured 
I = Indian 
W = White 
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5.4.1 Demographical presentation of results in mega companies 
Figure 5.2 shows the racial profile of directors in mega companies. It reveals that the 
majority (66.2%) of board positions were held by the White racial group, followed by 
Blacks (30.8%), followed by Indians and Coloureds with 1.5% representation each. A 
concerning finding was that there was no representation of Asians (female or male) 
represented on the boards of mega companies. 
 
Figure  5.2:  Racial profile of directors in mega companies 
 
To determine the disparities between male and female in mega companies, Figure 
5.3 shows that mega companies were dominated by male board members with a 
78.5% representation whilst 21.5% of board positions were held by females. 
 
Figure  5.3: Gender profile of directors in mega companies 
 

















Table  5.7: Racial and gender profile of directors in mega companies 
 
Mega companies 
Gender per race 
Grand 
Total Female Female 
Total 
Male Male 
Total B C W B I W 
Anglo American 
Platinum 14.3% 0.0% 14.3% 28.6% 21.4% 7.1% 42.9% 71.4% 100.0% 
AngloGold Ashanti 9.1% 0.0% 0.0% 9.1% 36.4% 0.0% 54.5% 90.9% 100.0% 
BHP Billiton 0.0% 0.0% 23.1% 23.1% 0.0% 0.0% 76.9% 76.9% 100.0% 
Goldfields 7.7% 7.7% 7.7% 23.1% 23.1% 0.0% 53.8% 76.9% 100.0% 
Impala Platinum 14.3% 0.0% 7.1% 21.4% 28.6% 0.0% 50.0% 78.6% 100.0% 
Grand Total 9.2% 1.5% 10.8% 21.5% 21.5% 1.5% 55.4% 78.5% 100.0% 
 
 
This comparison in Table 5.7 of the distribution of race, per gender, in each company 
in the mega category, shows that cumulatively White males carried a larger 
proportion of board seats with 55.4%, compared to Black males with 21.5% with a 
dismal 1.5% for Indian males. Only one company (BHP Billiton) had over 75% board 
positions representing White males, the other companies had less than 55% 
representation of White males. Furthermore, there was almost an equal distribution 
of Black females (9.2%) to White females (10.8%). It is rather alarming that the 
following racial groups were non-existent in mega companies: Indian females, Asian 
males and females, and Coloured males. Table 5.8 below, shows how board 
positions were demographically distributed in mega companies. 
Table  5.8: Gender and racial profile of board positions in mega companies 
 
Board position 
Gender per race 




B C W B I W 
CEO 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
NEC 20.0% 0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 40.0% 0.0% 20.0% 60.0% 100.0% 
DC 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
FD 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 75.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
CS 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
ED 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
NED 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 60.0% 0.0% 40.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
INED 12.2% 2.4% 12.2% 26.8% 19.5% 0.0% 53.7% 73.2% 100.0% 
LINED 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 




Table 5.8 presents the demographic profiles of different director positions in mega 
companies. It reveals that CEO positions in mega companies were exclusively 
occupied by White males. Also exclusive positions held by White males were those 
of executive directors and lead independent non-executive directors. However, 
independent non-executive director positions were distributed among different races 
with Black females accounting for 12.2%, Coloured females accounting for 2.4%, 
White females at 12.2%, Black males at 19.5% and White males at 73.2%. The 
financial director positions were distributed exclusively to males, White males (75%) 
and Black males (25%). Only one company in the mega company category had a 
deputy chairman, this position was occupied by an Indian candidate accounting for 
the total Indian representation in mega companies.  
 
 
Figure  5.4: Nationality profile of directors in mega companies 
 
Figure 5.4 illustrates that mega companies almost have an equal distribution of 
foreign nationals (49.2%) and South Africans (50.8%) on its boards.  
Table 5.9 shows how the nationality aspect was distributed in each gender. 
Table  5.9: Nationality profile of directors in mega companies 
Company 
Nationality per gender 
Grand 




Female Male Female Male 
Anglo American Platinum 7.1% 42.9% 50.0% 21.4% 28.6% 50.0% 100.0% 
AngloGold Ashanti 0.0% 54.5% 54.5% 9.1% 36.4% 45.5% 100.0% 
BHP Billiton 23.1% 69.2% 92.3% 0.0% 7.7% 7.7% 100.0% 
Goldfields 0.0% 46.2% 46.2% 23.1% 30.8% 53.8% 100.0% 
Impala Platinum 0.0% 7.1% 7.1% 21.4% 71.4% 92.9% 100.0% 







It was of interest to note the nationality profile of BHP Billiton (a South African 
company); in this company 92.3% of the board positions were held by foreign 
nationals. Conversely, in Impala Platinum almost 93% of the board seats were 
occupied by South Africans. Table 5.9 shows that 6.2% of females were classified as 
foreign, compared to 43.1% of the males in this category. It also shows that local 
females held 15.4% of board positions compared to males that held 35.4% of the 
South African total (50.8%). This indicates that most board positions held by foreign 
nationals were held by males. 
5.4.2 Demographical presentation of results in large companies 
Racial statistics in Figure 5.5 below, reveal that in large companies the Asian racial 
group held 0.5% (only males) of racial representation, Indians and Coloured racial 
groups each held 2.3%, Blacks accounted for the second majority of 31.7% and the 
White racial group accounted for the majority of 63.3% of board positions. 
 
 




Figure 5.6 below shows that in large companies, females held 12.8% and males held 
















Figure  5.6: Gender profile of directors in large companies 
 









Table  5.10: Racial and gender profile of directors in large companies 
Mega companies 
 
Gender per race 
 
Grand Total Female 
Female Total 
Male 
Male Total B C I W A B C I W 
African Rainbow Minerals 11.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.8% 0.0% 29.4% 0.0% 0.0% 58.8% 88.2% 100.0% 
Anglo American PLC 9.1% 0.0% 0.0% 9.1% 18.2% 9.1% 9.1% 0.0% 0.0% 63.6% 81.8% 100.0% 
Aquarius Platinum 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Assore 11.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 0.0% 11.1% 0.0% 0.0% 77.8% 88.9% 100.0% 
Coal of Africa 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 75.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Diamond Corp 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
DRDGOLD 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 22.2% 11.1% 0.0% 66.7% 100.0% 100.0% 
Exxaro 8.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 8.3% 0.0% 41.7% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 91.7% 100.0% 
GoldOne 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 12.5% 0.0% 0.0% 87.5% 100.0% 100.0% 
Goliath Gold 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 0.0% 83.3% 100.0% 100.0% 
Harmony 6.3% 0.0% 0.0% 6.3% 12.5% 0.0% 43.8% 0.0% 0.0% 43.8% 87.5% 100.0% 
Lonmin 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 9.1% 9.1% 0.0% 9.1% 0.0% 18.2% 63.6% 90.9% 100.0% 
Merafe Resources 41.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 41.7% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 58.3% 100.0% 
Mvelaphanda Group 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 60.0% 0.0% 0.0% 40.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Northam Platinum 15.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 15.4% 0.0% 30.8% 0.0% 15.4% 38.5% 84.6% 100.0% 
Omnia Holdings 0.0% 9.1% 9.1% 9.1% 27.3% 0.0% 9.1% 0.0% 0.0% 63.6% 72.7% 100.0% 
Optimum Coal 16.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 33.3% 8.3% 0.0% 41.7% 83.3% 100.0% 
Palabora Mining Company 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 0.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0% 50.0% 80.0% 100.0% 
RandGold & Exploration company  20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 80.0% 80.0% 100.0% 
Resource Generation 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Royal Bafokeng Platinum 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 10.0% 30.0% 0.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0% 40.0% 70.0% 100.0% 
Sentula Mining 12.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 12.5% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 62.5% 87.5% 100.0% 
Tawana Resources 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 




It is shown in Table 5.10 that a total of nine out of 23 (40% of large companies) had 
100% of board representation by males. This table also shows that amongst those 
nine companies, four companies (Aquarius Platinum, Diamond Corp, Resource 
Generation, and Tawana Resources) had a 100% White male domination on their 
board. Furthermore, six companies had 75%, or higher, representations of White 
males on their boards, namely, Assore (77.8%), Coal of Africa (75%), Goldone 
(87.5%), Goliath Gold (3.3%), RandGold & Exploration Company (80%) and Sentula 
Mining (87.5%). Considering total male representation (i.e. 87.2%), it was found that 
White males held the majority of board seats (60.6% of board positions) and Black 
males held only 22.5%, the remaining positions. Asian males (0.5%), Indian males 
1.8% and Coloured males (1.8%) accounted for only a few seats. It was also 
interesting to note that Black females held 9.2% of board seats, compared to White 
females who held 2.8%. Asians females were non-existent in large companies whilst 
Coloureds (male and female) held 1% of board positions. 
Table  5.11: Racial and gender profile of board positions in large companies 
Board 
position 






Total B C I W A B C I W 
CEO 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 5.3% 0.0% 10.5% 5.3% 0.0% 78.9% 94.7% 100.0% 
EC 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
NEC 5.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 70.0% 95.0% 100.0% 
DC 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 75.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
FD 11.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.8% 0.0% 5.9% 0.0% 0.0% 82.4% 88.2% 100.0% 
CS 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
ED 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 29.2% 0.0% 0.0% 70.8% 100.0% 100.0% 
NED 4.3% 0.0% 0.0% 2.1% 6.4% 2.1% 25.5% 2.1% 2.1% 61.7% 93.6% 100.0% 
INED 18.2% 0.0% 1.3% 5.2% 24.7% 0.0% 24.7% 2.6% 2.6% 45.5% 75.3% 100.0% 
LINED 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 50.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
Grand 
Total 9.2% 0.5% 0.5% 2.8% 12.8% 0.5% 22.5% 1.8% 1.8% 60.6% 87.2% 100.0% 
 
 
The demographic distribution per director position in large companies as shown in 
Table 5.11, demonstrates that almost 94% of CEO positions were held by males and 
that females accounted for just about 5% of the total. The most prominent 
demographic group appointed as CEOs was White males who accounted for almost 
79%, followed by Black males (10.5%), Coloured males (5.3%) and White females 
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(5.3%). The financial director positions were held mostly by White males (82.4%), 
while the remaining 11.8% were held by Black females. 
 
Figure  5.7: Nationality profile of directors in large companies (n = 218) 
 
Figure 5.7 shows that in large companies, 164 (more than 75%) of the board 
positions were held by South Africans, while 52 foreign nationals accounted for 
almost 24%. Two board members held both South African and British citizenship. 
As can be seen from Table 5.12 below, 11 of the 22 companies employed only 
South African board members. However, it is alarming that three companies 
(Diamond Corp, Resource Generation and Tawana Resources) had 100% foreign 












Table  5.12: Nationality and gender profile of directors in large companies 
Large companies 
Nationality per gender 
Grand 




South African SA 
Total Male Female Male Female Male 
African Rainbow Minerals 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.8% 88.2% 100.0% 100.0% 
Anglo American PLC 0.0% 0.0% 9.1% 72.7% 81.8% 9.1% 9.1% 18.2% 100.0% 
Aquarius Platinum 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 75.0% 75.0% 0.0% 25.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
Assore 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 88.9% 100.0% 100.0% 
Coal of Africa 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 58.3% 58.3% 0.0% 41.7% 41.7% 100.0% 
Diamond Corp 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
DRDGOLD 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
100.0
% 100.0% 100.0% 
Exxaro 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 8.3% 91.7% 100.0% 100.0% 
GoldOne 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 37.5% 37.5% 0.0% 62.5% 62.5% 100.0% 
Goliath Gold 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
100.0
% 100.0% 100.0% 
Harmony 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.3% 6.3% 12.5% 81.3% 93.8% 100.0% 
Lonmin 18.2% 18.2% 9.1% 36.4% 45.5% 0.0% 36.4% 36.4% 100.0% 
Merafe Resources 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 41.7% 58.3% 100.0% 100.0% 
Mvelaphanda Group 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
100.0
% 100.0% 100.0% 
Northam Platinum 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 15.4% 15.4% 15.4% 69.2% 84.6% 100.0% 
Omnia Holdings 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 27.3% 72.7% 100.0% 100.0% 
Optimum Coal 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 83.3% 100.0% 100.0% 
Palabora Mining Co. 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 40.0% 40.0% 20.0% 40.0% 60.0% 100.0% 
RandGold & Exploration 
company Limited 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 80.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Resource Generation 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Royal Bafokeng Platinum 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 10.0% 10.0% 30.0% 60.0% 90.0% 100.0% 
Sentula Mining 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 12.5% 87.5% 100.0% 100.0% 
Tawana Resources 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Grand Total 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 22.9% 23.9% 11.9% 63.3% 75.2% 100.0% 
 
 
5.4.3 Demographical presentation of results in medium companies 
The overall racial profile of medium companies shown in figure 5.8 below, shows that 
the White racial group held the majority of positions (73.5%), whilst the Black racial 
group held 14.3% and Indians and Coloureds each held 6.1% of the positions on 





Figure  5.8: Racial profile of directors in medium companies (n = 49) 
 
 
The gender profile of directors, as depicted in Figure 5.9, shows that in medium 
companies, 45 board positions (91.8%) were held by males and the remaining four 
positions (8.2%) were held by females. 
 
 
Figure  5.9: Gender profile of directors in medium companies (n = 49) 
 



















Table  5.13: Racial and gender profile of directors in medium companies 
Medium companies 
Gender per race 
Grand 
Total Female Female 
Total 
Male Male 
Total B C B C I W 
Afrimat 10.0% 0.0% 10.0% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 80.0% 90.0% 100.0% 
Eastern Platinum 
Limited 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Pan African Resource 14.3% 0.0% 14.3% 14.3% 0.0% 0.0% 71.4% 85.7% 100.0% 
Petmin 8.3% 0.0% 8.3% 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 75.0% 91.7% 100.0% 
Transhex 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 16.7% 50.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Wescoal 0.0% 16.7% 16.7% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 83.3% 100.0% 
Grand Total 6.1% 2.0% 8.2% 8.2% 4.1% 6.1% 73.5% 91.8% 100.0% 
 
 
It is interesting to note that no White and Indian females were appointed as board 
members in medium companies. However, there was one Coloured female (2% 
representation) and three Black females (6.1% representation). Four out of six 
companies in the medium category had more than 75% White male representation 
on their boards. The Afrimat board constituted of 80.0% White males, Eastern 
Platinum’s board had 100% White males representation, Pan African Resource’s 
board constituted of 71.4% White males and 75% of Petmin’s board members were 
White males. 





Gender per race 
Grand 
Total Female Female 
Total 
Male Male 
Total B C B C I W 
CEO 6 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 83.3% 100.0% 100.0% 
EC 1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
NEC 5 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 40.0% 0.0% 0.0% 60.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
DC 2 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
FD 6 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
ED 9 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 0.0% 88.9% 100.0% 100.0% 
NED 10 10.0% 0.0% 10.0% 10.0% 0.0% 10.0% 70.0% 90.0% 100.0% 
INED 9 11.1% 11.1% 22.2% 11.1% 0.0% 22.2% 44.4% 77.8% 100.0% 
LINED 1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Grand 




As shown in Table 5.14, all companies in the medium category did not have a 
company secretary. The CEO positions in medium companies were distributed 
between White males (83.3% of positions) and Coloured males (16.7% of positions). 
All executive chairman, financial director and lead independent non-executive 
director positions were exclusively held by the White males. White males showed 
less dominance on independent non-executive position with a 44% representation. 
 
Figure  5.10: Nationality profiles of directors in medium companies 
 
In medium companies, South African nationals held 77.6% representation whilst 
foreign nationals held only 22.4% representation. Table 5.15 shows how nationality 
was distributed in each gender. 
Table  5.15: Nationality and gender profile of directors in medium companies 
Medium companies 
Nationality per gender 
Grand Total Foreign 
Foreign Total 
South African 
South African Total 
Male Female Male 
Afrimat 0.0% 0.0% 10.0% 90.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Eastern Platinum Limited 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Pan African Resource 0.0% 0.0% 14.3% 85.7% 100.0% 100.0% 
Petmin 25.0% 25.0% 8.3% 66.7% 75.0% 100.0% 
Transhex 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Wescoal 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 83.3% 100.0% 100.0% 







It is shown in the table above that only one company (Eastern Platinum Limited) had 
100% foreign representation on their board, and four companies had 100% South 
African citizens on their board.  
5.4.4 Demographical presentation of results in small companies 
As can be seen in the figure below, the racial profiles of small companies show that 
54.3% of board positions were held by the White racial group followed closely by the 
Black race (40.7% of representations) and the remaining 3.7% of positions were held 
by Indians. It is also revealed in figure 5.11 that no Asians and Coloureds were 
represented on boards of small mining companies. 
 
 
Figure  5.11: Racial profile of directors in small companies (n = 81) 
 
Figure 5.12 below, illustrates that in small companies 72 out of 81 board members 
are male whilst females held only 11.1% (nine out of 81) board positions. 
 


















Table  5.16: Racial and gender profile of directors in small companies 
Small companies 
Gender per race 
Grand 
Total Female Female 
Total 
Male Male 
Total B I W A B I W 
Bauba Platinum 11.1% 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 55.6% 88.9% 100.0% 
Firestone Energy Ltd 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 60.0% 0.0% 40.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Great Basin Gold 12.5% 0.0% 12.5% 25.0% 0.0% 12.5% 0.0% 62.5% 75.0% 100.0% 
Hwange Colliery 11.1% 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 0.0% 88.9% 0.0% 0.0% 88.9% 100.0% 
Infrassors 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 75.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Kumba Iron Ore 10.0% 10.0% 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 30.0% 0.0% 50.0% 80.0% 100.0% 
Miranda Mineral 
Holdings 12.5% 0.0% 12.5% 25.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 50.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
Rockwell Diamonds 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 14.3% 14.3% 0.0% 71.4% 100.0% 100.0% 
Simmer & Jack 
Mines 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 80.0% 80.0% 100.0% 
South African Coal 
Mining 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 40.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Thabex Limited 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 42.9% 0.0% 57.1% 100.0% 100.0% 
Grand Total 7.4% 1.2% 2.5% 11.1% 1.2% 33.3% 2.5% 51.9% 88.9% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 5.16 shows that all small companies had more than 80% male representation 
on their boards with five companies having 100% male domination (Firestone Energy 
Limited, Infrassors, Rockwell Diamonds, South African Coal Mining and Thabex 
Limited). White males dominated board positions with 51.9% representation, 
followed by Black males representing 33.3% and Black females 7.4%, the remaining 
7.4% was shared by other racial groups.  
Table 5.17 below shows the racial and gender profile of board positions in small 
companies. As can be seen from this table, the position demographics in small 
companies reveal that 100% of CEO and executive chairman positions were held by 
the White males. Independent non-executive directors were distributed across race 
and gender groups but the majority were held by White and Black males, each 
accounting for 38.1%, followed by Black females (19% of representation), and with 
Indian females holding the remaining 4.8% board positions. Results show that no 





Table  5.17: Racial and gender profile of board positions in small companies 
Board 
position 
Gender per race Grand 
Total Female Female 
Total 
Male Male 
Total B I W A B I W 
CEO 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
EC 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
NEC 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 62.5% 0.0% 37.5% 100.0% 100.0% 
FD 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 16.7% 0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 66.7% 83.3% 100.0% 
CS 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
ED 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 33.3% 0.0% 55.6% 100.0% 100.0% 
NED 8.7% 0.0% 4.3% 13.0% 0.0% 34.8% 8.7% 43.5% 87.0% 100.0% 
INED 19.0% 4.8% 0.0% 23.8% 0.0% 38.1% 0.0% 38.1% 76.2% 100.0% 
LINED 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Grand Total 7.4% 1.2% 2.5% 11.1% 1.2% 33.3% 2.5% 51.9% 88.9% 100.0% 
 
 
Figure 5.13 presents the nationality distribution in small companies and shows that 
55 positions, namely 67.9% were held by South Africans and the remaining 26 
positions (32.1%) were held by foreign nationals. 
 
Figure  5.13: Nationality distribution of directors in small companies (n =81) 
 
 
Table 5.18 below, shows that only one company, Hwange Colliery, had 100% foreign 
nationals representation on their board, whilst Simmer and Jack Mines had 100% 
South African citizens on the board. Nine out of 11 small companies had more than 







Table  5.18: Nationality and gender profile of directors in small companies 
Small companies 
Nationality per gender 
Grand 




Female Male Female Male 
Bauba Platinum 0.0% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 77.8% 88.9% 100.0% 
Firestone Energy Ltd 0.0% 40.0% 40.0% 0.0% 60.0% 60.0% 100.0% 
Great Basin Gold 12.5% 12.5% 25.0% 12.5% 62.5% 75.0% 100.0% 
Hwange Colliery 11.1% 88.9% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Infrassors 0.0% 12.5% 12.5% 0.0% 87.5% 87.5% 100.0% 
Kumba Iron Ore 0.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 60.0% 80.0% 100.0% 
Miranda Mineral Holdings 0.0% 12.5% 12.5% 25.0% 62.5% 87.5% 100.0% 
Rockwell Diamonds 0.0% 71.4% 71.4% 0.0% 28.6% 28.6% 100.0% 
Simmer & Jack Mines 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 80.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
South African Coal Mining 0.0% 40.0% 40.0% 0.0% 60.0% 60.0% 100.0% 
Thabex Limited 0.0% 14.3% 14.3% 0.0% 85.7% 85.7% 100.0% 
Grand Total 2.5% 29.6% 32.1% 8.6% 59.3% 67.9% 100.0% 
 
 
5.4.5 Demographical presentation of results in micro companies 
 
Figure  5.14: Racial profile of directors in micro companies (n = 93) 
The racial profile of micro companies, as depicted in Figure 5.14, shows that the 
majority of board positions were held by the White racial group (64.5% of 
representation), followed by Blacks (26.9% of representation), followed by the 
Indians and Coloureds racial groups with 6.1% each. Asians were not represented 














As shown in Figure 5.15 below, males held 83 positions on boards, accounting for 
91.8% representation, whilst females held 10 positions, accounting for 8.2% of the 
board positions.  
 
Figure  5.15: Gender profile of directors in micro companies (n = 93) 
 
The racial and gender distribution in micro companies is shown in Table 5.19 below. 
Table  5.19: Racial and gender profiles of directors in micro companies 
Micro companies 
Gender per race Grand 
Total Female Female 
Total 
Male Male 
Total B C B C I W 
Afrimat 10.0% 0.0% 10.0% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 80.0% 90.0% 100.0% 
Eastern Platinum Limited 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Pan African Resource 14.3% 0.0% 14.3% 14.3% 0.0% 0.0% 71.4% 85.7% 100.0% 
Petmin 8.3% 0.0% 8.3% 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 75.0% 91.7% 100.0% 
Transhex 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 16.7% 50.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Wescoal 0.0% 16.7% 16.7% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 83.3% 100.0% 
Grand Total 6.1% 2.0% 8.2% 8.2% 4.1% 6.1% 73.5% 91.8% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 5.19 shows that there were only two representatives of Black (6.1%) and 
Coloured (2.0%) females. No White or Indian females served on the boards of micro 
companies. Indian males held 6.1% of board positions, which were equal to 
Coloureds (female and male combined) and Black females. The position 







Table  5.20: Racial and gender profile of board positions in micro companies 
Board position 
Gender per race Grand 
Total Female Female 
Total 
Male Male 
Total B C W A B W 
CEO 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 11.1% 77.8% 100.0% 100.0% 
EC 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
NEC 11.1% 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 0.0% 11.1% 77.8% 88.9% 100.0% 
DC 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
FD 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0% 70.0% 80.0% 100.0% 
ED 7.1% 0.0% 7.1% 14.3% 7.1% 14.3% 64.3% 85.7% 100.0% 
NED 8.3% 0.0% 0.0% 8.3% 12.5% 37.5% 41.7% 91.7% 100.0% 
INED 0.0% 4.8% 4.8% 9.5% 0.0% 23.8% 66.7% 90.5% 100.0% 
LINED 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
Grand Total 4.3% 1.1% 5.4% 10.8% 7.5% 22.6% 59.1% 89.2% 100.0% 
 
 
In terms of demographical statistics relating to micro companies, CEO positions were 
distributed between White males (77.8% or CEO positions), Black males (11.1% of 
CEO positions) and Asian males (one CEO representing 11.1% of CEO positions).  
Figure 5.16 illustrates that 82.8% of board seats were occupied by South Africans, 












Table 5.21 shows that three companies had 100% South African nationals on their 
boards, and the remaining companies had a mixture of foreign nationals and local 
candidates on their boards. 
Table  5.21: Nationality and gender profile of directors in micro companies 
Micro companies 
Nationality per gender 
Grand Total Foreign 
Foreign Total 
South African 
South African Total 
Male Female Male 
Chrometco 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
JCI Limited 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Jubilee Platinum 33.3% 33.3% 0.0% 66.7% 66.7% 100.0% 
Keaton Energy Holdings 10.0% 10.0% 20.0% 70.0% 90.0% 100.0% 
Platfields Limited 14.3% 14.3% 14.3% 71.4% 85.7% 100.0% 
SACoil Limited 37.5% 37.5% 12.5% 50.0% 62.5% 100.0% 
Sallies 42.9% 42.9% 0.0% 57.1% 57.1% 100.0% 
Sephaku Holdings 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 83.3% 100.0% 100.0% 
Village Main Reef 9.1% 9.1% 18.2% 72.7% 90.9% 100.0% 
Wesizwe 25.0% 25.0% 8.3% 66.7% 75.0% 100.0% 
Wits Gold 20.0% 20.0% 10.0% 70.0% 80.0% 100.0% 
Grand Total 17.2% 17.2% 10.8% 72.0% 82.8% 100.0% 
 
 
5.5 CUMULATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS  
This section presents a cumulative analysis of demographic and career experience 
profiles of directors on the board. The criteria that were considered included age, 
qualifications, qualification levels, as well as any relevant mining and board 
experience. 
5.5.1 Racial profiles in the South African mining industry 
Figure 5.17 depicts the overall collective racial demographics of board members in 





Figure  5.17: Cumulative racial profile in the mining industry 
 
Figure 5.17 shows the cumulative racial demographics, and displays that the 
majority of board positions (63.4%) were occupied by the White group, followed by 
the Black group at 30.4% representation. The remaining 6.2% was distributed 
among Indians (2.4%) and Coloureds (2%), with Asians the minority with 1.8% 
representation. 
Table  5.22:  Cumulative industry racial demographic profiles 
Industry category Race Grand Total 
A B C I W 
Mega 0.0% 30.8% 1.5% 1.5% 66.2% 100.0% 
Large 0.5% 31.7% 2.3% 2.3% 63.3% 100.0% 
Medium 0.0% 14.3% 6.1% 6.1% 73.5% 100.0% 
Small 1.2% 40.7% 0.0% 3.7% 54.3% 100.0% 
Micro 7.5% 26.9% 1.1% 0.0% 64.5% 100.0% 
Grand Total 1.8% 30.4% 2.0% 2.4% 63.4% 100.0% 
 
 
As far as the racial profiles are concerned, the mining industry has made some 
strides in achieving racial parity. From a general base of 81% in 2002, representation 
by the White race was 64% in 2011.This means that there has been a 17% 
distribution from the White racial group to other races between 2002 and 2011. 
Representation by the Black race group showed second dominance on the board by 
30% in 2011. However, progress remains slow for other racial groups, namely, 













The data contained in Table 5.22 illustrates that mega companies are still dominated 
by the White racial group (62.2% of board representation), followed by the Black 
racial group with 30.8% representation. Indians and Coloureds, collectively 
accounted for the remaining 3%. No Asians were represented in mega companies. 
In large companies, Whites dominated with 63.3% representation, followed by 
Blacks representing 31.7% of board memberships. Asians, Indians and Coloureds 
collectively accounted for the remaining 5.1%. In medium companies, Whites 
dominated with a 73.5% representation, followed by the Black group occupying 
14.3% of board positions. Asians, Indians and Coloureds collectively accounted for 
the remaining 12.2%. In small companies, Whites dominated with 54.3% 
representation, followed by Blacks with 40.7% representation. Asians and Indians 
collectively accounted for the remaining 4.9% of positions on boards. No Coloureds 
were serving on the boards of small companies. In micro companies, the same trend 
was observed, with Whites dominating representation on boards (64.5%), followed 
by Blacks (26.9%), and with Asians and Coloureds collectively accounting for the 
remaining 8.6%. 
From Table 5.22 and the exposition above, it can be deduced that Asians were 
better represented in micro companies (7.5% of board positions) followed by their 
representation in small companies (1.2%). Black board members were best 
represented in small companies (40.7%), followed by large companies (31.7%) and 
mega companies (30.8%). Coloured groups were better represented in medium 
companies (6.1%), followed by large companies (2.3%). Indian groups were best 
represented in medium companies (6.1%), and small companies (3.7%). Overall 
representation in the various sized companies was dominated by the White race.  
5.5.2 Gender profile in the South African mining industry 
Figure 5.18 illustrates the overall collective gender demographics and Table 5.23, 





Figure  5.18: Cumulative gender profile in the mining industry (n = 506) 
 
Figure 5.18 shows that males occupied the majority of board positions (87.2%), 
compared to females representing 12.8% of board positions. Although racial 
disparities are improving in the mining industry, gender disparities in the mining 
industry remain a concern. Results show the continued dominance of men on the 
board of directors. 





Mega 21.5% 78.5% 65 
Large 12.8% 87.2% 218 
Medium 8.2% 91.8% 49 
Small 11.1% 88.9% 81 
Micro 10.8% 89.2% 93 
Grand Total 12.8% 87.2% 506 
 
 
Table 5.23, however, suggests that mega companies have made great strides in 
addressing gender challenges with a 21.5% representation by females. Large, 
medium, micro and small companies were showing slow transformational progress 
by 2011 with less than 13% female representation. Findings furthermore highlighted 
that 13 out of 56 companies had 100% male domination on their boards. Not one 
company had more than 30% female representation on its board.  
Table 5.24 (below) presents data about races of different genders. Findings indicate 
that White male representation amounted to 59.5% in 2011.Though it was 







encouraging that Black male representation accounted to 22.7% in 2011. Black 
female representation demonstrated a 7.7% representation in 2011, but no Asian 
females were represented on boards. Indians and Coloureds (combined genders) 
each had less than 5% representation. 










Total B C I W A B C I W 
Mega 9.2% 1.5% 0.0% 10.8% 21.5% 0.0% 21.5% 0.0% 1.5% 55.4% 78.5% 100.0% 
Large 9.2% 0.5% 0.5% 2.8% 12.8% 0.5% 22.5% 1.8% 1.8% 60.6% 87.2% 100.0% 
Medium 6.1% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 8.2% 0.0% 8.2% 4.1% 6.1% 73.5% 91.8% 100.0% 
Small 7.4% 0.0% 1.2% 2.5% 11.1% 1.2% 33.3% 0.0% 2.5% 51.9% 88.9% 100.0% 
Micro 4.3% 1.1% 0.0% 5.4% 10.8% 7.5% 22.6% 0.0% 0.0% 59.1% 89.2% 100.0% 
Grand 
Total 7.7% 0.8% 0.4% 4.0% 12.8% 1.8% 22.7% 1.2% 2.0% 59.5% 87.2% 100.0% 
 
5.5.3 Cumulative nationality profile in the South African mining industry 
Figure 5.19 shows the overall nationality demographics and Table 5.24 below shows 








Figure  5.19:  Cumulative nationality profile in the mining industry 
 
Figure 5.19 illustrates that 72.5% of board positions were filled by South Africans, 
whilst 27.1% were held by foreign nationals, and the remaining 0.4% by those with 
dual nationality. Table 5.25 (below) shows that mega companies had almost equal 
distribution between foreign (49.2%) and local (50.8%) nationals represented on 
boards. This was anticipated as the majority of mega companies are foreign-owned 
companies. 
Table  5.25: Cumulative industry nationality profiles 
Industry category Nationality Grand Total 
Dual nationality Foreign South African 
Mega 0.0% 49.2% 50.8% 100.0% 
Large 0.9% 23.9% 75.2% 100.0% 
Medium 0.0% 22.4% 77.6% 100.0% 
Small 0.0% 32.1% 67.9% 100.0% 
Micro 0.0% 17.2% 82.8% 100.0% 































5.6 CUMULATIVE DEMOGRAPHIC BOARD POSITION RESULTS 
Tables 5.26 to 5.28 present the overall board demographics in terms of race and 
gender.  




Asian Black Coloured Indian White 
CEO 2.1% 6.4% 4.3% 0.0% 87.2% 47 
EC 0.0% 28.6% 0.0% 0.0% 71.4% 7 
NEC 0.0% 38.3% 0.0% 0.0% 61.7% 47 
DC 11.1% 33.3% 0.0% 11.1% 44.4% 9 
FD 2.3% 11.6% 0.0% 0.0% 86.0% 43 
CS 0.0% 33.3% 16.7% 0.0% 50.0% 6 
ED 3.5% 22.8% 1.8% 0.0% 71.9% 57 
NED 3.7% 36.7% 0.9% 3.7% 55.0% 109 
INED 0.0% 38.5% 3.0% 3.6% 55.0% 169 
LINED 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 8.3% 66.7% 12 
Grand Total 1.8% 30.4% 2.0% 2.4% 63.4% 506 
 
 
Table 5.27 below, depicts cumulative board positions according to gender. 
Table  5.27: Gender profiles of board positions in the mining industry 
Board position Gender Count 
Female Male 
CEO 2.1% 97.9% 47 
EC 0.0% 100.0% 7 
NEC 8.5% 91.5% 47 
DC 11.1% 88.9% 9 
FD 11.6% 88.4% 43 
CS 33.3% 66.7% 6 
ED 3.5% 96.5% 57 
NED 8.3% 91.7% 109 
INED 23.1% 76.9% 169 
LINED 16.7% 83.3% 12 




The findings indicate that CEO positions (n = 47) in the South African mining industry 
were occupied by 97.9% males and only 2.1% females in 2011. As shown in Tables 
5.27 and 5.28, Whites were appointed in the majority of cases (females = 2.1% and 
males = 85.1%), followed by Black males (6.4%) and Coloured males (4.3%). Only 
2.1% of positions were held by Asian males. No Indian (female or male) was 
appointed in a CEO position in the mining industry during 2011. Table 5.28 further 
shows that there was no Asian, Black, or Indian female CEO in the mining industry 
during 2011. 
A 100% of executive chairman positions (n = 7) were held by males. White males 
held the majority (71.4%) of positions and Black males accounted for the rest 
(28.6%). Non-executive chairman positions (n= 47) were dominated by males 
(91.5%). White racial group accounted for 61.7% (females 2.1%, males = 59.6%) 
and Black racial group held the remaining 38.3% (females 6.4%, males = 31.9%) of 
non-executive chairman positions.  
Deputy chairman positions (n=9) were also dominated by males (88.9%). In terms of 
racial distribution, it was found that 11.1% of the identified positions were 
respectively occupied by Asian and Indian males, 33.3% by Blacks (female = 11.1%, 
male =22.2%) and 44% by White males. No Asian, Indian or White females acted as 
a deputy chairperson. 
Most companies appointed male financial directors (n = 43; 88.4% = male, 11.6% = 
female). Asians account for 2.3% (female = 0%, male = 2.3%), the Black racial group 
for 11.6% (female = 4.7%, male = 7.0%) and White racial group held the majority 
86% (female = 7%, male =79.1%) of these positions. No Coloureds and Indians were 
appointed as financial directors. 
Even company secretary positions (n=6) were dominated by males (66.7%). Blacks 
account for 33% (only males), Coloureds 16.7% (one female), and Whites for 50% 
(female = 16.7%, male =33.3%) of appointments. No Asians or Indians occupied this 
position on the boards investigated. 
Findings indicated that most companies appointed executive directors (n = 57; males 
= 96.5%, females = 3.5%). Asians held 3.5% (two males) of these positions, Blacks 
held 22.8% (female = 1.8%, male =21.1%), Coloureds accounted for only 1.8 % (one 
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male), and Whites held the majority 71.9% (female = 1.8%, male = 70.2%) of 
appointments. No Indians were appointed in this position. 
Non-executive director positions (n = 109) were also dominated by males (91.7%). 
Asians held 3.7% (only males), whilst Blacks held 36.7% (female = 6.4%, male = 
30.3%), and Coloureds accounted for the minority 0.9% (one male), and Indians held 
3.7% (only males), whilst Whites accounted for the majority 55 % (female = 1.8%%, 
male = 53.2%). No Asian, Coloured and Indian females held non-executive director 
positions in the mining industry. 
Independent non-executive director positions (n = 196; males = 76.9%. females = 
23.1%) were occupied by 38.5% Blacks (female =14.2%, male =24.3%), 3% 
Coloureds (female =1.8%, male =1.2%), 3.6% Indians (female =1.2%, male =2.4%), 
and 55% Whites (female =5.9%, male =49.1%). 
Not surprisingly, lead independent non-executive directors (n = 12) were also 
dominated by males (83.3%). The Black racial group accounted for 25% (female 
=8.3%, male =16.7%), whilst Indians occupied the minority of 8.3% (female =0%, 
male =8.3%), with Whites holding the majority of 66.7% (female = 8.3%, male 






Table  5.28: Cumulative race and gender demographic profiles of board positions 
Board positions Female Female  
Total 
Male 
Male Total Grand Total 
B C I W A B C I W 
CEO 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 6.4% 4.3% 0.0% 85.1% 97.9% 100.0% 
EC 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 28.6% 0.0% 0.0% 71.4% 100.0% 100.0% 
NEC 6.4% 0.0% 0.0% 2.1% 8.5% 0.0% 31.9% 0.0% 0.0% 59.6% 91.5% 100.0% 
DC 11.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 11.1% 22.2% 0.0% 11.1% 44.4% 88.9% 100.0% 
FD 4.7% 0.0% 0.0% 7.0% 11.6% 2.3% 7.0% 0.0% 0.0% 79.1% 88.4% 100.0% 
CS 0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 16.7% 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
ED 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 3.5% 3.5% 21.1% 1.8% 0.0% 70.2% 96.5% 100.0% 
NED 6.4% 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 8.3% 3.7% 30.3% 0.9% 3.7% 53.2% 91.7% 100.0% 
INED 14.2% 1.8% 1.2% 5.9% 23.1% 0.0% 24.3% 1.2% 2.4% 49.1% 76.9% 100.0% 
LINED 8.3% 0.0% 0.0% 8.3% 16.7% 0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 8.3% 58.3% 83.3% 100.0% 
Grand Total 7.7% 0.8% 0.4% 4.0% 12.8% 1.8% 22.7% 1.2% 2.0% 59.5% 87.2% 100.0% 
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Tables 5.29 and 5.30 show that South Africans accounted for 72.5% of the board 
positions in the mining industry, while foreigners accounted for 27.1% of the board 
positions. The majority of foreign nationals were found in the positions of company 
secretary and non-executive director position. 




Dual nationality Foreign South African 
CEO 2.1% 25.5% 72.3% 47 
EC 0.0% 14.3% 85.7% 7 
NEC 2.1% 31.9% 66.0% 47 
DC 0.0% 11.1% 88.9% 9 
FD 0.0% 16.3% 83.7% 43 
CS 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 6 
ED 0.0% 28.1% 71.9% 57 
NED 0.0% 33.0% 67.0% 109 
INED 0.0% 26.0% 74.0% 169 
LINED 0.0% 16.7% 83.3% 12 
Grand Total 0.4% 27.1% 72.5% 506 
 











SA Total Grand Total 
Male Female Male Female Male 
CEO 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 23.4% 25.5% 0.0% 72.3% 72.3% 100.0% 
EC 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 14.3% 14.3% 0.0% 85.7% 85.7% 100.0% 
NEC 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 29.8% 31.9% 6.4% 59.6% 66.0% 100.0% 
DC 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 77.8% 88.9% 100.0% 
FD 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 16.3% 16.3% 11.6% 72.1% 83.7% 100.0% 
CS 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 33.3% 50.0% 16.7% 33.3% 50.0% 100.0% 
ED 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 28.1% 28.1% 3.5% 68.4% 71.9% 100.0% 
NED 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 31.2% 33.0% 6.4% 60.6% 67.0% 100.0% 
INED 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 24.3% 26.0% 21.3% 52.7% 74.0% 100.0% 
LINED 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 66.7% 83.3% 100.0% 
Grand 





5.7 PROFILING THE AGE OF DIRECTORS IN THE SA MINING 
INDUSTRY 
Table 5.31 shows statistics of 458 directors’ ages that was captured from the 2011 
annual reports and the Orbis system. Figure 5.20 illustrates the distribution of the 
directors’ ages. Then Table 5.32 contains the overall demographic profiles of 
directors in terms of position, race, gender, age and nationality. A total of 48 
directors’ ages could not be recorded due to unavailability.  
Table  5.31: Cumulative age of directors 
N = 458 
Missing values = 
48 
Mean Standard deviation (SD) Minimum Maximum 
Director Age 53.82 10.231 28 78 
 
As tabulated in Table 5.31, the average age for directors in the mining industry was 
53.82 (SD =10.2) in 2011. The youngest board member, a 28-year-old foreign White 
male, held a non-executive director position at a large company, Tawana Resources. 
He possesses a postgraduate degree in finance and had only two years’ both mining 
and board experience. The oldest board member in the mining industry was a 78-
year-old South African White male who held an executive director position at a large 
company, Northam Platinum. This candidate possesses an undergraduate law 
degree and had 12 years’ mining experience and 13 years’ board experience.  
 































As seen in Figure 5.20 (above), six scales were used to report the ages of directors: 
younger than 30 years, 31 to 40 years, 41 to 50 years, 51 to 60 years, 61 to 70 years 
and older than 70 years. Figure 5.20 shows that four directors (almost 1%) were 
younger than 30 years and 276 directors (60% of directors) were aged between 41 
and 60 years. Only 22 directors (4.8% of directors) were older than 70 years. 
 
Table  5.32: Age distribution of board of directors in the mining industry 
Position 
Age distribution of board members 
Count 
Below 30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 Over 70 
Count 4 52 118 158 104 22 Total = 458 
CEO 0.0% 6.7%  40.0% 46.7%  6.7% 0.0% 45 
EC 0.0% 0.0%  28.6%  71.4% 0.0% 0.0% 7 
NEC 0.0%  4.7%  14.0%  37.2% 41.9% 2.3% 43 
DC 0.0% 22.2% 0.0%  44.4% 33.3% 0.0% 9 
FD 2.7% 21.6%  56.8%  16.2%  2.7% 0.0% 37 
CS 0.0% 25.0% 50.0% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4 
ED 0.0% 14.3% 26.5% 38.8% 16.3% 4.1% 49 
NED 2.2% 16.1% 22.6% 34.4%  20.4% 4.3% 93 
INED 0.6% 7.5% 17.4% 33.5%   31.7% 9.3% 161 
LINED 0.0%  20.0% 70.0% 0.0%  10.0% 0.0% 10 
Total count % 0.9% 11.4% 25.8% 34.5%  22.7% 4.8% 100% 
 
 
Table 5.33 (below) summarises the average age per position and provides data 
about the gender and nationality of the youngest and oldest member per category. 
The table furthermore indicates the standard deviation per position.  
As can be seen in Table 5.33, the youngest CEO in the mining industry was a 37-
year-old Black male South African. This candidate was employed at a micro 
company (Platfields Limited) and has an undergraduate degree in law. This CEO 
had ten years board and mining experience. The oldest CEO in the mining industry 
was 64-year-old White male South African. This candidate was also appointed at a 
micro company (Jubilee Platinum) and holds an undergraduate BSc Chemical 






Table  5.33: Overall demographic profile of directors (according to age) 
Director position Age Mean 
Std. 




Black Male South African 




White Male South African 




White Male Foreign 




Black Female South African 




White Male South African 




Coloured Female South African 




Black Male South African 




White Male Foreign 




Black Male South African 








White Male South African 
Max 64.00 White Male South African 
 
 
The average age for an executive chairperson position in the mining industry was 
53 years (SD = 6.5). The youngest executive chairperson in the mining industry was 
a 42-year-old White South African male. This candidate was from a small company 
(Simmer and Jack Mines) and has a postgraduate qualification in both business and 
science. This candidate had one year board and 12 years’ mining experience. The 
oldest executive chairperson in the mining industry was a 59-year-old White South 
African male. This candidate was appointed at a small company (Great Basin Gold) 
and holds an undergraduate finance degree and had 19 years’ board experience and 
26 years’ mining experience.  
The average age for a non-executive chairperson position in the mining industry was 
58 years (SD = 8.8). The youngest non-executive chairperson in the mining industry 
was a 31-year-old foreign White male. This candidate was from a micro company 
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(Sallies Limited) and has an undergraduate business qualification. This candidate 
had three years’ board and two years’ mining experience. The oldest non-executive 
chairperson in the mining industry was a 77-year-old White South African male. This 
candidate was appointed at a medium company (Transhex) and he holds an 
undergraduate law degree and had 12 years’ board experience and 18 years’ mining 
experience.  
The average age for a deputy chairperson position in the mining industry was 55 
years (SD = 9.8). The youngest deputy chairperson in the mining industry was a 40-
year-old Black South African female. She was from a medium company (Petmin) and 
has a postgraduate business qualification. This candidate had eight years’ board 
experience. The oldest deputy chairperson was a 69-year-old White South African 
male. This candidate was appointed at a large company (Assore) and holds an 
undergraduate law degree and had two years’ board experience and two years’ 
mining experience.  
The average age for a financial director position in the mining industry was 44 years 
(SD = 7.3). The youngest financial director in the mining industry was a 30-year-old 
White South African female. This candidate was appointed at a small company 
(Simmer & Jack Mines) and possesses an undergraduate business qualification. 
This candidate had six years’ board experience and six years’ mining experience. 
The oldest financial director in the mining industry was a 64-year-old White South 
African male. He was with a micro company (JCI Limited) and holds an 
undergraduate finance degree and had 19 years’ board experience and five years’ 
mining experience.  
The average age for a company secretary position in the mining industry was 47 
years (SD = 6.5). The youngest company secretary in the mining industry was 40 
years old and the oldest was 56 years old. The 40-year-old was a Coloured South 
African female. This candidate was appointed at a large company (Omnia Holdings) 
and has an undergraduate law qualification. The career experience of this board 
member was not recorded. The oldest company secretary in the mining industry was 
a 56-year-old foreign White male. This candidate was with a large company 
(Resource Generation) and holds a postgraduate qualification in finance and had 
three years’ board experience and 15 years’ mining experience.  
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The average age for an executive director position in the mining industry was 53 
years (SD = 10.20). The youngest executive director in the mining industry was a 32-
year-old Black South African male. This candidate was with a micro company 
(Village Main Reef) and has a postgraduate engineering and business qualification. 
This candidate had four years’ board experience and four years’ mining experience. 
The oldest executive director in the mining industry was a 78-year-old White South 
African male at a large company (Northam Platinum). This candidate has an 
undergraduate law degree and had 12 years’ board experience and 13 years’ mining 
experience.  
The average age for a non-executive director position in the mining industry was 53 
years (SD = 10.72). The youngest non-executive director in the mining industry was 
a 28-year-old foreign White male who held a non-executive director position at a 
large company (Tawana Resources). It was recorded that he possesses a 
postgraduate degree in finance and had two years’ both mining and board 
experience. The oldest non-executive director in the mining industry was a 76-year-
old foreign White male at a large company (Resource Generation). This candidate 
holds an undergraduate engineering sciences degree and had 30 years’ board 
experience and 50 years’ mining experience. 
The average age for an independent non-executive director in the mining industry 
was 57 years (SD = 10.21). The youngest independent non-executive director in the 
mining industry was a 29-year-old Black South African male who held a position at a 
micro company (SAcoil Limited). He further possesses an undergraduate degree in 
finance and had two years’ board experience and five years’ mining experience. The 
oldest independent non-executive director in the mining industry was a 75-year-old 
foreign Black male at a mega company (AngloGold Ashanti). This candidate 
possesses a postgraduate engineering sciences degree and had one year board 
experience.  
The average age for a lead independent non-executive director in the mining 
industry was 46 years (SD = 7.51). The youngest independent non-executive director 
in the mining industry was a 37-year-old White South African male who held a 
position at a small company (Simmer and Jack Mines). He further possesses a 
postgraduate degree in finance and had only one year board experience and one 
year mining experience. The oldest lead independent non-executive director in the 
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mining industry was 64-year-old White South African male at a medium company 
(Petmin). This candidate possesses a postgraduate engineering sciences degree 
and had 11 years’ board experience and 26 years’ mining experience.  
Table  5.34: Directors’ ages according to gender 
Gender of 
Directors 
Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation 
Female 49.8226 33.00 68.00 9.51362 
Male 54.4419 28.00 78.00 10.20941 
 
 
Table 5.34 shows that the average female director in the mining industry was 50 
years old (mean = 49.82). The youngest female director was 33 years of age and the 
oldest female director was 68 years of age. The youngest female director was a 33-
year-old Black South African from a large company (Merafe Resources) and holds a 
postgraduate degree in finance; she is also a certified chartered accountant holding 
an independent non-executive director position. She had one year board experience 
and one year mining experience. The oldest female director was a 68-year-old White 
South African from a mega company (Impala Platinum) and occupied an 
independent non-executive director position and holds a postgraduate degree in 
business finance and had 13 years’ board experience and 21 years’ mining 
experience.  
The average male director was 54 years of age (mean = 54.55). The youngest male 
director was 28 years of age and the oldest was 78 years of age. This 28-year-old 
foreign White male held a non-executive director position at a large company 
(Tawana Resources). He possesses a postgraduate degree in finance and had only 
two years’ both mining and board experience. The oldest board member in the 
mining industry was a White South African male of 78 years. This 78-year-old White 
male held an executive director position at a large company (Northam Platinum). 
This candidate possesses an undergraduate law degree and had 12 years’ mining 





Table  5.35: Directors’ ages according to race 
Director race Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation 
Asian 46.2857 40.00 61.00 7.29644 
Black 50.5507 29.00 75.00 9.45838 
Coloured 47.4000 40.00 53.00 4.00555 
Indian 55.3636 39.00 73.00 12.79275 
White 55.7021 28.00 78.00 10.17629 
 
 
Table 5.35 indicates that the average age of Asian directors serving on the board of 
directors was 46 years. The youngest Asian on the board was a 40-year-old foreign 
male serving as a non-executive director at a micro company (Wesizwe) and he 
holds an undergraduate degree in law and had one year board experience and nine 
years’ mining experience. The oldest Asian on the board was a 61-year-old foreign 
male at a large company (Anglo American PLC) who held a non-executive director 
position and possesses a postgraduate degree in engineering sciences and had 17 
years’ board experience. 
On average, Black directors serving on the board of directors were 50 years old. The 
youngest Black candidate on the board was 29 years old and the oldest was 75 
years old. The youngest South African was a 29-year-old Black South African who 
held an independent non-executive director position at a micro company (SAcoil 
Limited). He further possesses an undergraduate degree in finance and had two 
years’ board experience and five years’ mining experience. The oldest Black director 
on the board was a 75-year-old foreign male at a mega company (Anglo Gold 
Ashanti) who held an independent non-executive director position and possesses a 
postgraduate degree in engineering sciences and had one year board experience. 
On average, Coloured directors serving on the board of directors were 47 years old. 
The youngest Coloured candidate on the board was 40 years old and the oldest was 
53 years old. The youngest Coloured director was a South African female serving as 
a non-executive director at a large company (Omnia Holdings) as a company 
secretary and she holds an undergraduate diploma in law. The oldest Coloured 
director on the board was 53-years-old South African female at a mega company 
(Goldfields) who held an independent non-executive director position and possesses 
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an undergraduate degree in law and had 11 years’ board experience and only two 
years’ mining experience. 
On average, Indian directors serving on the board of directors were 55 years old. 
The youngest Indian candidate on the board was 39 years old and the oldest was 73 
years old. The youngest Indian director was South African female serving as an 
independent non-executive director at a large company (Omnia Holdings) and she 
holds a postgraduate degree in finance (certified CA) and had one year board 
experience and one year mining experience. The oldest Indian director on the board 
was a 73-year-old South Africa male at a large company (Northam Platinum) who 
held an independent non-executive director position and possesses a postgraduate 
degree in finance (certified CA) and had 16 years’ board experience and 15 years’ 
mining experience. 
The average age of White directors serving on the board of directors was 56 years 
old. The youngest White candidate on a board was 28 years old and the oldest was 
78 years old. The youngest White board member was a 28-year-old foreign White 
male who held a non-executive director position at a large company (Tawana 
Resources). He further possesses a postgraduate degree in finance (certified 
chartered financial analyst) and had two years’ both mining and board experience. 
The oldest board member in the mining industry was a White South African male of 
78 years. This 78-year-old White male held an executive director position also at a 
large company (Northam Platinum). This candidate possesses an undergraduate law 
degree and had 12 years’ mining experience and 13 years’ board experience 
Table  5.36: Directors’ ages according to nationality 
Nationality Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation 
South African 52.7003 29.00 78.00 10.10277 
Foreign 57.3394 28.00 76.00 9.92865 
Dual citizenship 55.5000 49.00 62.00 9.19239 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.36, the average age of South African directors was 53 
years and 57 years for foreign directors. The average age for board members with 
dual citizenship was 55 years of age. 
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5.8 PROFILING THE CAREER BACKGOUNDS OF DIRECTORS ON THE 
BOARD 
As stated in Section 5.1, career backgrounds are presented in the form of 
qualification categories, qualification levels, board experience, mining experience 
and years of experience on current board. These results are compared with board 
positions to present cross-tabulation results. 
5.8.1 Qualifications of board members 
Qualifications of board members are presented in qualification fields and qualification 
levels. Qualification fields indicate the area of specialisation and the qualification 
level shows whether qualifications were undergraduate or postgraduate. 
5.8.2 Qualification fields 
Table 5.37 (on the next page) shows that the most prevalent qualifications that most 
board members possessed were finance, business, engineering and law. A large 
proportion of directors (147) had a finance background (almost 30%); these 
candidates were mainly certified chartered accountants and had a bachelor’s degree 
in finance and auditing. About 94 of the directors (18%) were in possession of an 
engineering degree. Approximately 11 % of the directors had a business qualification 
and 10% were in possession of a law degree. Directors showed least representation 




Table  5.37: Qualification fields of board members 
Qualification fields 
Position represented on board level 
Valid % 
Count CEO EC NEC DC FD CS ED NED INED LINED 
Agricultural Sciences  2 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 
Arts 19 0.0% 0.0% 4.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 8.7% 3.1% 0.0% 3.9% 
Business 59 4.3% 0.0% 17.8% 22.2% 7.0% 0.0% 12.3% 14.4% 13.0% 11.1% 12.1% 
Business & Science 45 14.9% 14.3% 13.3% 0.0% 2.3% 0.0% 17.5% 4.8% 8.6% 11.1% 9.2% 
Economics 18 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 0.0% 4.7% 0.0% 0.0% 7.7% 3.7% 11.1% 3.7% 
Education 8 2.1% 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 1.6% 
Engineering Sciences 94 36.2% 14.3% 15.6% 22.2% 0.0% 0.0% 28.1% 18.3% 19.1% 11.1% 19.2% 
Entrepreneurship 1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 
Finance 147 34.0% 28.6% 11.1% 11.1% 83.7% 50.0% 14.0% 23.1% 30.2% 33.3% 30.1% 
Geological Sciences 21 2.1% 14.3% 8.9% 0.0% 2.3% 0.0% 8.8% 3.8% 3.1% 0.0% 4.3% 
History 1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 
Law 52 6.4% 14.3% 13.3% 11.1% 0.0% 50.0% 12.3% 10.6% 11.1% 22.2% 10.6% 
Mathematical Science 1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 
Medical Sciences 8 0.0% 14.3% 4.4% 11.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.9% 0.6% 0.0% 1.6% 
Physics 1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 
Political Sciences 4 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 1.9% 0.0% 0.8% 
Public Administration 4 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 0.0% 0.8% 
Social Sciences 4 0.0% 0.0% 4.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.6% 0.0% 0.8% 




5.8.3 Qualification levels of qualifications of directors serving on the board 
The results for the variable “qualification level” are presented in Figure 5.21 and 
Table 5.38 below. 
 
Figure  5.21: Qualification levels (n=486) 
 
Table  5.38: Qualification levels of board of directors (n = 486) 
Board position 
Qualification levels Total 
count Count Postgraduate Count Undergraduate 
CEO 29 63.0% 17 37.0% 46 
EC 5 71.4% 2 28.6% 7 
NEC 31 68.9% 14 31.1% 45 
DC 4 44.4% 5 55.6% 9 
FD 38 88.4% 5 11.6% 43 
CS 3 50.0% 3 50.0% 6 
ED 42 73.7% 15 26.3% 57 
NED 64 62.1% 39 37.9% 103 
INED 119 73.9% 42 26.1% 161 
LINED 6 66.7% 3 33.3% 9 
Grand Total 341 70.2% 145 29.8% 486 
 
 
Qualification levels were recorded in terms of undergraduate and postgraduate 







directors (70.2%) possessed postgraduate qualifications and 145 directors (29.8%) 
undergraduate qualifications. On the board of directors most financial directors 
88.4% had postgraduate qualifications.  
5.8.4 Board experience of board members  
Board experience relates to the number of years a director had been serving on the 
board. It includes experience of previously held positions on the board of directors in 
other companies. Table 5.39 shows the average board experience in years, as well 
as the standard deviation, and minimum and maximum amount of board experience 
in years.  
The results for the variable “board experience” are presented in Table 5.39 and 
Figure 5.22. 
Table  5.39: Board experience in years (n = 486) 
N = 486 
Missing values = 20 
Mean Standard deviation (SD) Minimum Maximum 
Board Experience  
(in years) 8.97 7.47 1 39 
 
 


























Board experience categories (in years) 
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Six scales were used to report on the board experience of directors: less than five 
years, six to 10 years, 11 to 15 years, 16 to 20 years, 21 to 25 years and longer than 
25 years. Board experience ranged from one to 39 years. Table 5.39 shows that the 
average years of board experience was 8.97 (SD =7.47). The minimum and 
maximum years served on the board were one year and 39 years respectively. The 
majority of directors (42.2%) had less than five years’ board experience and 25.7% 
had board experience ranging between 6 and 10 years. Only a few directors (8%) 










CEO EC NEC DC FD CS ED NED INED LINED Total count 
Less than 5 years 23.4% 14.3% 15.6% 33.3% 67.4% 60.0% 55.4% 51.0% 40.1% 41.7% 206 42.4% 
6 to 10 years 42.6% 42.9% 24.4% 55.6% 20.9% 20.0% 28.6% 18.0% 24.7% 16.7% 125 25.7% 
11 to 15 years 14.9% 14.3% 24.4% 11.1% 4.7% 0.0% 5.4% 9.0% 14.2% 33.3% 61 12.6% 
16 to 20 years 17.0% 28.6% 17.8% 0.0% 4.7% 0.0% 8.9% 9.0% 12.3% 8.3% 55 11.3% 
21 to 25 years 0.0% 0.0% 6.7% 0.0% 2.3% 0.0% 0.0% 6.0% 6.2% 0.0% 20 4.1% 
Longer than25 years 2.1% 0.0% 11.1% 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 1.8% 7.0% 2.5% 0.0% 19 3.9% 




5.8.5 Mining experience 
Mining experience relates to the number of years involved in the industry and/or 
related activities thereof. Table 5.41 and Figure 5.23 summarise the average mining 
experience, ranges in years and the standard deviation.  
Table 5.41 shows the mining experience of board of directors. 
Table  5.41: Mining experience in years (n = 463) 
N = 463 
Missing values 
= 43 








Figure  5.23: Mining experience of the board of directors 
 
In Table 5.42 (on the next page) six scales have been used to report the mining 
experience of directors: less than five years, six to 10 years, 11 to 20 years, 21 to 30 
years, 31 to 40 years and more than 40 years. This table displays that the mining 
experience of directors ranged from one year to 57 years, and the average mining 



































CEO EC NEC DC CS FD ED NED INED LINED 
Less than 5 years 7.0% 14.3% 20.0% 25.0% 20.0% 55.8% 21.2% 32.0% 41.0% 41.7% 150 32.4% 
6 to 10 years 11.6% 14.3% 17.5% 25.0% 20.0% 18.6% 11.5% 15.5% 15.4% 16.7% 71 15.3% 
11 to 20 years 20.9% 28.6% 27.5% 25.0% 40.0% 20.9% 25.0% 20.6% 10.9% 25.0% 88 19.0% 
21 to 30 years 46.5% 28.6% 7.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 23.1% 16.5% 12.2% 16.7% 74 16.0% 
31 to 40 years 14.0% 14.3% 20.0% 25.0% 20.0% 4.7% 17.3% 8.2% 16.7% 0.0% 63 13.6% 
More than  40 years 0.0% 0.0% 7.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 7.2% 3.8% 0.0% 17 3.7% 






5.8.6 Years of experience on current board 
The years of experience on current board reveals the total experience per director on 
the current board when the annual report of the company was released in 2011.   
The results for the variable “years of experience on current board” are presented in 
table 5.43, figure 5.24 and table 5.44. 
Table  5.43: Years of experience on current board (n = 485) 
N = 485 
Missing values 
= 21 









Figure  5.24: Experience on current board 
 
Six scales were used to report the experience on the current board on which the 
directors serve: less than five years, six to 10 years, 11 to 20 years, 21 to 30 years, 
and 31 to 40 years. As depicted in table 5.44 the maximum years of experience on 
the current board was 38 years and the minimum experience is less than a year. The 










CEO EC NEC DC CS FD ED NED INED LINED Total Count  
Less than 5years 57.8% 66.7% 52.2% 77.8% 40.0% 74.4% 70.9% 71.7% 66.7% 75.0% 324 66.8% 
6 to 10 years 26.7% 16.7% 32.6% 22.2% 40.0% 23.3% 18.2% 24.2% 24.2% 25.0% 119 24.5% 
11 to 20 years 13.3% 16.7% 10.9% 0.0% 20.0% 2.3% 7.3% 2.0% 9.1% 0.0% 35 7.2% 
21 to 30 years 2.2% 0.0% 2.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5 1.0% 
31 to 40 years 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2 0.4% 






In this chapter, the descriptive analysis of board composition and director profiles are 
presented in terms of frequency tables, graphs and figures. Firstly, frequencies 
provided demographic profiles statistics of age, race, gender and nationality of 
directors. This was followed by cross tabulations of each director position in relation 
to demographic profiles. This chapter was concluded by descriptive results of career 
profiles of directors in terms of qualification categories, qualification levels, mining 
experience, board experience, and experience on current board. 
The next chapter provides the results of the second phase of the research which is 
based on qualitative analysis. This will be followed by the last chapter (Chapter 7) 




 INITIATIVES UNDERTAKEN AND CHALLENGES CHAPTER 6  
EXPERIENCED IN TRANSFORMING THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
MINING INDUSTRY 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reports on findings of the analysis of data collected during the second 
phase of the research. Phase 2 of the research sought to address the last four 
research objectives of this study, namely, to report on the progress towards and 
determine the current status of transformation within the South African mining 
industry measured against EE scorecard targets, to understand current challenges 
experienced and initiatives undertaken in this industry in terms of transformation, to 
understand barriers to transformation in the mining industry, and report on the 
criteria employed to appoint members serving on boards of mining companies listed 
on the JSE.  
During Phase 2 interviews were conducted with participants in the South African 
mining industry. Transcripts of these interviews were subjected to qualitative analysis 
as discussed in Chapter 4. A semi-structured interview guide (APPENDIX C) was 
used to assist the researcher to obtain information with the aim of identifying 
common or divergent themes in the respondent’s answers. These interviews took 
place from September 2012 to December 2012 (see interview schedule in 
APPENDIX A). As indicated in Chapter 4, each interview was audio-taped and 
transcribed and analysed in Atlas.ti. In the CD Annexure, transcribed interviews were 
saved under the primary documents (PD) folder and all the analyses was saved 
under the outputs folder. 
The analysis of Phase 2 was done through the reporting of emerging categories, 
themes and sub-themes that evolved from the coding process. Themes and sub-
themes that were identified for all ten interviews conducted are presented in each 
category. Each theme was used to address the research questions and study 
objectives. The coding process revealed a total of seven categories, namely, (1) 
interpretation of transformation, (2) transformation and legislation, (3) transformation 
and key stakeholders, (4) challenges of transformation, (5) transformation in the 
mining industry, (6) board transformation, and lastly (7) barriers to transformation. 
The results are presented using verbatim quotation to indicate which source was of 
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the information was used as evidence. For example, (10:5:59) means primary 
document 10, quotation number 5 and line 59. 
6.2 INTERPRETATION OF TRANSFORMATION 
The initial objective of this analysis was to report on the mining industry’s progress 
on transformation and to identify barriers to transformation. Firstly, it was important 
to understand what the industry’s understanding of transformation is. It was also 
deemed important to understand how this understanding supports or differs from 
existing definitions and expectations in the literature and relevant legislation and 
industry guidelines. Robertshaw (2006) defined transformation as a political, social, 
and economic change process, with the aim of redressing historical imbalances. The 
South African government defines transformation as an inclusion of diversity and 
democracy in the organisational operations. Others view transformation as a vehicle 
to transmit corporate social responsibility initiatives to empower and develop the 
HDSA (Arya & Bassi, 2009). Six common themes that emerged from analysis in 
terms of transformation interpretation was that transformation is about cultural 
change and not about race and colour, it’s about mindset change, diversity, 
equalising rights and creating opportunities, it’s about doing what is right for the 
company, and it’s a process.  
6.2.1 Culture change  
Some participants, three out of ten (30%), considered transformation to be changing 
the way they do business, and indicated that they regard transformation to be about 
the culture of the business, which can only be obtained through cultural change in 
the operations of the company. Transformation is not considered as acquiring black 
candidates for key positions but rather as transforming the way things are done in 
the business. 
Transformation is not getting black managers on top of the organisational structure. 
Transformation is [a] complete culture change, doing things differently, in order to 
make sure that you sustain the organisation.  That is transformation for me.  And 
transformation has got to be holistic and integrated.  It must not be sort of piece-meal, 
because people think that, when you have got two or three black managers sitting in 
the board or at the top of the organisation, then you are transformed (1:1:2). 
 
..  because if [refers to a stakeholder] understanding of transformation is getting more 
blacks and getting more women, then we have got a serious challenge there, because 
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you cannot put a black individual in a position who hasn’t got the competencies 
(1:15:25). 
Transformation is regarded as a holistic and integrated process of doing things 
differently in an organisation. The cultural change implies that the business must 
change the way they do things. This transition requires a mental shift and there is an 
agreement that it is impossible to change the culture of the business without 
changing mindsets. 
6.2.2 Mindset change 
Mindset change was also regarded as an interpretation of transformation. There was 
general agreement that transformation was about changing mindsets or referring to a 
mind shift whilst seeking innovative ways to address historical imbalances.  
We all now understand that we had these imbalances it’s a question of now changing 
our minds instead of us being pushed by the Act to make these changes, by now we 
should be making these changes ourselves without waiting for the Act (10:23:27). 
 
Transformation, it means doing things differently than you used to do them before. 
…now what we need to do, we need to make sure that we transform the way we do 
things (1:1:13). 
 
Changing the way things have been done, implies learning to accept and support the 
policies that are formulated to fast track transformation. Through the constitution of 
South Africa, clear and solid transformative projects were drawn (Heller & 
Ntlokonkulu, 2001). The response below proves that that changing mindsets and the 
culture of the business means the adoption and acceptance of policies that requires 
culture change. This includes acting in a fair and accountable manner.  
The other issue is also the culture that, you know, well, I suppose policies and 
procedures also talk to that, that you know, the way in which things are done in an 
organisation must be fair (4:3:30). 
 
Cawood (2004) advised that the mining industry should consider mineral policies and 
pieces of legislation in order to transform and be relevant. The acknowledgement of 
policies and the adoption thereof indicate that the mining industry regulation and 
statutory framework are taken seriously. The acceptance of policies shows that 




6.2.3 Creation of opportunities and equalising rights 
A further 20% (two out of ten) participants stated that transforming an industry is also 
seen as creating opportunities, equalising rights and ensuring fair representation for 
all. This means avoiding discrimination of any individual and giving everyone 
opportunities to partake in the growth and development of the business. 
Transformation in South Africa really, it is yes first and foremost it’s about equalising 
the rights it’s about equalising society. And giving an opportunity to those that didn’t 
have an opportunity before.  But to me that, yes it is an imperative but that’s a short 
term view in my opinion.  I think transformation in South Africa it’s an opportunity.  It’s 
an opportunity of saying if I was a white manager and I’m running [name of company], 
it will be an opportunity, I would see that the growth of my business is in my people in 
my country, whether they black, green ,yellow, blue, understanding my business and 
what I do about my business (8:3:39). 
 
Transformation means that there has to be fair representation and distribution of 
everything. Then coming back to the work context, fair distribution of wealth, 
possessions, there must be just equity and fairness in the workplace (4:1:26). 
 
Diversity in the workplace is achieved by giving opportunities to HDSAs. Other 
participants’ remarks suggested that transformation for them meant that diversity 
should be encouraged. 
6.2.4 Valuing diversity  
Further analysis of this theme revealed that transformation is about diversity and 
valuing of differences. Arfken et al. (2004) define diversity as a reflection of gender, 
religion, age, physical appearance, culture, job function or experience, disability, 
ethnicity and personal style. To embrace diversity, Kahn (2002) and Daily and Dalton 
(2003) stated that differences in organisations are recently valued in organisations, 
though, a thought raised by the below participant that differences are not valued and 
exploited to their full capacity in the mining industry. 
Because people fundamentally don’t understand what diversity means and the fact 
that the more different we are, the better we can be.  You know, because typically we 
try to gravitate towards the sameness, you know.  If I am an African female, maybe I 
will work better with a fellow African female.  Now [when] a white woman comes in, all 
of a sudden there is tension, maybe we don’t understand why, but we don’t leverage 






Diversity inclusion by transforming the human resources of the business in terms of 
HDSA representation and inclusion means that a sense of belonging must be 
created for those who enter the industry.  
This is about creating a culture of openness where everyone feels like they belong. 
You know, you can't bring people into an organisation and still make them feel like 
they don’t belong (4:4:36) 
 
Although it is believed that transformation means that a sense of belonging needs to 
be created with an accommodative culture, it appears that there is a yearn for the 
African culture to be embraced and preserved without necessarily compromising on 
profits and sacrificing the standards of the business by including HDSAs who do not 
merge well with the operations of the business.  
…transformation, what it means for this country going forward is that we have to 
embrace the African culture, the South African culture, the indigenous of South African 
culture into business.  And making it work and make money out of it.  Nowhere does it 
say you must lower your standards because the world will eat you alive.  Nowhere it 
says you must compromise your profits (8:5:43). 
 
The appreciation for diversity inclusion in business is regarded as a way for the 
business to transform. However, there is a concern that differences and diversity 
advantages are not explored to their full potential in the mining industry. It is 
moreover agreed that transformation means that a sense of belonging needs to be 
created for those who enter the mining industry. It is also emphasized that profits 
cannot be compromised in the process of addressing historical imbalances. 
Transformation is also seen as doing what is right. 
6.2.5 Doing what is right 
Another 20% of participants consider that an effort executed to transform is the right 
thing to do and not about achieving the numbers targeted in the scorecard. The 
mining scorecard gives the mining industry a guideline in achieving certain targets 
with a view to achieving transformation.  
And our view is not necessarily to tick the box in the scorecard, our view is, do the right 
things and the numbers will come…. so we are not really fixated about ticking the 
scorecard. We are more fixated about doing what is right for the business (6:14:15). 
 
It is not about ticking box number 1. It is not just about meeting the compliance 
requirements.  But it is also about what is it that we would like to see the industry, 
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starting with our own organisation, looked like at a particular point in time, because 
transformation assumes a particular journey now knowing and understanding the 
history of mining in South Africa within the context of the history of the country. You 
can't transform the country and have the [mining] industry stay where it was (3:1:28). 
Transformation is thus not viewed as ticking a particular scorecard target and 
achieving the numbers as set by the DMR, but rather as doing justice to the society. 
Also, doing what is right is seen as a motivation for driving transformation. The next 
theme finalises this section and concludes by suggesting that transformation is a 
process that will be achieved over a long period. 
6.2.6 It’s a process  
The industry acknowledges that transformation cannot be achieved in a short space 
of time but it is a process that will take time to realise. The view is that the status or 
the culture of the business must continually progress so to better the industry with 
regards to fair representation and distribution. This view suggests that transformation 
is a long process. 
…so today must obviously be better than yesterday and tomorrow must always be 
better than today et cetera, as you move forward in transformation. It is a gradual 
process.  It is a process, but it must be a process that indicates a difference as you 
move (3:7:32). 
 
…so it is actually moving the different segments of society at least up one or two 
notches [so that], the next generation can be better off …so it is a long-term 
transformation (2:3:49). 
 
The findings of the Mining Charter Impact Assessment suggest that the mining 
industry is showing a slow progress in transformation (DME, 2009:10). However 
responses above put forward that transformation will take longer to realise. This is 
because the mining industry had to start from a zero base. 
…there was a point in time where women were not allowed to be involved in mining.  
So really, [its] an industry [where] you come from a zero base where there were no 
women that could work underground. I mean, there were certain jobs I think above 
ground that could be done by women, limited, but ja, not even talking African women.  
I am talking about there would have been white women at that time, because black 




To conclude this section, the interpretation of transformation in the mining industry 
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can be described in six ways. Firstly, it is understood that transformation is about 
culture change, and not about race and colour, which means that the people in the 
organisation must change the way they do business. Secondly, transformation is 
about a mindset change this can be done by undergoing a mind shift and 
acknowledging that historical imbalances should be addressed. Thirdly, 
transformation is about the creation of opportunities and ensuring equity and fairness 
for employees in the workplace. This action requires that the mining companies 
abide by certain legislative policies, for example, the EE Act, MPRDA and the Mining 
Charter. This includes the acceptance of policies and legislation, also ensuring fair 
and equitable hiring procedures, with fair and equitable employee treatment in 
organisations. Fourthly, transformation is about mirroring the demographics of the 
country by means of including and valuing diversity in businesses. Additionally, 
transformation is about creating a sense of belonging for mining industry entrants. 
Fifthly, transformation is seen as a vehicle that will be used to make things right and 
achieve social justice given the inequalities of the country. Lastly, there is an 
acknowledgement that transformation is a journey and a process that will take longer 
to realise. 
6.3 TRANSFORMATION AND LEGISLATION 
The need for transformation in South Africa is enforced through legislation (Cawood, 
2004). It is made in prevalent documents such as the Mining Charter, the MPRDA 
and applicable acts described in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. Through probing and 
deeper questioning by the interviewer to understand the industry’s compliance with 
legislation, four themes evolved, namely, (1) transformational definitions and terms 
of references were confusing, (2) there is buy-in for transformation, (3) there is 
somewhat adherence to the scorecard through EE plans and reporting, and (4) 
perception shadowing the industry was unpacked.  
6.3.1 Definitions 
Despite different views being held in the industry about the meaning of 
transformation, all participants (100%) considered the terminology to be very broad, 
and agreed that terms of references need to be defined in a standardised manner. It 
is also consensual that the definition of transformation needs to be tabled specifically 
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for the South African mining industry, given the concerns associated with the 
different interpretations of this broad term. 
That is quite an overloaded word… we have got different meanings to attach to these 
things and I think for me transformation or any other thing, for example with us, we had 
to come together and say, how do we define transformation for ourselves.  Not the 
buzz word from the environment or legislation or from the dictionary.  If we are saying 
transformation for ourselves and we want to transform, what would that mean?  
Amongst others it would mean affording every person who is in the system an 
opportunity to be developed in the areas of their future careers, career aspirations 
(5:1:27). 
 
It was evident that most participants understood transformation in their own context 
and defined it as such as shown in Section 6.2. 
One participant claims that there was a call made to the DMR to review the 
scorecard, to standardise terms of reference, and to provide industry definitions. 
Despite the acknowledgement by the DMR that the scorecard or legislation is not 
standardised, nothing has been done to date about this legitimate concern.  
…we have already mentioned this to the regulator.  We said at the DMR, you and the 
Department of Labour and the Department of Trade & Industry aren’t marginalised in 
your scorecards, can you make it one?  And they said, they know that they are not 
compliant, they are not marginalised…[and] consistent, so the regulator also need to 
sort themselves out, because they create confusion (2:19:73). 
 
According to Rungan et al. (2005) the term HDSA has been defined differently in 
government policy documents. It also has different meanings attached to it which 
includes and excludes certain groups. Participants also expressed this notion and 
indicated that there is contradiction in the way the HDSA terminology is used. 
For example, the MPRDA contradicts the Labour Relations Act. I will give an example. 
The Labour Relations Act would say we define an employee and an employer in a 
specific way….that definition when you are in the MPRDA is different. I spoke about 
the Mining Charter and Employment Equity Act of 1998. They are talking to 
transformation but they define categories of employees differently [that] there’s [a] 
contradiction around that which employers are following. So I am saying even the 
legislative framework need to assist employers to talk the same language. Which one 
do I follow then do I follow the Labour Relations Act or do I choose the MPRDA? Do I 
go with Mining Charter, with Employment Equity Act, do I go with Skills Development 
Act and so on. So what we are saying is that mining companies are dealing with a 






There is a general understanding being held by seven out of ten participants (70%), 
that HDSA does not exclude white women but excludes white males. This 
understanding agrees with the definition of the Mining Charter and the MPRDA that 
HDSA refers to the “South African citizens, category of persons or community, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination before the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa) came into operation which should be representative of the 
demographics of the country” (Mining Charter, 2010).  
Mining Charter talks about HDSA, the Historically Disadvantaged. So this is your black 
people, Indians, white females, ja, and excludes white males (4:6:44). 
 
According to the definition of “Historically Disadvantaged South Africans”, that includes 
Africans, Indians, Coloureds, and white females (1:13:19). 
 
So it is everybody who didn’t enjoy the full economic and educational privileges of the 
past (2:17:67).  
 
However, the two participants below (20%) of the participants had the view that 
HDSA in the mining charter excluded white females. Their responses showed that 
their understanding is similar to the definition of the BBBEE Act of 2004 that HDSA 
refers to “all black people including women, workers, youth, people, living with 
disabilities, people living in rural areas “(BBBEE Act, 2004) 
In terms of the charter, the charter defines the historically disadvantaged South 
Africans as Blacks, Indians and Coloureds and black women. It then differentiates 
white women and black women. So in this case white women are not included. It only 
concentrates only on black females (10:19:33). 
 
Well those are the people who had the skills and the economic barriers in the past.  
You know, it would be people that were politically disenfranchised.  So we are talking 
about [the] black South Africans, white, I mean black, Africans, male, female, Indians, 
Coloureds.  I mean, even in some cases Chinese and others were also [included].  It is 
actually quite broad (2:16:67). 
 
The BBBEE Act, by definition, advances the interests of black people exclusively, 
whilst the definition of the HDSA referred to by the Mining Charter and the MPRDA 
Act refers all who were disadvantaged before the constitution came into effect 
(Rungan et al., 2005). 
In one of the interviews, the participant showed discontent over the focus placed on 
providing opportunities solely for HDSAs. This participant apprehended that the term 
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HDSA should be about demographic representation and participation, and not about 
race and addressing colour. This participant advocated for the balance between 
HDSA and non-HDSA by suggesting that one should be looking beyond the colour 
issues, and for companies to mirror the demographics of the country in recruitment 
and hiring. This involves a mixture and a balance of all races in a company. 
We go along and say African, African, African, before we know it we have marginalised 
the youth of another colour.  What are we turning them into, because now we are 
complicating the social problems. That is why we have to be big and make sure about 
it, look at the dynamics of the country, the demographics I mean to say.  Not [to] build 
negative dynamics within the company for yourself by trying to push a particular 
agenda because of colour.  So we are not going to use colour that much.  But at the 
same time, you need to look into it to say, you can't just have 100% Africans (5:4:27). 
 
The broad legislation framework seems to be a critical subject in the mining industry. 
As such, there is a call for the regulator to define what transformation and HDSA 
entails. This definition needs to be determined exclusively for the mining industry as 
there is confusion whether to use the definition of the Mining Charter, MPRDA or 
BBBBE.  
6.3.2 Buy-in 
Despite confusing legislative terminology, there is a general acceptance for the 
necessity for transformation. Participants showed appreciative remarks in support for 
the need to change and transform. 
…we do understand the spirit of it in terms of passing balances, issues of fairness, 
removing barriers and ensuring that we set ourselves goals to achieve different 
transformational goals in each level of the organisation. The Mining Charter has got 
the same spirit and goals (7:5:13). 
 
And you will see that even when we look at our housing policies, really, yes they were 
first initiated by the charter but then we then recognised that it’s a business imperative. 
So the issue of converting rooms to one person per room is very relevant because 
obviously if we have a situation where, when the working and living condition of the 
employee is not sustainable or conducive it has a direct impact on your productivity 
(6:16:15). 
 
To that effect, one participant mentioned that there is visibility and evidence that 
senior managers in the mining industry acknowledge the need for transformation, not 
only in companies, but also in communities around mining operations. 
…white people have had to think that now I have to look beyond Van Wyk, and 





We realise [Name of interviewer], that the local community around us are the one that 
can be our greatest enemy and also greatest friends (2:14:63). 
 
Even though the course for transformation is acknowledged by senior managers and 
executives in mining companies, one participant pointed out that not everyone in the 
organisation understood transformation. For example, this participant stated that in 
terms of procurement, the procurement officer would not consider the scorecard 
targets or HDSAs in issuing tenders.  
And unfortunately the challenges around transformation is that sometimes we are not 
all singing the same tune, and  that is a fact…I am yet to come into an organisation 
that says everybody gets it and everybody understands exactly what we have to do.  I 
think from a management point of view and from an executive point of view we get it. 
But when it comes to the people on the ground the person sitting behind the computer 
issuing that order or that tender they work within the confines of their scope of work 
(6:64:31). 
 
The course for transformation in the mining industry is accepted and acknowledged. 
There is buy-in amongst management and personnel that transformation needs to 
happen. However, there is still the challenge that not everyone in mining companies 
understands it, particularly those in lower management or the operative personnel. 
6.3.3 Adherence 
Adhering to transformational targets means that each JSE listed mining company 
should submit its EE plan and reports at the end of each year (Burger & Jafta, 2006). 
EE plans are crucial as they allow the government to evaluate compliance of 
companies to the objectives set in the EE plans (Thomas, 2002). All participants 
confirmed their submission of EE plans and reports to the DMR or the Department of 
Labour. These participants state that their reporting is done annually and the plans 
are submitted each year.  
Ya, we have got a five year employment equity plan, we have been reporting ever 
since the Employment Equity Act was enacted in 1998, [we are] reporting annually and 
we get audits now and then with the Department of Labour coming to do the audit, so 
it’s coming to something that we work very closely on a continuous basis (9:10:23). 
 
Another participant mentioned that before the EE plans are submitted to the 
Department of Labour, some companies say they are first submitted to the board 
and the progress that has been achieved is evaluated. 
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Ya, we have EE plans; I don’t directly run those EE plans. But like I said … my scope 
is quite broad, we have people who specialise in that area but we have an EE plan and 
we have EE reports that are submitted to [the] board every year. And the CEO goes 
through them every year to understand where we are on the different operations. And 
he signs. In fact I know a week ago they were sitting with him going through the EE 
report and the progress against plans (6:26:23). 
 
This adherence is contradictory to the DMR which state that only 10% of mining 
companies are submitting EE plans and reports (DME, 2009). All participants stated 
that their companies are excluded from the ones that are not submitting. 
I think fortunately or unfortunately we don’t fall under that blanket. We, if you read 
deeper even about this means that (mentions company name ) has actually, they had 
a target of 10% women but we have at least surpassed that one (3:15:59).  
 
In addition to the submission of plans, reports have to be compiled on what has been 
done. All participants interviewed agreed that they do some reporting on the plans 
set in the EE plan. EE reporting is conducted based on the EE plans submitted. For 
larger companies that have different operations spread across the country, each 
operation reports separately. One participant stated that reporting was done on the 
seven pillars of the scorecard. 
We report on [the] Employment Equity in the Mining Charter.  My HR colleagues have 
got Employment Equity plans (2:21:85). 
 
In our case, I can tell you, in terms of statutory reporting, it is something that we abide 
by law. We report, I don’t remember any other year that we never reported or never 
reported on time. So whether its EE reports, skills development reports, the annual 
works skills plan, the annual planning report from MQA. All the statutory reporting that 
are required are there. So if you look at our record we report on time and every time. 
(9:11:25). 
 
We have got about five operations, each operation has its own plan and we report 
separately and each operation have its own number that it reports to the DOL. And we 
report every year and we’ve got a plan (10:18:37). 
 
…I report into the CEO, who reports into the board and every quarter. We give 
feedback on our progress on the seven different pillars as to how we are progressing 
and then also there are plans (1:45:67). 
 
Only two participants (20%) confirmed that the DMR continuously visits the mines to 
do some auditing on the EE reports. 
And you know, when the DMR comes and does audits with us, they will come and ask 
us, “[Name of participant], what have you guys done in compliance with the 
scorecard?” “Yes, we have done the following.” Then they will say, “okay this is the 
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documentary evidence, let us go and talk to the community, how is the housing doing,” 
… “how, what are the projects that you are doing, how do you economically lift them 
[communities] up,” and they will ask those people. So we need to engage more 
(2:15:65). 
 
… we get audited by the Department of Labour. Members of the departments do audit 
as well on an annual basis, in fact this is an industry where auditing on transformation 
happens continually. So meaning the government every year come in mining and do 
audits especially on the Mining Charter and the Social and Labour plan. So that keeps 
going continuously so you cannot afford not to report because then you will be in 
trouble (9:11:25). 
During the interview, some participants stated that they have already exceeded the 
goals of the Mining Charter in their reporting, and are now targeting HDSA 
candidates for higher or more senior roles. There has also been an increase in the 
number of women that are employed in the mining industry which is a sign that there 
is adherence to the requirements of the Mining Charter. 
We do have an employment equity plan. So far as per the Mining Charter we were at 
one stage above the Mining Charter, but when you look at the numbers it is like you 
don’t employ, well we meet the legislative requirements, but where do you really need 
those people, at which type of levels?  That is another challenge.  You can satisfy the 
requirements, but what type of positions are these people occupying?  Most of them 
are occupying your administrative or lower positions.  You find fewer people at higher 
level positions (5:15:43). 
 
…we have won the resource category for women as one company that has really put 
in some strides in terms of developing the women in particular within the resource 
category.  So we really try hard (3:39:150).  
 
Even in the appointments to senior management positions, black females were 
favoured more than black males because of the belief that black women would take 
care of the communities more than their male counterparts would. 
Black women are far more concerned about their family, the community and making a 
difference. So we have also got a strong focus on black women and women in mining 
(2:66:237). 
 
There are also more opportunities for black females and because they are few in 
terms of qualifications and experience, the ones that are to be employed can 
demand higher salaries. 
But the people who come through the funnel are very few.  And the mining companies, 
what happens is that if you black, if you female and you’ve got a technical degree, 




Then we have a specific focus to get women in mining and the government wants us 
to get women in mining.  And if you look at the scorecards, there is an, you can adjust 
your percentage on your scores if you have black women and you get an extra little bit 
of score if you get a black woman instead of a black man in, or an Indian or a Coloured 
in (2:46:151). 
 
According to the responses specified above, adherence to the transformation 
scorecard is done through the submission of EE plans to the DMR or Department of 
Labour. EE plans submissions are done and reporting on the EE plans is done 
annually. Furthermore adherence is demonstrated by the efforts of the inclusion of 
females in senior management roles in companies. The inclusion of women in 
mining also forms part of the initiatives undertaken by the mining industry to realise 
transformation and is discussed in detail in Section 6.6.   
6.3.4 Perceptions 
The overall perception regarding transformation in the mining industry is that 
transformation occurs at a slow pace. In the Mining Charter Impact Assessment that 
was done in 2009, Minister Susan Shabangu reported on the slow transformational 
progress in the mining industry and its reluctance to transform (Shabangu, 2010). 
Eight out of ten (80%) participants felt that industry culprits who did not comply with 
transformational goals are the ones putting the efforts of the compliant companies in 
disrepute. 
… I suppose the question would be what informs the Minister’s statement…because 
ultimately you must remember that the DMR has got the latitude to come in and do an 
audit and if you are not complying,[to] take away your licence. They have that power. 
So…there is absolutely no reason why the DMR is not practicing what it is supposed to 
be doing as enforcement. So our view as a company is that if things are going wrong, 
they are going wrong under DMR’s watch (6:27:25). 
 
This respondent above further stated that the mining industry is doing a lot of work, 
but that work is hardly acknowledged because other mining companies are not 
adhering. 
People are quick to say the mining industry is an evil industry. But the mining industry 
is actually doing a hell of a lot of work it’s just not impactful and I think we all agree 
[that] we are spending millions and billions on socio-economic development but there 
is no impact. We are not creating the jobs that we want to create and it’s not 
sustainable (6:47:31).  
 
… we get painted by the same brush and then we all look bad. So it’s like mining is not 
transforming so it means anybody is not transforming. But I wouldn’t say we are there 
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yet, but I would say that if you take the effort, if you look at the projects that are being 
put on the space, there is quite a lot of [work] what has been done and like I said 
maybe we are not communicating hard enough, and we are not really marketing 
ourselves in that space (9:13:29). 
 
However, one participant acknowledged that the living conditions of mineworkers in 
other mining companies put the mining industry, as a whole, in a bad light. This 
participant also expressed concern that there has been more criticism of the mining 
industry than credit for those companies that are compliant. 
But guess what, you can find a company or two in certain sectors within mining that 
have something that … you can call it a compound because of the living conditions.  It 
might not be concrete beds anymore, but it is pretty much something akin to that than 
what we are trying to get towards from a transformative point of view.  So ja, we have 
culprits amongst within the industry, but to the extent that we are doing well we also 
want to get the credit that we think we deserve and I don’t think there is a balance.  I 
think there is more criticism (3:64:353). 
 
In addition, another participant admitted that in the early years of democracy, mining 
did not take transformation targets seriously. Moreover, since the DMR recently 
started taking strict enforcement steps, mining companies have only recently started 
taking transformation seriously.   
I think the Minister is correct. This, the MPRDA came out in 2002 and then the first five 
years or so, [states the name of the interviewer], I don’t think the industry took it 
seriously enough.  I think they had the minimum compliance view…they did audits, but 
let us say they were lenient.  I think the industry caught a wake-up call in the last three 
years.  The last two or three years we have gotten a wake-up and realised, you know 
what, we need to do something.  Otherwise we are going to have Marikana’s and 
those types of things happening industry wide and it is going to be a huge, huge risk 
for the country, not just for the industry.  So yes, I don’t think we took it seriously as an 
industry in the past (2:23:101). 
 
Lastly there is a call for the industry culprits to be identified and singled out and dealt 
with. Most participants felt that those that are not compliant are ruining the industry’s 
image and that they need to be held accountable. 
Okay I cannot speak for other companies but I’m sure there are those that are not 
doing their bit and then when the Minister or government make their announcement 
they will talk about mining in general. But then without really not picking those that are 
culprits and not doing their bit, so it would help to when those kinds of comments are 
made they would pick up those that are not doing their bit and then shame them 
(9:12:27). 
 
I think they need to be specific which companies have not being complying. Now we 
are blaming the whole industry. I mean there could be companies which are doing that. 
But one needs to tell me that [name of the company] is doing that so we can deal with 




To conclude this section, the findings regarding transformation and legislation reveal 
that there is a need for core concepts such as transformation and HDSA to be 
defined. It was found that there is industry “buy-in” for a case for transformation. This 
is evidenced by the adherence to the scorecards targets. All (100%) participants 
confirmed, for example, submission of plans and reports to the DMR or the 
Department of Labour. Adherence to the scorecard was also evidenced by the 
reports for inclusion of women in more senior roles in mining companies. The 
negative perceptions regarding the slow transformation in the mining industry was 
not welcomed by the participants. This is demonstrated by the finding that 80% of 
the participants indicated that transformation was on track, whilst only 20% 
acknowledged that the mining industry has only recently started taking enforcement 
seriously. 
6.4 TRANSFORMATION AND KEY STAKEHOLDERS  
According to the Mining Charter, the beneficiaries and stakeholders of transformation 
and the scorecard are the HDSAs (Mining Charter, 2004). The PMI (2008:23) 
defines stakeholders as persons or organisations who are actively involved in the 
development, or whose interests may be positively or negatively affected by the 
performance or completion of the plan. Stakeholders may also exert influence over 
the plan, its deliverables, and the project team members. Thus it is critical to identify 
both internal and external stakeholders to determine the requirements and 
expectations of all parties involved. The results of the interviews identified other 
stakeholders of transformation, namely, HDSAs, communities, business, and 
employees.  
6.4.1 HDSAs 
As discussed in Section 6.3 a total of 70% (seven out of ten) participants interviewed 
stated that mining companies do not comply with the BBBEE Act definition that 
excludes white women, instead they consider white women as one of the 
beneficiaries of transformation. 
In our companies the beneficiaries would be what we call historically disadvantaged 
South Africans. In this case you mean all women and all blacks, black meaning 
African, Coloured, and Indians. Of course Chinese they fall under the Coloured 
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subcategory. And of course the people with disabilities as per the Employment Equity 
Act. We don’t really, we don’t move that far from, we actually, within the mining 
industry based on the Mining Charter we did not like remove [the] white women… we 
are still complying with the Employment Equity Act which takes all women.  Although if 
you look at the new Mining Charter now, it actually went a bit further to say, even 
though you are targeting all these people, make sure that they mirror the 
demographics of this country (3:11:48). 
 
According to the Mining Charter, HDSA includes all women, black people, coloured, 
Indians and people living with disabilities. The majority of participants adopted the 
Mining Charter definition. 
6.4.2  Communities 
All participants specified that most of their capital for transformation is spent on 
community development and outreach. Other issues include involvement in 
community services that are expected to be provided by government such as health 
and education. Some projects are also done with the aim to make a positive social 
impact, such as skills development. 
That would be the community, you know the biggest portion of our work is largely on 
community so if we move away from employment equity specifically so the biggest 
effort that we are doing that means efforts that we are doing and especially in terms of 
those communities where we operate so ensure that we intervene in a more decisive 
way to change their lives in terms of whether it’s a community development project, 
developing or encouraging economic activities in terms of entrepreneurship and also 
putting money in areas like education and health where there is issues that are not yet 
addressed or the state  has not yet reached them and we intervene in those areas. But 
most of our efforts I can tell you that we are pushing hard on education in terms of 
giving infrastructure or equipment to school, upgrading certain schools and even FET 
colleges where we do Teacher- Lecturer development and capacitation. So, most of 
our work is geared towards associating with the majority of our Grade 12, uplifting 
communities around where we operate (9:4:17). 
 
We upskill there and this is all in response to the Mining Charter.  Then what we also 
do is help local communities with all our social economic developments.  So we are 
not perfect there, but we realise the social impact we can have and the social, potential 
social unrest we have to address with Marikana and all that.  Besides just the Mining 
Charter telling us to look at that, we are looking at our communities around us and we 
are engaging with municipalities, communities, schools et cetera, to help develop 
them, uplift them with education, with skills, starting local businesses, et cetera 
(2:11:57).  
 
 In many instances participants felt that their companies involvement goes beyond 
expectations or legal obligations, and some participants even suggested that they 
are taking responsibility to deliver services expected to be performed by government.  
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6.4.3 The business 
Some participants indicated that there is a correlation between scorecard adherence 
and organisational sustainability.  
Beneficiaries of the scorecard, if you do it very well, first of all is the benefit of the 
organisation… And then the beneficiaries of the scorecard will be the shareholders.  
Because if you do it right, you are going to be appointing competent individuals who 
are going to add value into the organisation to increase (1:10:17). 
 
So the communities are beneficiaries yes in terms of monitoring but the ultimate 
beneficiary is you. If you do it properly, you benefit because then your license is secure 
(8:12:73). 
 
It is going to be all or stakeholders, all, well our shareholders initially will have long-
term benefit, because we will have a licence to operate and we will continue operating.  
Because the government that regulated DMR puts an onus on us to comply.  If we 
don’t, then we get directives and then worst case scenario we shut down and lose 
money and then everybody loses out, especially [the] shareholder (2:7:57). 
 
Licence renewal was also a motivation to meet, and even, exceed scorecard targets. 
Transformation thus has the potential to earn return on investment for the 
shareholders. Since the business will have a licence to operate, the shareholders will 
benefit from long-term income. Carter et al. (2003) highlighted that there is a debate 
whether companies are attending to diversity (in South African terms’ transformation) 
because it is the right thing to do, or because it enhances shareholder value? It can 
be justified from the responses above that other companies may be adhering to 
scorecards for regulatory purposes. 
6.4.4 Employees 
Employees of companies benefit in share schemes and options. The HRD scorecard 
stipulates that employees in the mining industry be awarded opportunities for training 
and development (DMR, 2009). Female employees are also benefiting as their 
development is encouraged by the scorecard. 
There’s a lot, communities are the top beneficiaries our employees are our top 
beneficiaries in terms of the share schemes and women are the beneficiaries at the 
moment and all those people to me are those benefiting a lot (10:20:31). 
 
The section above considered the beneficiaries of transformation by pointing out the 
stakeholders benefiting from it. Apart from HDSAs, also mentioned were 
communities, the business, and employees. It is clear that HDSA candidates are 
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offered preference above other groups. Mining communities benefit from community 
development projects. The business benefits because it attains licence renewal 
when they adhere to scorecards so they are able to run their operations and 
business and shareholders can earn profits. Employees benefit from developmental 
programmes and training as well as other benefits, such as share options. This 
section also covered some of the progress made in achieving transformation. More 
details on the progress made and initiatives undertaken to realise transformation are 
explained in detail in Section 6.6. Challenges of transformation faced by mining 
companies are discussed in the next section. 
6.5 CHALLENGES OF TRANSFORMATION 
Limpitlaw et al. (2005) identified the challenges faced in the mining industry by listing 
mine health and safety, as well as the depletion of resources as the prime 
challenges. Core transformation issues identified by this author were good 
governance, disclosure policy and access to information, capacity building, conflict 
management, human rights, dialogue and partnership facilitation, legacies of the 
past and closure, standards- guidelines and monitoring, gender inequality, 
corruption, empowerment of civil society, social and environmental responsibility of 
business, impacts and benefits at community level, institution building and regulatory 
framework, social mitigation, economic diversification, and poverty alleviation.  
In the coding process for the challenges for transformation, it was discovered that 
the participants in this research revealed more specific challenges. Seven 
challenges facing the mining industry are grouped in themes, namely: recruitment of 
suitable candidates, mining not always suitable as a career choice, operational 
challenges, role of government, spirit of transformation, war for talent, and the 
nationalisation of mines debate. 
6.5.1 Recruitment of suitable candidates  
The recruitment of suitable candidates forms the basis for selecting the most suitable 
candidate for a specific job. The sub-themes that emerged from this theme included 
the skills shortages of HDSAs and the difficulties in appointing candidates with the 
required experience and qualifications, as well as geographical challenges in 
employing local versus migrant labour.    
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   Skills shortage and lack of qualifications and experience 6.5.1.1
Nine out of ten (90%) participants mentioned that transformation targets are often 
not achieved due to the shortage of skills preventing HDSAs from entering the 
mining industry. In 2010, the DME also identified skills shortage as the principal 
limitation of competitiveness (DME, 2010). It appears that the issue of skills shortage 
is an ongoing challenge in the mining industry. 
You know, the issue of skills development, we need skills and we all know that skills 
are a big issue in this country. However it is how you find effective programmes that 
still make you tick the box. So we look at skills for example, we run training 
programmes where we cover sports and training. So we take a lot of people who are 
sportsman in to our sports academy. And what we allow them to do is to practice 
sports but at the same time they then acquire skills through training in technical and 
artisanal skills (6:18:15). 
 
It was also indicated by one participant that the availability of skills does not only 
mean that a candidate has the required higher education qualification, but also 
requires of the candidate to have sufficient experience and insight. Engineering, 
technical and artisanal skills were identified as critical skills that HDSAs are short of. 
… secondly, another challenge is availability of skills.  I mean, if we, when we say 
skills, I am not talking about someone who is going to come out with a master’s degree 
at [a] university and then we say that is skills.  Skills come with experience, experience 
brings about insight.  Now that is what we are running short of (1:23:33). 
 
So there is a shortage of talent particularly the black engineers. And I think statistically 
it has been proven that there isn’t too many of them in the country in terms of mining. I 
am talking mining in particular. There might be a lot of them in the system but they are 
not yet ready to take the position (10:9:45). 
 
Another participant stressed that competent candidates are high in demand in the 
mining industry. He argued that competence is not measured by the colour of your 
skin but rather on how competent you are on the job. He argued that competence is 
the driving force of excellence in the mining industry and that safety and even profits 
cannot be compromised to accommodate a certain colour ratio. 
… competence is colour blind in this industry because remember that if you are at the 
top and you have a thousand people underground, three kilometre down there, 
working at the rock face, it’s got nothing to do with colour. When you are the 
accountable guy here, you have to pull them out. Safely as well, set them down there 
safely (7:19:27). 
 
Only one participant (10%) argued that there is a redundancy of skills in the country 
and suggested such candidates were not given the opportunities to excel. 
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…and now we are saying the skills are scarce.  We have got ample skills.  We are just 
not using them (5:31:73). 
 
The skills[shortage] is still a challenge, but at the same time I think really South Africa 
has got skills…because I always ask myself this question, which really bothers me a 
lot: On a yearly basis universities produce [students] What happens to those students? 
(5:17:45). 
 
This participant further remarked on the need for companies to provide development 
programmes for University graduates in order to give them experience and exposure 
in the mining industry. This participant also argued that skills development should be 
a partnership between the mining industry and the government. 
 …but because we don’t have the patience to develop and afford practical experience 
to the poor students. They get graduated, then they are at home, you want a job, you 
look at the newspaper 10 years’ experience five years’ experience.  Very few 
companies you will find those companies that have got development programmes like 
we do (5:17:45). 
 
Though, one participant mentioned there are people with the appropriate skills 
(referring to non-HDSA candidates, mostly white males), however, they are last in 
the queue because companies have to comply with EE and transformational targets. 
…because you must remember now you have got existing white males who have been 
there who are highly competent who are fully performing and all that (1:48:75). 
 
And we can't fill them because we can't get the skills.  And we need to fill them with the 
right skills so that we get our BEE right. We get our compliance right and we have got 
a whole queue I don’t know how many of white people waiting who could potentially 
meet half of those but they are last in the queue.  So if you have got a queue of people 
your HDSA’s take up the first 80% of the queue and the last 20% we will consider the 
white people.  So they are there but we have got to try and give preference.  We can't 
find the skills.  We are, it is the, my HR people are going grey and they are it is a huge 
problem.  It is a huge problem (2:57:193). 
 
As explained before, there is a critical shortage in the mining industry for engineers. 
It was explained as one of the positions where skills are scarce but an area to be 
considered very valuable. Due to the shortage of engineers, most vacancies cannot 
be filled because of a shortage of adequate skills and qualifications. 
… I am an engineer, I know, it is an incredibly strenuous and onerous degree to get.  It 
is not Mickey Mouse you have got to work hard. You have to have a little bit of ability, 
you have got to be able to think at a certain level, and you have got to be able to apply 
yourself, you have got to work hard. There is no free lunch in these types of skills 




…you still have got lots of vacancies in the engineering department which you can't fill 
today because of lack of adequate skills (3:17:79). 
 
…so now that in itself is a strenuous process. That is why people outside don’t seem 
to understand the challenges that we have got. I mean, that is why earlier on I said, if it 
was get 20% handsome women and, beautiful women and handsome men, we will 
have done it (1:51:79). 
 
In order to address the skills shortage challenge, it was stated that efforts are being 
made by mining companies to assess matriculants for entry-level positions. 
Unfortunately, they do not pass these assessments that would grant them entry-level 
jobs in mining. Even when the assessments are made more lenient at a Grade 8 
level, the matriculants still fail them. 
And in an absence of adequate and good education, I mean you get people, who say 
they have matric, then you do an assessment test and they don’t even pass the 
assessment at matric level, you can actually take it down to maybe Grade 8, and they 
still fail a Grade 8 assessment so you know and then what we do is [to] have a 
bridging course to say okay fine maybe you didn’t make it here let’s have this one. So I 
think skills is a big issue so  skills is a big problem at a higher level only we see skills 
at the lower level being the most difficult. And that is just from an educational 
perspective (6:64:35). 
 
The mining industry has limited control to influence the incoming skills outside the 
industry. All participants agree that the environment outside the mining industry, 
namely, the education system, which they regard as poor, seems to be influencing 
the non-availability of technical skills. 
It’s not enough technical skills coming through and that is influenced by the 
environment outside of mining (7:18:27).  
 
Then some of the skills are at a higher level we have struggled to find. I used to be the 
mentor for all the industrial engineering students and fraternity, I did all the bursaries 
for them and I really struggled to find HDSA students and candidates (2:26:107). 
 
It was noteworthy to report that one participant admitted that the mining industry 
does not have a robust process of recruiting and appointing people with professional 
skills especially for people living with disabilities.  
We don’t have in my view a robust system or a process, whatever you want to call it, 
that focuses on people with disabilities and ensures that we can as a country produce 
people with good skills.  Not just skills in terms of being a typist or as a person with a 





Due to skills shortages, recruitment of women, especially in middle to senior 
management positions, also remains a problem. Three out of ten (30%) participants 
stated that qualified and experienced women (particularly black females) were hard 
to recruit. The participant below ascribed the low representation of African females in 
senior management roles to the qualifications and experience needed at that level. 
The challenge remaining on the senior management and also the demographics you 
will find that [for] African females in particular there is still a challenge there. But you 
can also realise that when we are talking about senior management we are talking 
about someone who has an experience of ten years or more to fifteen years in terms 
of that group of people. So you will find that in most cases the skills that are required 
for that level are not that many and we are competing all for the same people. So you 
find that it is expensive to keep people because you have to pay them more to keep 
and retain them. So that is the base we can relate to the amount of skills and because 
all of them are required especially African females particularly. There is a demand for 
them at that level and I think that it become the challenge (9:16:33). 
 
The recruitment of suitable candidates is also a geographical challenge. There 
seems to be a challenge on the recruitment of local versus migrant labour. 
   Geographical challenges: Local versus migrant labour 6.5.1.2
In addition to the shortage of skills, experience and qualifications of HDSAs, mining 
companies face the challenge of recruiting local candidates. The industry 
appreciates that it needs to employ local candidates. 
Mining is as you would appreciate its history has a lot of migrant labour so as localise 
labour it talks about transformation wanting to see a lot more locals (7:8:15) 
 
Although mining companies target local candidates, six out ten (60%) participants 
commented that local candidates in mining communities are not willing to do the 
work that the foreigners or men from the Eastern Cape or Lesotho are willing to do. 
… skills is a big issue education is a big issue and as much as within our own 
organisation we target people from the local communities to bring into the 
organisation.  What you find is they are not willing to do the same kind of work like 
people in the Eastern Cape and other places are willing to do. So now you have a 
problem you have to hire locals but the locals don’t want to do the job that you do 
(6:41:27). 
 
And they also would fail the health tests and they would go for all this training before 
they go underground and it is a similar training that will be happening underground.  
And when they come from the training some don’t even finish their training.  They say 
“no it is hard thank you I am not going to I can't do it.”  That is why we are having 
people from Mozambique because it is physical.  Lesotho, that is where you get the 
rock drill operators and Eastern Cape.  It is the physical type of a job as well but health 




Although local candidates enrol for training for mining employment, some do not 
complete and quit due to an inability to cope. Participants also stated that the 
migrant labour is easy to recruit because they are willing work underground, unlike 
the local candidates or women who want to do office work and were not suitable or 
willing to consider positions such as a rock drill operator. 
…and you have got people from all over the show, Lesotho, because those, that is 
where you are getting the rock drill operators.  For example, unemployment around the 
mines, the community surrounding the mines or the business, the mine businesses, 
you will find that those people would want office jobs and not go and become a rock 
drill operator (5:46:91). 
 
I found that most of the women that I have talked to underground they don’t want to 
work there.  And because they don’t want they are not going into mining because they 
want to (3:30:125). 
 
It is alarming that local candidates and communities discriminate against non-local 
candidates when they are employed. These employees subsequently feel isolated 
because they are not accepted in the communities and treated like foreigners. This 
finding supports the findings from research done by Shabangu (2010) who 
highlighted the tension between communities and mining companies.  
I mean, there has been a lot of talk about hiring local people and unfortunately, where 
there is a dire need for jobs there is competition. And that creates a lot of tension 
within the communities so all the people who come from the Eastern Cape or come 
from Mozambique or come from Lesotho, find themselves isolated because they are 
not accepted into the communities (6:37:27). 
 
In fact they are seen as foreigners in those very same communities so what options do 
they have but to go and build a shack and live in a shack and bring up their kids in 
those shacks. So the challenges are broad and I think it’s really a time for both 
companies, and DMR and other departments to really rethink the issue you know, how 
we transform the industry such as the mining industry (6:37:27). 
 
The recruitment of candidates with suitable skills, qualifications and experience 
remains a challenge in the South African mining industry. The key question that can 
be posed is what happens to graduates from Universities who possess qualifications 
that are suitable for them to work in the mining industry. What happens to those that 
have the experience and skills, for example, non-HDSAs, like white men? Though 
the recruitment of local candidates is encouraged and advised, the mining industry is 
faced with a challenge to employ local candidates because they are not willing to 
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work in underground conditions. The next challenge that is explained is the role of 
government to fast-track transformation in the mining industry. 
6.5.2 Role of government  
The sub-themes identified in the role of government theme are the education 
system, the culture of dependency that has been created, legislation, as well as 
service delivery issues. 
   Education system 6.5.2.1
The mining industry views education as a vehicle that can prepare students for 
University and consequently for the mining sector. However, all participants criticised 
the education system for doing the contrary.  
But our education system also needs to be jacked up.  It is not serving any purpose to 
say we have got this 60% or 80% pass rate as a country only to find that the results 
actually, people can't do anything, it is pass, but pass on what? You can't even get 
[the] university entrances (5:35:79). 
 
The schools in the rural areas do not have sufficient facilities to prepare the learners 
for tertiary education or even employment. Required facilities are, for example, 
access to the library, laboratories and access to equipment for experiments, and so 
on. In addition to facilities, the resources to teach matriculants are also important.  
Now, in that school there is no library… it is overcrowded and all.  Now part of our 
initiative, we are helping some of those schools that we have identified. We have 
computer centres with a library [and] with laboratories. Now that is part of the initiative 
(1:33:49). 
 
…you can eradicate poverty but how do you do that when you still have … people 
haven’t even received their text books and they are busy with the exams and the 
government’s response is like no but we are busy delivering and we have delivered.  
Okay, when do you deliver? End October (5:11:37).  
 
As a consequence to a lack of facilities and resources, there is a concern that the 
education system is producing poor performing matriculants who are not eligible for 
University and who are specifically not suitable for mining qualifications. 
Because we have realised that they can't get [the] university entrance … That is why 
… the youth in the villages you will find that most of them [the youth] are matriculants, 





… I think our government has failed us in the education system.  They need to 
produce people with matriculation exemption that can actually study further into tertiary 
levels.  Because the skills we need are people who are going to have some kind of 
tertiary skilling certification education, et cetera, et cetera.  So we are not getting the 
skills, school leavers that are at a level that we can actually take them further. We 
have a huge issue on that (2:25:107). 
 
The low standard of education requires the mining industry to develop and 
implement alternative methods to accommodate HDSA school leavers in order to 
enter the mining industry. 
So we are actually having to pick it up. What the government has failed to provide is 
adequate education for school leavers or the standard is just too low. We have got an 
issue there  (2:26:107).  
 
Because it is okay for the government to say to industry, “alright guys, these are the 
targets.”  But then the government has a commensurate responsibility to make sure 
that they deliver the education to our young people, then we can take school leavers 
and educate them and take them further.  We are very happy to do that.  But if we 
have a paucity of skills and abilities and school leavers coming out, it is actually almost 
abdicating that responsibility to industry.  And I know that the government will confess 
privately that they don’t have the capacity to deliver on anything that they need to as 
the governor…so they admitted that they don’t have all the capacity to do it (2:31:117). 
 
Even when mining companies accommodate HDSA learners, for example, with 
bursaries and finances for bridging courses, some learners still fail to obtain the 
desired outcomes. 
We would give 60 students bridging year opportunities and maybe 10 would be good 
enough to get through to first year to carry on.  The education is a serious, serious 
problem. It is really, and I am saying it, government has failed us in that area.  The 
government has got its challenges but we are already 18 years since independence or 
a new society or the start of enfranchisement.  I know it is going to take more than 18 
years but I was expecting more progress. Maybe the education department took the 
wrong direction in terms of its OBE et cetera I don’t know (2:29:113). 
 
Those who manage to go to University drop out or their studies are terminated by the 
University due to poor performance. 
… in fact, I had a lot of my students I had given bursaries to, they just couldn’t get past 
second year.  They did first year, failed first year, did second year, failed second year.  
So by the time they hadn’t even completed second year they had already been 
studying for four years. And universities also have cut-off’s (2:28:111). 
 
FET colleges are also not producing quality students who are eligible for mining. 
 
..the FET colleges to some extend are not assisting us to a great deal. You know I 
don’t want to talk about numbers because sometimes it’s about quality, but it is just the 
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consistent performance, you know, too few are performing well and they come under 
strain but we need much more. To be able to get as many people on the field as 
possible (7:21:29). 
 
Another transformation aspect related to the role of government is the culture of 
dependency that is created among the youth of South Africa. 
   Culture of dependency 6.5.2.2
One participant was of the opinion that the government has created a culture of 
dependency by stating that young people from the HDSA group have a sense of 
entitlement. Entitlement, according to the respondent, is created by grants offered to 
people without necessarily working hard for them. 
Because you will get a free house by hook or crook, you will make [the] means, 
because they are available somewhere and then you will get pregnant you go to [get] 
social grant, then you will have two kids, you already budget. That is what the youth is 
doing now. Even if you interview them, “ja I need three kids so that at least I can get 
this much” and then they budget already. Then when you get older you will go for the 
social the old age social grant. So there is always something that will be handed out.  
So we have created a culture of dependency (5:41:91). 
 
This participant alleged that most of the youth blame apartheid for their shortcomings 
and are really not doing anything to improve their education because the government 
provides them with social grants. 
Blaming the apartheid? Even during apartheid at schools I mean I am from Mafikeng at 
home, you know, even deeper than Mafikeng. That government at the time they would 
go to those schools they would furnish you with toothpaste, toothbrush, they would 
have a subject called Health. They were educating. So that is why we got people who 
became doctors for that matter. We have got medical doctors from those old schools 
and then yet we want to blame that [apartheid] (5:52:103). 
 
Legislation was identified as another governmental shortcoming. This section was 
explained on transformation and legislation in Section 3.2. 
   Legislation 6.5.2.3
As explained in Section 3.2 the uncertainty of the regulatory environment is also one 
of the major challenges of EE scorecards targets being unmet due to the confusion 
on the array of policies. Policies are not aligned. It was confirmed in the literature 
review that this big fallacy has caused misunderstandings and confusion in the South 
African mining industry.  
… the policy has to be aligned generally. The policy on community development the 
geniuses that wrote that …Oohhh I told them at DMR  I had a meeting that other day 
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with them and [I] said they should not tell us what we are not doing right they must first 
fix the municipalities (8:36:157.) 
 
Others observed that the MPRDA, the Mining Charter, the Labour Relations Act, the 
EE and Skills development act have different meanings for the categories of 
employees. Thus, this creates confusion on which policy or act to follow.  
…some policies are not aligned with other developmental policies in different, in other 
departments of the country (8:33:173).   
 
Where we say they are not talking to each other they talk to different, they track 
different things. They track core skills in mining. They define management differently to 
the act… so we do follow more of the charter because the charter itself has got 
numeric goals already set for companies within the mining sector (7:5:13). 
 
In addition to the policies that are not aligned, the government is blamed for not 
cooperating with the private sector.  
   No cooperation between mining sector and government 6.5.2.4
Particularly in community development projects that need collaboration between 
mining companies and the municipalities, the municipalities are alleged not to be 
assuming responsibility where they are accountable. 
…the one in local and mine community development, although it says that you’re 
supposed to find a program in the IDP but these municipalities themselves often don’t 
understand these IDP’s.The IDP’s are outdated and there is no governance 
framework, very important. There’s no governance framework i.e. they are supposed 
to work nice with the municipality in developing the project (8:33:173). 
 
Part of the reason why there is no collaboration in the mining industry is that there 
exists a lack of trust between the mining sector and government. There is also 
limited dialogue taking place between the mining sector and the government due to 
suspicions and lack of trust. 
For as long as we treat each other with suspicion… because that unfortunately that is 
the fact there is a lot of suspicion around the mining industry and unfortunately what 
happened at Marikana doesn’t paint us at a good light at all. And as much as we 
might, maybe know that perhaps there are industries that are not doing so good and 
there are industries that are doing great (6:50:31). 
 
Treasury and the DTI are never interested in hearing what industry needs to do or 
what industry thinks should be done to fix the problem. They have their own agendas 
and their own ideas and you go by the book. And I think for as long as that is the 




Claims of limited service delivery by government were also major concerns justified 
by participants.  
But I think right now there are a very few case studies where we can say…the 
communities are happy to have mines here. And it’s inflated by lack of service delivery 
from the municipalities as well. Because just from our perspective we have 
implemented 90% of what we said we would do we’ have done.  What we haven’t 
done is where we felt that it would be irresponsible to even bother to start on 
something we have brought on the table (6:61:33). 
 
So I think the targets were onerous, bearing in mind the fact that we are not getting the 
full cooperation from the government in terms of that.  So it is a partnership.  We had a 
meeting with the DMR a few months ago where the DMR said to us we are industry 
and they are the regulator. But actually in effect we are in the same boat.  They are 
sitting on the right-hand side of the boat we are on the left-hand side of the boat and 
we, either of us can make this boat sink. Them [the regulator] with onerous regulation 
us [mining companies] with not complying or not help and transform (2:32:117). 
 
The responses above and below suggests that there is a conflict between the 
regulators, namely, the DMR and the private sector, namely, the mining industry. 
One of the issues was how do we capacitate local municipalities? What role do we as 
industry want to play in that space? We don’t want to take over municipalities but how 
do we capacitate them? We don’t want to take over municipalities it’s not our job. 
We’ve got a company to run but how do we capacitate them so that they can deliver 
because if they can deliver they take the pressure off us you understand? For as long 
as they don’t deliver we will always be at the mercy of communities and we accept that 
we have a responsibility towards [these] communities (6:58:33). 
 
…I don’t think they have their ducks in the roll. That to me that’s the biggest barrier as 
well. Because if you say to me please implement this but you still don’t have your 
house in order [and] you don’t even guide me on how to do it you must forget 
(10:14:43). 
 
Two participants howled for governmental support in realising the transformational 
goals. One of these respondents stated that the lack of cooperation and 
governmental support is also caused by political interferences within the DMR. 
How do other non-mining people out there [do], what role do they need to play. [The] 
government being one of them in making sure…because we always get hammered 
when things go wrong...but then we don’t get the level of support (3:29:122). 
 
...unfortunately within the DMR itself there is a lot of political manoeuvring and that 
political manoeuvring unfortunately is detrimental to the community which is on the 
ground because what you are finding is that companies were committed to projects 
that they knew right from the beginning that the projects were unsustainable (6:28:25). 
 
It is clearly identified, judging by responses received, that the non-cooperation 
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between the mining industry and government limits opportunities for transformation, 
especially in mining communities. 
   Monitoring challenges 6.5.2.5
Added to the issue of service delivery, only one participant added that government is 
having challenges to accurately monitor the adherence to the legislation by mining 
companies.  
I know that they had a challenge; they have got a challenge of monitoring companies 
in terms of how far they are going… (3:56:209). 
 
It is alarming that one participant admitted that mining companies perform inaccurate 
or false reporting of the demographic presentation of results. This participant 
expressed the concern that mining companies are reporting flawed and inaccurate 
data. 
But then there is like real issues…if you are an executive, you must not be like that, 
think that… because you get the reports that says everything is well, then everything is 
well.  You must just learn to go down there and really find out as to what the hell is 
going on or else you are going to be surprised all the time. Because people don’t just 
strike or go on a go-slow… when issues have not been addressed. They try for a long 
time to address issues and then resort to stoppages (4:23:158). 
 
This participant questioned the occurrence of labour unrest in the mining industry 
whilst the industry claims that it is transforming. 
Though the recruitment of local candidates is encouraged and advised, the mining 
industry is faced with a challenge to employ them because they are not willing to 
work under those conditions. The next section discusses the challenges of mining as 
a career choice. 
6.5.3 Mining as a career choice  
Participants in the study revealed that mining as a career choice entails that you may 
have to succumb to adverse working conditions, such as facing health and safety 
risks, and working underground, resulting in employees being subjected to gender 
stereotyping. The sub-themes identified for this theme are health and safety, 
underground conditions and housing problems. 
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Operational challenges refer to the challenges faced in the mining working 
environment. Limpitlaw et al. (2005) identified health and safety as a prime challenge 
facing the mining industry.  
   Health and safety 6.5.3.1
Health and safety is also considered a transformational objective and there is an 
understanding in the mining industry that the wellbeing of employees is a prime 
objective. 
When we speak about health which is also a transformational issue, I mean when you 
talk about employee health and HIV and TB and all the things that come with the kind 
of job that we do, we extend that to understanding the health and wellbeing of our 
employees (6:6:13). 
 
Although the mining companies claim to have installed safety control measures to 
prevent fatalities, there are occurrences outside their control often happen and cost 
the miners lives.  
…issues around health and safety that is a major challenge for the mines. Because 
sometimes the health and safety is not within the control… you get things like fall off 
ground… you can bar all the places and all that and then all of a sudden a rock falls 
out there(1:28:41). 
 
The mining industry appreciates the need for safety underground, as such there are 
measures put in place to prevent accidents and fatalities. However, events outside 
their control sometimes do happen. 
   Underground conditions 6.5.3.2
All respondents (100%) agree that underground conditions are a serious challenge 
facing the mining industry, due to safety reasons. They state that the underground 
environment is not an easy or conducive environment to work in.  
I think when you are outside it is easy to say people don’t have interest.  But once you 
get inside then you can understand the dynamics [of] what kind of business are we 
talking about. Who wants to go underground, how many people want to go 
underground and blast. Hence you saw the recent splash of aggrieved miners saying 
“we really work very hard underground.” And it is true, it is a tough job…the working 
conditions underground are not conducive for a normal human being (5:19:49). 
 
It appears underground condition makes it difficult for mining companies to ensure 
equal representation of demographics of the country. The Mining Charter also 
requires a certain percentage of women to be employed in the industry. All 
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participants stated that the reality is that underground conditions are not suitable for 
women. 
…and you must understand, working underground is not an easy job for anybody.  
Now if you are a female it is even worse (1:46:49). 
 
…you need to have 10% women in mining from the different levels at the scope and in 
management level and in professional level we need to have 10% artisans, women 
10%, electricians, everything that we have got has to be 10%.  But then that is not an 
easy thing to do because there are some places where the underground is not 
conducive for females (1:8:15).  
 
The machinery and equipment in the mining industry, for example, is not designed 
for women. Most mining companies are still using conventional mining equipment 
that has been designed for use by strong, fit men. 
Equipment that we are using is not economically designed for women.  We are still 
using lots of conventional mining.  I mean that drill weighs about 24 kilo’s and if you 
are to pick it up as a woman I don’t know if I can…and the heat tolerance test which 
has got issues with our anatomy because it is our anatomy. It has got nothing to do 
with anything else. We are a degree higher than men anyway so unfortunately it 
catches up with the woman on the other side (3:20:91). 
 
How many female RDO’s [Rock drill operators] did you see striking when we want 10% 
in woman?  They physically can’t carry those things. So there’s a lot of theory but you 
know I don’t want to throw the baby with the bath water, there’s some good things 
(8:16:115). 
 
Due to cultural diversity challenges and operational challenges, most of the women 
who are employed underground end up quitting the job because of inability to cope 
in that environment.  
…they say no it’s too much for me because it’s hard work. I mean you have never 
been underground I suppose, well I have been underground a few times and ahh the 
few times I have been there, I just thought this is… it’s like being in the dark ages. It’s 
not a way of life you would want for your husband, your son and your child (6:43:29). 
 
The quotes presented below state that another issue is the one of women falling 
pregnant which means that their employers are then confronted with the challenges 
of finding suitable environments within the workplace where it’s conducive for 
pregnant women to work. 
It is difficult. I mean, women fall pregnant and it has certain consequences. And you 
can't put them into places where it is going to develop risks for the pregnancy or 




Even the conditions of employment in particular for women, because once you are 
pregnant, as soon as you know that you are pregnant you cannot go underground.  ….  
yes, we want to mirror what we are saying in terms of transforming our companies and 
everything, but it is a huge, huge challenge because the conditions of service of 
employment with regards to pregnancy issues women working in high risk areas is 
very challenging.  Once you are pregnant you are out (3:19:83). 
 
… because you are no longer going underground you have to be taken and that is 
what the legislation also dictates.  You have to be removed and we have to find you an 
alternative on the surface. And everyone wants to work at the surface because 
underground really it is tough (5:21:53). 
 
The underground conditions are considered not suitable for women as the machinery 
and equipment that are used underground are still conventionally designed for 
males. Autonomy is another issue, given that women may fall pregnant, and finally 
the role that women play as mothers inhibit their sustainable employment in mining. 
The housing problem is also a challenge facing the mining industry. 
   Housing problems 6.5.3.3
According to Cawood (2004), the mineworker should be given respect and human 
dignity by improving their housing and living conditions with the view of increasing 
home ownership schemes. Due to the fact that most underground workers in the 
mining industry are migrant workers, they have to find suitable living arrangements 
around mining communities. According to Shabangu (2010) suitable living conditions 
will improve their productivity and performance at work. In fact, literature revealed 
that the housing problem is still one of the major challenges facing the mining 
industry. There is an acknowledgement that living conditions of miners have to be 
transformed; however housing remains a critical concern. 
So if you take the housing problem that mining had and still has, and you transform 
that and you infuse the aspect of dignity, the aspect of… respect, the aspect of you 
know, do you want your employees, do you want to associate your name as an 
organisation with a particular set of conditions that your employees might be living 
under? that taints you…(3:4:30). 
So if your employees live under conditions that still say that is not conditions of 2012, 
but they are conditions of maybe 1962, the history comes into it again.  To the extent 
that you have transformed that aspect, you will be able to say I have moved in tandem 
with the movement that the country presumably is making towards a future where 




With clear set targets in the scorecard, the mining industry is required to execute 
development plans to improve the housing and living conditions of mineworkers 
through the following activities (Mining Charter, 2009): 
• Convert or upgrade hostels into family units by 2014. 
• Attain the occupancy rate of one person per room by 2014. 
• Facilitate home ownership options for all mine employers in consultation with 
organised labour by 2014. 
From the responses received, it seems that the 2014 targets of improvement of 
housing and living conditions will not be achieved. 
…don’t want to say all mining companies have done what they are expected to do. 
There are some mining companies that haven’t bothered to convert. In fact I know 
companies that have just sold their housing and living structures and out-sourced it to 
other companies so they have nothing to do with accommodation (6:32:25). 
 
As stated above, legislation urges that the miners must have decent accommodation 
or be given a benefit in the form of an allowance to build a proper house close to 
where they work. Mining companies provide such benefits and it has been 
established that this act creates more social problems because miners often use the 
money to support a second family they have in the surrounding mining community.  
… but the problem is that you still have people who don’t necessarily want to live in 
that single room accommodation… so we may have given them that R2000 or so that 
is supposed to be a living out allowance, but it not being used for living out 
accommodation. It’s being used to supplement a secondary family that they may have 
in the North West while they have another family in the Eastern Cape (6:34:25). 
 
It was revealed by participants of this study that some mineworkers choose not 
spend the money on accommodation but rather use it to support their families and 
build homes in the area from where they migrated. In these cases, instead of renting 
rooms, they choose to erect a shack in an informal settlement and live in poor living 
conditions. 
The living conditions when you looked at those shacks that they were showing on TV, 
indeed these people live in those shacks and these people indeed are getting housing 
or living out allowance, which is obviously not much. Some of them get R1 800,00, 
then they erect these backyard, and some are renting proper rooms in the backyards 
of people in the nearby villages.  But most of these people, 90% of them are saying, “I 
am here for work, I would rather build the house at home because that is where I am 
going to retire.”  That is why the person is happy to sit in this shack because he is not 
going to invest here…home is not here. But the other complication is that this person, 
if you have a proper home there, then you are also having, trying to have a proper 
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home at home, your salary is going to be so stretched to maintain both proper homes.  
So you rather save the money for main home (5:43:91). 
 
We need the legislature to cross that line of understanding that when we talk about 
hostel accommodation in today’s terms we are not talking about a single room with a 
hundred people. We are talking about one person in a room (6:35:27). 
 
It was also revealed as a concern that those that build houses near where they work 
have created more social problems. Others have married twice and started a new 
family. 
And the other dynamics is that of now they end up now marrying twice. Legal and 
illegal and those that appeared on TV, you will find that it is not the lady from home, it 
is the lady that the person just found there. There is still a wife and five kids at home 
and this one also has got two kids… because you know what ladies also do?  “I will put 
him down, I will have kids with him,” only to find that, let him die then you see all the 
dynamics.  Then you have to carry this as an employer, this person back home, to be 
buried back home. Now you have got the complications.  In your record you have got 
this one at home. All the monies are going to.  Now you have got to also attend to this 
new case and look at the rules that govern the money of this person and try and 
search beyond this to say, “who are other possible beneficiaries,” and now start taking 
that money, distributing it to all the beneficiaries (5:44:91). 
 
As a result of having two families, mineworkers end up having garnishee orders 
against their salaries because they borrowed money from loan sharks in order to 
cope with providing for two families. Seemingly, if the mineworker is not able to 
provide for the other family then they are subjected to court orders for child support 
and maintenance. 
... and then this person ends up having to feed two homes and what will the other 
person also, this person will also do?  They have got garnishee orders as well.  They 
go and have loans from the loan sharks. Today you have got not only the banks 
enticing people about the loans. You have got the loan sharks (5:45:91). 
 
You have got people, now this second lady or wife or girlfriend having kids as well.  
They go to magistrate, he is not supporting the kids, automatically garnishee order.  
How many garnishee orders and what do you end up with as net?  Sometimes, 
nothing sometimes, R2 000, 00.  What will you do with R2 000,00?  Because those are 
garnishee orders, we have to deduct them, it is a court order.  What do you do?  The 
next things, then they go on strike to say, “This is my pay.” Yes, some of them could 
have been made better in terms of the salaries (5:45:91). 
 
Indeed, in many instances the conditions in the lower ranks of the mining industry 
are not suitable for women. The autonomy and role of women in society makes it 
difficult for them to enjoy sustainable employment in mining, particularly 
underground. The legislation calling for mining companies to improve the living 
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conditions of miners, also has its challenges. Mining companies provide a housing 
allowance for accommodation and housing. Or mining companies should convert or 
upgrade hostels into family units, or even facilitate home ownership for mineworkers. 
However this exercise creates more social problems as the money is used to support 
a second family, and in cases where miners build a proper home, they end up 
marrying twice.  
6.5.4 Spirit of transformation  
The spirit of transformation focuses on how employees in the mining industry 
perceive transformation and conduct themselves in operational areas. Sub-themes 
identified in this theme are gender stereotyping, cultural diversity challenges and lack 
of mentorship. 
Gender stereotyping implies that a certain gender believes that they are superior to 
the other. This can be evidenced from certain behaviours and actions of one gender 
that proves discriminatory against the other gender.  
   Gender stereotyping 6.5.4.1
There is confirmation that gender stereotyping exists in the mining industry and it 
was held that mining is a male-dominated environment. Challenges are evident 
when females enter, either management positions, or work in positions traditionally 
set aside for their male counterparts. For example, when a young woman is 
appointed as a supervisor underground, the older men do not accept her authority as 
she is not one of them. 
… it’s a very male dominated environment and I think there is still a lot of stereotype 
about what woman can do and what woman can’t do. Whether or not we put any 
weight to anything that a woman is saying. So I think there is a lot of a stereotype 
around gender (6:70:37). 
 
Because it’s not a point of just putting a woman there, we need to change the 
dynamics of how we operate in that environment. And maybe younger people in the 
underground world will not have a problem with having a woman there. But, the older 
generation is a big problem. And remember a lot of these women are actually young 
woman who are coming to the underground and a lot of these miners are older miners, 
they are in their 50’s. Some close to 60.  They don’t understand this kid and a woman 
nogal coming to tell me what to do (6:72:39). 
 
Gender stereotyping is not only a challenge underground but it also extends to the 
board of directors. The participant quoted below has previously worked underground 
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and has climbed the corporate ladder in the mining environment and is now serving 
on a board. This participant reflects on the stereotypical attitudes even in the 
boardroom. 
Across, and it’s not to say that it is documented somewhere it’s just when you observe 
in a boardroom at certain levels you get a sense that when a man speaks they 
probably hear him the loudest (6:71:39). 
 
Although only one participant referred to gender stereotyping as a main challenge, 
this perspective confirms literature studies of board governance and diversity which 
reports sex bias, stereotyping and tokenism on boards where women serve (Erhardt 
et al., 2003). Added to gender stereotyping, it was found that there is also age 
stereotyping which is a cultural diversity challenge. 
   Cultural diversity challenge 6.5.4.2
Although they referred to board appointments, Arfken et al. (2004:184) argued that 
diversity is not only required in gender and race but also in age. Young women are 
often given supervisory roles underground. It was found that men who had been 
working underground for a number of years do not want to accept authority from a 
younger generation. 
… they are entrenched here, they have been here 30, 40 years and they will tell you 
now you come in your 20s and you want to come with a new way of doing things.  
Classic diversity challenges (3:52:193). 
 
The cultural setting that a woman cannot be higher in position in the mining industry 
also creates a space for men to be less subservient to the supervision of a female 
gender. 
Because I think, you know, when you start and bring woman who previously were not 
in those roles, it really becomes a problem. It’s a problem at a very senior level, it’s a 
problem even at a very lower level. And underground also it’s a big problem (6:72:39). 
 
And I think it’s one of the barriers to transform so far as gender is concerned and you 
need to understand that in our culture, the African culture, a woman is more 
subservient to a man. So suddenly you are you are trying to promote woman into a 
supervisory position. And these men don’t understand. They say, “what the hell now a 
woman must come and tell me what to do?”…so it creates a whole different 
dimension. Suddenly this man is being told by a woman what to do so it’s a problem 
and I think superficially, we want to bring in woman but from a cultural perspective [we] 





The cultural belief that a woman has to be subservient to a man poses challenges, 
especially underground, within the traditional African cultural context. The spirit of 
transformation can be enhanced by the amount of mentorship in a mining company. 
   Lack of mentorship 6.5.4.3
Mentorship involves grooming existing individuals in the company to thrive in existing 
positions or even prepare them for more senior roles. One participant argued that 
although many capable black people appointed in middle to upper management 
could benefit from mentorship, it is currently not done. She further argues black 
candidates appointed in senior positions do not receive the same support to which 
their white counterparts were privy.  
I think mentoring is a big problem. I think black people get thrown into positions and 
then there are no safety nets. And unfortunately, when that happens and that person 
fails and then the argument is black people can’t do it. It’s not that. They need to be 
given the same support that their white counterparts were given in order to succeed 
(6:68:37). 
 
…the biggest issue is lack of mentorship … I think there is a lot of the black or HDSA’s 
who have the qualifications, have the potential. But they don’t have the same amount 
of mentorship that was given to our predecessors…if you look at how you can get a 
white person thrown into a very senior position, with very little knowledge and 
experience, yet they succeed.  How is it possible? (6:66:35). 
 
In defence of the lack of mentorship, one participant observed that a mentorship 
programme is a human relations issue, and that the mentor and mentee relationship 
is important. This participant added that that if people do not relate in terms of 
background it’s difficult for appropriate mentorship to take place. Even more so, 
people need to understand each other and that is not the case in the mining industry.  
…one of the barriers is the fact that you don’t have enough mentors who are like the 
people that you are trying to empower [HDSA]. Because it is sometimes very difficult to 
empower people or advise people when you don’t really understand where you are 
coming from or where they are coming from when you can't relate...That is why I am 
saying it is a human relations issue, because you must be able to relate before you 
mentor (4:13:78). 
 
Further to a lack of mentorship, the spirit of transformation means that opportunities 
are diminishing for those who do not fall within the HDSA group. This lack of 
opportunity brings the anxiety and fear from non-HDSAs about the future of their 
careers in mining organisations. As such, early retirement is not considered and staff 
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turnover is slow. This creates double payroll since the mining industry is forced to 
create opportunities for the HDSAs and have to accommodate HDSAs. 
The other thing is, a lot of white people are afraid and entrenched.  So we find a lot of 
the older white people feeling they are not going to get another opportunity so they are 
reluctant to leave.  So the staff turnover is slow…So in effect we are having to create 
almost a double payroll. Older people stay there because the Labour Law is stringent, 
you can't constructively dismiss people.  That is also not fair.  But yet you need to get 
other people in.  So I think it added a burden to the payroll by having to compromise 
between two things.  And also, we have got to transfer skills from the older people who 
have already been in the economy for a while and the new one. So we have got to 
keep both in the organisation at the same time.  So the companies are stretched and 
burdened with extra costs on the payroll and so on (2:30:113). 
 
This participant further emphasised that feelings of reverse apartheid are being 
experienced by the white people.   
White people are feeling so disenfranchised now. They are feeling so reversed 
apartheid nowadays and it is a real feeling [they] get. [They] feel like second class 
citizens at the moment.[They] feel [they] have got something, but at any moment [they] 
can lose it and it is actually very depressing for white people.  So the white people are 
feeling more and more afraid.  Some people are able to bridge it and say, “you know 
what, I still want to make a difference, I want to help, I know I can still serve the 
country.”  But I think more of our lower skilled white people are extremely afraid, they 
are… and that brings out a resistance… people are changing, people not wanting to 
take another job or scared of resigning or scared of moving on, because … they think 
they are not going to get opportunities…I really feel sorry for the white people in these 
lower [skills]...they are struggling (2:38:131). 
  
A lack of mentorship can be ascribed to fear among non-HDSAs in companies, and 
also the unavailability of mentors who can mentor HDSAs in mining companies. 
There were allegations by another participant that there is favouritism in mentoring, 
in other words, a white candidate is mentored appropriately whilst a black candidate 
is thrown in at the deep end. Another challenge of transformation is employee 
retention due to a war for talent. 
6.5.5 War for talent  
Employee retention refers to the ability of a company to retain the talented 
employees currently in an organisation. All participants in the study confirmed that 
there is a war for talent in the mining industry due to the inability to attract and retain 
talented individuals. In some cases mining companies are able to attract suitable 
candidates with premiums and attractive packages; however there is a war for talent 
due to the unavailability of skills. 
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The major challenge is [the] attraction and retention of individuals. Secondly, another 
challenge is [the] availability of skills. When we say skills, I am not talking about 
someone who is going to come out with a master’s degree at university and then we 
say that is skills. Skills come with experience, experience brings about insight. Now 
that is what we are running short of (1:23:33). 
 
There is also a high HDSA turnover due to the war for talent. Those who are 
mentored, coached and given training and development are often head-hunted and 
recruited by rivals. 
But people do not stick it at the mining environment... probably every year we get top 
guys, we mentor them, we coach them, we give them positions, they work, after six, 18 
months they get poached by somebody else because there is a scarce skill. Have you 
heard about the words “war for talent”? That is what we are facing in the mining 
industry (1:18:25).   
 
…you would find that in certain levels especially in mining there is a good guy who is in 
another mine and to attract that guy you must pay him more money. And you will find 
that you attract him here and seven months later he gets attracted elsewhere 
(10:9:45).  
 
All of the participants affirmed that they head hunt HDSAs and often pay a premium 
to recruit them. Other companies pay HDSAs attraction bonuses for accepting a job 
with a company. The challenge remains, however, that HDSAs still leave the 
company as soon as they find another occupation with more financial rewards. 
We have got pools that our CEO has money for, where he pays for us when we 
identify HDSAs that have got talent or abilities. We get them in, at least get them 
trained, and the moment there is a vacancy we get them in.  So we try everything we 
can, we are head hunting, we recruit in a special way to get people in but there is such 
a war on talent (2:47:151). 
 
But now what is happening, because of the supply and demand, supply is low demand 
is high.  So what do we do?  We pay a premium.  We bring you in, we don’t even look 
at your competencies, you come at this level. The next door company sees that you 
are there because we have published you in the papers they go for you, they give you 
[attractive package]… you go.   Another one gives you, you go. So it is like a spring of 
a car.  Your salary is being pulled (1:53:81). 
 
There is a war for talent and by the way it’s not a South African war…so they are 
enticed to move. So not only are we producing a little, once we produced it we fight 
amongst ourselves between industries for that talent. And once we fight there is the 
international layer on top that is also looking for talent. So, there is a brain drain that is 
taking place of absolutely critical skills (7:20:29). 
 
War for talent can be attributed to the skills shortage. Individuals with these skills are 
in short demand and have the leverage to negotiate salaries or leave their current 
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positions when offered better employment. The last and most recent challenge 
facing the mining industry was the call on the nationalisation of mines. 
6.5.6 Nationalisation of mines debate 
Malema’s call has opened a debate on the nationalisation of mines which has 
initiated an intense anxiety about the future of the mining industry, the economy of 
the country and investor risk due to uncertainty (Gordhan, 2011). As a result, South 
Africa has become a potential high-risk investment for foreign investment (Otto, 
2011). Coetzee (2010) defines nationalisation as an operation of transferring an 
industry or assets into the state ownership of the national government to achieve 
political and economic growth. The interviews revealed three sub-themes regarding 
the debate about nationalisation, namely, opposing views, proposing views and 
those that need more information.  
   Opponents of nationalisation 6.5.6.1
It was found in the study that three (30%) participants opposed the idea of 
nationalisation as a policy in South Africa. The opponents of nationalisation argued 
that insufficient information regarding nationalisation exists and alleged that a 
political agenda was behind the call. There were also concerns about the state’s 
ability to run mines and questions about whether research was done to determine 
the viability of nationalisation if it was to become policy. 
I don’t think we are ready for the nationalisation of mines in particular. I think for me it 
would be an absolute disaster if we nationalise the mines. I think in terms of the listing 
of the companies, a lot of our companies are listed overseas and I don’t think we as 
the company are ready to nationalise (10:5:51). 
 
There were questions about whether the callers for nationalisation understood what 
nationalisation is. The argument was that the government has enough challenges of 
its own and does not have the capacity to run the mines. Other opponents requested 
the need to define what nationalisation is. 
So I am not sure that the nationalisation debate is really understood by the people who 
push for it. I don’t think they understand what they mean by nationalisation. I think 
what they are talking about is about wholesale nationalisation. Taking the mines and 
owning them and running them. And our view is that I don’t think government has the 
capacity.  We just have to look at a few state run enterprises, and think that it would be 
a huge mistake. I think the state does have a role to play, they just need to identify the 




You can imagine if you put them in the hands of the state. And the state is battling with 
the other companies that it has, just in the management compass in making sure that 
you can turn them to become profitable…I am not sure if that’s the best way to go. You 
can look at the amount of money that we paid to buy these mines and to put them 
under the hands of the state. So it’s not gonna be free for all. It’s a lot of money so I’m 
not sure if the state has got that money to run the mine and the expertise to run them. I 
mean we just need to make sure that we can run the big companies that we already 
have appropriately and profitably (9:27:47). 
 
The participant below acknowledges that nationalisation might be a good idea, 
however, he made a reference to the commission that investigated the viability of 
nationalisation in South Africa, and it was found that South African is not yet ready 
for the nationalisation of mines. 
It may just be a good thought but I don’t think we are ready and I think the ANC 
commissioned a study where they investigated whether we are ready and that study 
came up that we are not yet ready at all. My view is that we are not and we should not 
even pursue it for now. I am not talking about other industries, but I’m talking about 
mining in particular. So my view is no (10:6:51). 
 
I am not sure whether the guys that are arguing for have already done the calculations 
to ensure that in fact that the state has got money to buy these mines, number one. 
Number two, whether the state will be able to run them profitably than the current guys 
who are running them to make enough profit to cover the costs of buying the mine and 
to serving the community that it wants to serve. So I am not sure if anybody have done 
those calculations. Because if you have, you would realise that it’s not an easy thing to 
do. To take them without paying which will be a nightmare (9:29:49). 
 
One opponent for nationalisation attributed the call for nationalisation of mines to the 
call for transformation. 
When I listen to Malema,I am not hearing nationalisation…I am hearing transformation.  
Because he is of the view that if the mines belong to the government the government 
will make sure that they transform. Now let us take Transnet, let us take ESKOM, let 
us take all the state owned enterprises, how far have they transformed? (1:38:57). 
 
There were, however, also remarks that supported the idea of nationalisation from 
mining executives. This was attributed by statements on the lack of transformation in 
the mining industry, 
   Proponents for nationalisation  6.5.6.2
On the other hand, 20% of the participants made positive remarks in support of 
nationalisation. The participant quoted below, sits on the board of directors and 
alleged that there is no change in the mining industry. This participant reported that 
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initiatives undertaken in their company to transform do not work as their company is 
still faced with transformation issues.  
I think that you have extremes. That argument is extreme, without looking at the 
research and everything what has happened anywhere. That is an extremist approach.  
But there comes a time where you realise [indistinct] maybe that is the way to go, to be 
honest because everything else that is well thought through, that is supposed to be 
working for all and everyone, it just doesn’t work.  So you think, oh well, maybe going 
the extreme route will kill some people but maybe it will yield some results at some 
stage.  Because the youth is very, very unhappy with the state of skills.  And not just 
the youth only, I think that the middle class is very frustrated because people just see 
no change. There is very, very little change.  I have been in different industries in my 
career.  Sometimes I get arguments that I used to get in other industries, I get them 
now, like that I used to get year 2000, get them now in 2012, same argument  honestly 
(4:19:104). 
 
Nationalisation is actually something that is a global phenomenon.  It is a complex 
thing, but I actually understand the logic. We have limited national resources in the 
ground where we have got, and it is all over the world.  It is China, it is Asia, it is 
Australia, it is South Africa, South America.  Nationalisation basically is all about thee 
minerals and these things belong to the local community at the very least, they belong 
to the local society or the local province or they belong to the country.  I mean, in 
South Africa minerals actually by default are owned by the government.  So it is seen 
as something for the common good of the country and it is not for the select few who 
can reap it economic benefits (2:49:157). 
 
The participant quoted below, questioned the existence of labour unrest in the 
mining whilst the mining industry claims that it is transforming. Further to her 
argument, the participant revealed that the boards of mining companies and the 
minister are given flawed or inaccurate reports by mining companies which suggest 
that transformation in the mining industry is cosmetic. 
We know that something is not right because surely the Marikana debacle should have 
been picked up. But you must remember that the boards and the minister and those 
people they are obsessed with good reports, so that is what they get (4:21:148). 
 
  Clarity seeking for nationalisation  6.5.6.3
The remaining 50% of the participants requested the proponents of nationalisation to 
define it so that the mining industry can understand what it means. 
What is nationalisation? It means different things to different people. As (Name of the 
company) the outlook is different. At the end of the day we say all shareholders 
whether they are community or you and I or whoever around that needs to get a return 
on their investment. Now if nationalisation is a vehicle that achieves that so be it. You 
know, around that. So our concern would be the mixed messages. So, let’s get that 




I mean our view is, it depends on what we mean by nationalisation. If the view is we 
want to buy all mines then by all means. If the government thinks it’s got a couple of 
trillion rands to buy out all the mines. But we don’t think that is the way to go. And we 
don’t have an issue with state intervention so far as the state wants to have shares in 
the mine. But I think where the challenge arises is where we talk about no 
compensation, taking mines without compensation. I think it would be detrimental to 
the economy to do that (6:83:45). 
 
The industry also showed interest in becoming part of the debate to encourage 
dialogue with key stakeholders of the mining industry. 
So we want to be part of the debate, we encourage dialogue and I think it’s important 
for us from a policy making point of view we get that clarity and I think that’s one of  
reasons the investment is not coming in. Remember investors have invested in other 
companies where nationalisation exists. But the reason they do so is because of policy 
clarity. So they are not opposed to it, but they invest in something they know. “So it’s, 
oh, I understand it”. It means1, 2, 3 & 4, whereas in South Africa we are talking about 
nationalisation but we have not defined it. So those who have the money to put in hold 
back and say well, I will wait for you until you have defined this model. Once I 
understand it I will make a choice as to how I want to go about it. So I think the 
urgency really is let’s define nationalisation (7:26:39). 
 
The call for the nationalisation of mines has caused a stir in the future of the South 
African mining industry (Gordhan, 2011; Otto, 2011). It is explained above that there 
are those opposed to the idea of nationalisation due to perceptions of government 
incapacity, hidden political agendas and insufficient information and a lack of 
understanding of the motive call. The participants who supported nationalisation 
referred to it as a result of a lack of transformation and frustrations by stakeholders. 
However, those who requested more information, especially requested that 
nationalisation to be defined in order to understand its meaning.  
In concluding the seven challenges facing the mining industry, it is clear that the 
inability to recruit suitable candidates is due to a lack of skills, as well as a lack of the 
necessary qualifications and experience from HDSAs. In the mining industry there 
are shortages in the engineering fields, as well as technical and artisanal skills. 
Furthermore, there is a challenge in recruiting local, compared to migrant labour, due 
to a low willingness from the local community to assume labour intensive or lower 
skilled mining jobs. The role of government in facilitating transformation was 
questioned. For example, the education system was criticised for not producing 
suitable matriculants who are eligible to enrol for mining-related qualifications at 
tertiary institutions. The government is also criticised for creating a culture of 
dependency through the social grants system to unemployed youth. It was alleged 
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that the youth blames apartheid but are not willing or capable to improve their 
education. Inconsistent legislation has caused confusion in mining companies due to 
dissimilar policies, for example, a definition of the HDSA is not the same in BBBEE, 
the Mining Charter and the MPRDA. To work in the mining industry is not always 
considered a suitable career choice; this is due to underground conditions that are 
not conducive to a pleasant working environment. Also with the housing problem, 
more social problems are created when mining companies build houses for 
mineworkers near the mining operations. Mineworkers often have second families 
and are at times subjected to garnishee orders as a result of the inability to support 
two families. Operational challenges due to the health and safety of mineworkers is 
also a big challenge. The spirit of transformation is not entrenched within the mining 
industry, for example, there exists gender stereotyping, an inability to embrace 
cultural diversity, and a lack of appropriate mentorship. The mining companies are 
also not able to retain talented staff due to high HDSA turnover that is caused by a 
war for talent. Lastly, the nationalisation of mines has opposing and supportive 
views, as well as individuals who would like the nationalisation of mines to be 
defined and clarified. 
The next section provides initiatives undertaken to realise transformation. 
6.6 TRANSFORMATION IN THE MINING INDUSTRY 
Given the challenges stated above, and critiques about the slow transformational 
progress and reluctance to transform that have been levied against the mining 
industry, the researcher explored some of the initiatives undertaken by mining 
companies to realise transformation. The Broad-Based Socio-Economic 
Empowerment Charter for the mining industry is concerned with increasing the 
prospects for HDSAs in the mining industry through ownership, management of 
mining projects, employment by the South African mining industry, worker and 
community participation in the South African mining industry, and sharing the 
benefits arising from the mining industry (Cawood, 2004:56). 
Key sub-themes that emerged in this theme were entry level positions, staff 





6.6.1 Entry levels 
The goal of the EE Act is to implement affirmative action measures to redress 
employment disadvantages experienced by HDSAs (Thomas, 2002). The second 
goal is to enforce participation of HDSAs in professional and decision-making 
activities in companies (DTI, 2004). Staff recruitment in the mining industry is 
practiced by offering entry-level programmes and some companies go as far as head 
hunting suitable candidates. 
All participants confirmed that they are running graduate programmes to create 
opportunities for the graduates to gain experience and obtain skills. Other companies 
offer management development programmes that are designed to equip enterers 
with the management skills necessary to assume roles in management. 
We do take graduates into our systems and we have got a mixed group at the 
moment, yes. The greater percentage we also target students from the environment or 
from the areas that are surrounding our mines (5:6:29). 
 
We also have [a] management development programme (4:16:90). 
 
So we are continuously looking for opportunities to bring them in. With the challenges 
that we have as a global company I think the efforts that have been made are in fact 
gonna go a long way in addressing that (9:26:43). 
 
Entry-level jobs are awarded to graduates to allow them to gain experience and to 
prepare these candidates for senior management roles in the mining environment. 
Other human resources development initiatives are done to allow employees to grow 
within mining companies through the implementation of staff development 
programmes. 
6.6.2 Staff development  
According to DMR (2010:3) human resources development represents a significant 
contribution to social transformation and continued growth in a company (DMR, 
2010:3) thus, the mining industry must apply and provide a certain percentage of 
annual payroll (as per applicable legislation) for required skills development activities 
that are contemplative of demographics. 
Sub-themes that emerged in this theme were bursaries for staff members, personal 
change programmes, staff training, fast track and talent pool identification. 
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   Bursaries for staff 6.6.2.1
In order to further their education, staff members are awarded bursaries to pursue 
studies at higher education institutions. Some companies extend their bursaries to 
people in the communities who would like to join the mining industry. 
In bursaries, there are those we give to our staff members and those we give to 
communities. In some there are bursaries we give to people that want to work for us, in 
some we give to people who want to develop themselves that they may do whatever 
they want to do there (9:8:19). 
 
Staff bursaries are designed to enhance staff development through further 
education. It was encouraging to note that bursaries are not only awarded to 
members of staff but also extended to community members around the mining 
operation. Only one company took pride in personal change programmes that were 
initiated in their own mining environment. 
   Personal change programmes 6.6.2.2
Though it was recognised as an important initiative, it was concerning that only one 
participant discussed personal change programmes aimed at accepting and 
embracing diversity in the workplace.  
…if the environment is not ready [and] you bring somebody that comes in here they 
will definitely leave.  So we have initiated some personal change programmes over the 
past three years and the stories that come out of the personal change programme 
feedback are very enriching (3:43:161). 
 
…people that are in one team, normally we talk about gangs and [indistinct], okay, in a 
team that operates a gang maximum of about 13 people that work together. So they 
get in and they sit and they get to understand. You see me coming to work here; you 
don’t know where I come from every morning. Now this is an opportunity to understand 
who I am, where I come from, what makes me as a person, what makes me unhappy 
about you, what is it that you don’t like about me you must tell me and we talk about 
those issues. And as a team we need to build up a plan that says we are one team we 
need to work on certain things and when you start doing that. There is no ways that 
you can operate in a different direction once you have made a commitment to the 
team. People to say that, if at any case they didn’t have respect for the lady that 
worked in the team, that you would disrespect that woman.  They will remind you.  
They will put out the values card on you to say, but you are not living according to our 
value. Remember the value set? Care and respect? Then they work together like 
that...so it is actually life changing (3:45:163). 
 
The interviews revealed that personal change programmes had specific benefits. For 
example, there were feelings of accomplishment in companies where transformation 
is facilitated by introducing personal change programmes. It was discovered that in a 
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company where these programmes are implemented, people embraced diversity and 
these programmes were referred to as life changing. 
   Staff training 6.6.2.3
Similar to bursary schemes, training is given to people inside the organisation and to 
external people, namely, community members. The industry understands that they 
have to use 2% of their payroll to train, upskill and equip HDSAs in the mining 
companies.  
So we have training that we use to train our own people and also training that we train 
other people. And then for example with ABET, we have ABET for our own staff that 
still need upgrading and we open our facilities of ABET for other communities or 
people that who will need some training not necessarily in our staff members (9:6:19). 
 
The government expects us to pay, spend 2% on payroll on training and so on and we 
are making sure that we are focusing most of our skills and training on core and critical 
skills, but we are looking specifically at the HDSA’s that they get it ( 2:45:151). 
 
The focus on training is mostly on HDSAs, followed by white women. 
And by HDSAs we are actually narrower than even white women. White women also 
are last in the queue in terms of that ranking of getting training. So we try to train 
people to go up, getting more core skills in. So if we have got a local guy living near a 
mine and he comes from a local community, we teach him how to dig in the ground, 
we teach him how to work underground, we teach him how to do drilling, blasting, we 
teach him how to drive trucks… we teach him more and more (2:45:151). 
 
   Fast tracking of staff 6.6.2.4
The Mining Charter impact assessment revealed that about 83% of mining 
companies had not identified a talent pool, with only 17% fast tracking those 
recognised for management positions by the end of 2009. During that time 
employment samples in the mining industry revealed that the mainstream of HDSAs 
were still employed in bottom level positions (DMR, 2010). It was pleasing to 
establish that more than 50% of the participants had initiated fast tracking 
programmes for HDSA groups.   
But the primary focus is to get our internal employees up skilled especially our 
historically disadvantaged employees, to get them up skilled one notch.  We have got 
fast development, fast-tracking programmes for people to get them up from a lower 




We also have got fast tracking programmes where we show that we target people who 
are HDSA’s only to try and fast track them instead of going through that lengthy 
services (3:37:140). 
 
And we are bringing females at the top at Exco. We have three females there and that 
was not the case about three or four years ago. As much as I’m saying the challenges 
of African females in senior management we have been planning for the last three 
months we would have had three or so coming in at those levels (9:26:43). 
 
Another important finding is that fast tracking of women is a major initiative 
undertaken in the mining industry. Such initiatives symbolise that women 
development is taken seriously in the mining industry. This is evidenced by efforts to 
encourage gender diversity in the mining companies.  
We have got programmes that are mainly run for women where we fast track them and 
accelerate their development and make sure that they are ready within those particular 
roles (3:33:131).  
 
We are currently busy with woman and focus programme where we are trying to really 
have dialogue, more importantly with the woman that are underground so that we 
understand their issues. What are the barriers, what do we as a company need to do 
so that we make it more practical for women to work underground? And also to absorb 
women not just underground but across the board (6:77:43). 
 
We have also increased our level of women intake into positions that were previously 
held by males underground in particular. We have shift bosses that are women. We 
are now accelerating their development to become mining overseers (10:7:47). 
 
The quotes above suggest that fast tracking women in mining is a reality and the 
success recorded implies that fast tracking of women is one of the main focus areas. 
This is shown in one company being recognised for taking the strides in fast tracking 
the development of women. 
  Talent pool identification 6.6.2.5
It is alarming that only one participant mentioned the development of talent where 
potential candidates are earmarked for higher positions and are given training and 
mentorship in order for them to reach senior management levels. 
So one of the things we are trying to do to address all of this things is to put together 
what we call a talent pool where we say here are the people that are earmarked for 
certain positions and we believe that within this period they will be ready and this is 




We will say for instance, in this level we have seven black people of whatever the 
number might be, in this level we’ve got two lets maybe accelerate or expedite 
development in this pipeline, so that comes the time the people are ready to leave, 
there are people ready to take over (10:11:45). 
 
So I think for me sometimes it’s not about colour it’s about who you can get but I think 
the key thing is that if then you have a colour issue I think you need to put together a 
developmental plan or a pool of people that you are identifying to take over when the 
other people leave then at least you will have a talent pool (10:1:57). 
 
The remaining nine participants did not mention any initiatives to identify a talent 
pool and fast track them for development. This could be regarded as a major 
concern. 
6.6.3 Staff retention efforts 
Staff retention was mentioned as one of the challenges of transformation in the 
mining industry. In order to retain staff, participants stated that employees in the 
mining industry are granted scarcity allowances and housing benefits. 
   Scarcity allowances 6.6.3.1
Scarcity allowances are given to candidates with scarce skills who have been 
attracted to the company. These allowances are awarded with an expectation that 
the HDSA will stay longer with the company.  
You as a black individual, we attract you we give you more money than the white 
individual (1:35:49). 
 
Although scarcity allowances are given to HDSAs, a war for talent still results in a 
high HDSA turnover. In addition to the scarcity allowances, housing benefits are 
offered to mineworkers, though it was established in the research that housing 
creates more social problems. 
   Housing benefits 6.6.3.2
Only two (20%) of the participants showed pride in their home-ownership schemes. 
They specified that their companies offer housing benefits and facilitated home 
ownership for the miners. But, as discussed previously, home ownership in the 
mining communities has its pros and cons.  
But it’s fun, I mean it is fun, it is tiring, it is - but when we get it right, when we build a 





I think there are some issues that have been impactful like our housing projects, 
probably the best projects that we can show in terms of transformation. But it also has 
had its consequences because while we have driven home ownership, the one thing 
that everybody missed is that not everybody who is working for you wants to own a 
house in Rustenburg (6:30:25). 
 
The participant below mentioned that their company offers a housing benefit in the 
form of a bond on a discounted rate.  
At the same time we have seen it as an opportunity to actually give our employees an 
opportunity to own a house for the first time. So what we have done is actually 
provided a house for every employee, on a bond but discounted (6:16:15). 
 
Housing benefit to miners and the provision of scarcity allowances are the two major 
perks offered to HDSAs in order to retain them. Housing benefits in a form of 
discounted bond and the scarcity allowance means that the HDSAs candidate will 
earn more than other non-HDSA individuals who are on the same position. The next 
section discusses some of the community engagement and outreach projects 
executed by mining companies. 
6.6.4 Community engagement and outreach 
As part of the immediate goals, the mining industry is required to provide 
entrepreneurship programmes and provide literacy and numeracy as part of adult 
education (Cawood, 2004).The sub-themes identified in this theme were participation 
in schools, provision of bursaries and learnerships to community members and 
community training and development. 
   Participation in schools 6.6.4.1
One participant mentioned that they provided bridging schools to allow matriculants 
who did not do well in their matric year to repeat matric and to improve their grades. 
Successful students are considered for bursary opportunities to further their 
education in University or technical colleges. 
On the skills level, for the school leavers we have got bridging schools. So we are 
paying for students with no bursary obligations. We are just giving them money and 
saying, “you are a school leaver and you are historically disadvantaged, you come 
from local high school somewhere in the rural areas near a mine, we give you money 
to do bridging for a year and then we re-evaluate how well you have progressed.” So 




This participant, however, raised concerns that only a few candidates would do well 
at bridging schools whilst the majority still struggle, even when offered an 
opportunity. 
We would give 60 students bridging year opportunities and maybe 10 would be good 
enough to get through to first year to carry on. The education is a serious, serious 
problem government has failed us in that area. The government has got its challenges, 
but we are already 18 years since independence or a new society or the start of 
enfranchisement. I know it is going to take more than 18 years but I was expecting 
more progress. Maybe the education department took the wrong direction in terms of 
its OBE (2:29:113). 
 
Another participant mentioned that they also adopt a school and provide extra 
lessons for capstone subjects that are necessary to enrol for University, such as 
mathematics and science.  
We identified one particular high school, but obviously we went for other high schools 
making one high school a centre where we are providing extra lessons for Maths and 
Science grade 10 to 12 (5:34:75). 
 
Other mining companies have developed programmes for school children, as early 
as Grade 9 to Grade 12. These programmes introduce school children to the mining 
environment, to cultivate their career aspirations for the mining industry. 
We also participate in a programme called the techno gap programme, where we bring 
kids from Grade 9, ja Grade 9, Grade 10, 11, and 12 so that they should be able to 
get, it is just like on the job, it is just like shadowing a bit.  Bring them in expose them 
they come every holiday, so that by the time they go through Grade 12 they will have 
had an interest and see what they want to do in mining. So we try in that way we think 
we are making a dent in the low representatives of women in the mining sector 
(3:37:140). 
 
In schools where there are no libraries, no laboratories or which are overcrowded, 
this mining company provided computer centres with libraries and laboratories.  
We are helping those, some of those schools that we have identified. We have 
computer centres with a library, with laboratories…now another initiative is to have a 
performance management system in place so as to identify the super performers so 
that you can groom them for further development. So there is [a] quite number of 
initiatives that we are doing (1:34:49). 
 
Almost all participants declared that they provide ABET for the local communities. 
This programme assists community members in basic education like writing and 
reading. 
People who are the local communities who can't even read and write we do ABET  
Adult Basic Education Training. We do night schools for these people so that they can 
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get to read and write properly so they can at least start working and going up 
(2:45:151).  
 
Participation in schools involves bursaries for bridging schools to enable school 
leavers and matriculants who did not do well in matric to repeat matric. Extra lessons 
for mathematics and science are provided. Laboratories and libraries have been 
provided for schools with no access. Other activities include exposure to the mining 
environment to encourage careers in mining. Lastly, ABET programmes are provided 
to provide the basics of writing and reading in community members. 
   Bursaries and learnerships 6.6.4.2
In addition to school participation, mining companies also provide bursaries and 
learnerships to community members who are eligible for University. About 70% of 
the bursaries are aimed at HDSAs and 30% to others. Women are also a priority for 
bursaries and learnerships. 
We have got bursaries, we have got learnerships, we have got commitment that within 
those areas we will take 70 as in equity and then 30 as in other races.  But obviously 
you make sure that within those as well you commit, because we have got a target that 
we have to work towards from a gender point of view. Commit that we will take about 
30% of women within our learnerships and bursaries and make sure that we work 
towards that even in training (3:34:131). 
 
As mentioned above, the bursaries are first targeted at needy students who show 
potential, but are also awarded non-HDSAs. 
Even when we give bursaries we target those students from the poor, poor 
surrounding communities and yes, there are also those other people from the other 
colour that we would also take into the programmes (5:6:29). 
 
   Community training and development 6.6.4.3
All participants (100%) agreed that training and development in the community is 
one of the major focus areas of mining companies in community development. 
Participants showed pride in their community projects and kept on reiterating that 
they are the only industry that trains communities, even if the skills are not 
specifically meant for that industry. 
(Name of the company) in this year alone for an example has trained over 5000 
community members on different skills programmes. Now I am not aware of any other 
industry that trains people outside the company other than its own. And that is typically 
what mining does. Mining is the one industry that I know that provides and heavily 
subsidises home ownership. For example, it gives cash to its employees to buy homes 




We provide learnerships and in some areas we provide what we call community 
development or training. We even train communities even in areas where we are not 
going to be appointing them. But we have the capacity to train people and give them 
skills that they can use elsewhere (9:5:19). 
 
Community trainees are also absorbed in the environment in the mining environment 
if they show potential. 
When they complete that technical training we then absorb them into the organisation. 
So at the same time we are actually offering an opportunity for young people who 
enjoy sports to also acquire an alternative skill (6:19:15). 
 
Communities around mining areas are also provided with mine shares in order to 
share the wealth of the mine with community members. 
But what we can do is we can help local communities share in the profits. You get this 
employee share schemes where we are doing that now in [name of the company] we 
are going to make the local communities around each mine share in the wealth of the 
mine long-term so they get shares in the mine (2:50:157). 
 
Two (20%) participants’ responses affirm that community development projects are 
initiated by mining companies to provide a platform for communities to develop and 
run businesses.  
We’ve got a vegetable garden that supplies the local Pick ‘n Pay with vegetables and 
fruit and veg (8:27:215). 
 
For example like at NBC in, near Belfast where we started a bakery business. So we 
got some local people, there are 16 people employed and now there is a bakery 
business (2:13:59). 
 
We are looking at our communities around us and we are engaging with municipalities, 
communities, schools etc. to help develop them, uplift them with education with skills 
starting local businesses (2:11:57). 
 
Community training and development projects aim at providing the skills needed in 
the mining environment, such as entrepreneurial skills. Local businesses have 
arrangements with communities to supply the local retailers with merchandise. A last 
initiative undertaken is cooperation with stakeholders in the mining industry. 
6.6.5 Cooperation with key stakeholders  
Although the pursuit of some community engagements and projects have been 
implemented, there have been some challenges, especially those of working with 
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key stakeholders such as municipalities; however, only one participant acclaimed 
their careful cooperation with municipalities in order to get the projects implemented. 
We talked to [the] municipality, they formalised it, they put in water, electricity, we have 
built a school there. And that school, the frames, steel frames came from a welding 
centre that we built in the community (8:27:215).   
 
Transformation in the mining industry is supported by five initiatives identified in this 
research. Firstly and foremost, staff recruitment practices include entry level 
positions. Graduates are also afforded the opportunity to develop skills and gain 
experience through graduate programmes or management development 
programmes. The second initiative involves staff development where members of 
staff are awarded bursaries to further their education. One participant mentioned that 
their company went even further to introduce personal change programmes to 
encourage the acceptance of diversity. As part of staff development, programmes for 
the training of staff, and fast tracking of HDSAs, especially women, have been 
implemented. However, it was alarming that only participant mentioned that a talent 
pool was identified in their company. The third initiative involves staff retention 
efforts, for example, mining companies provide scarcity allowances to skilled 
HDSAs. In addition, housing benefits are provided by means of discounted bonds. 
The fourth initiative involves community engagement and outreach projects. This 
initiative requires mining companies to participate in school leavers’ development by 
means of bridging schools, extra classes for mathematics and science, and ABET 
programmes for basic education for community members, bursaries and 
learnerships and community training and development projects. The last initiative 
involves cooperation with key stakeholders, such as municipalities to get the 
community projects off the ground. 
 
The next section investigates and discusses how the board of directors has 
transformed in the South African mining industry.  
6.7 BOARD TRANSFORMATION 
This section reviews the sub-themes identified under board transformation, namely, 
the criteria for board appointments and board composition. 
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6.7.1 Criteria for board appointments 
Participants were asked to highlight the criteria they follow for board appointments. 
Competency was ranked as the most valuable criteria when determining the 
suitability of a candidate. Participants affirmed that this specific competency is 
measured in terms of what values and skills the candidate brings to the board, and 
not just by qualifications. 
…probably the most critical criteria is what value are you going to add at the board?  
Because it is even more serious because you are the one who is having the fiduciary 
duties of the organisation, to give the organisation direction, [and] to give the 
organisation advice (1:54:83). 
 
…the influence is largely on what value they can add in terms of their skills as I 
said…because they represent various committees. You would typically have an audit 
committee; you would have a transformation committee. So you are looking for 
somebody who is quite skilled, who will sit on an audit committee to come in and do 
work…to review us as a company (3:58:215).   
 
The competencies and appropriate skills are desirable due to the rationale that 
boards have specific committees, and the board members are supposed to serve on 
such committees. As such, 30% of the responses from participants shows that it is 
deemed important for a candidate to specialise in a certain area to advise and give 
insight in his or her area of specialisation  
Now for instance, now I am grounded in Human Resources.  I cannot accept a board 
position whereby I must comment on finances. I am not going to accept that.  But the 
job that I can accept is if I become a chairman of the HR Committee or Remuneration 
Committee. Yes, because then I am able to ask intelligent questions. So that is the 
criteria.  So the criteria is nothing else other than the competencies and the skills that 
you bring [on] the table (1:55:83).  
 
We can never have somebody who is sitting on the audit committee who is not a CA or 
somebody that is qualified within that particular area. Same applies to your 
transformation committee. You need an HR expert who would be able to challenge 
some of the things that are being done within that particular area (3:58:215). 
 
We had a remuneration committee, subcommittee of the board, transformation 
subcommittee of the board. So at least, even though you know, there were challenges, 
but at least you know, you knew that the board, the subcommittee are going to sit and 
they are going to ask questions (4:20:114). 
 
The above participant highlighted that that a board appointment should not be made 
on the basis of political affiliation but rather as a result of the candidate’s skills and 
competencies. This participant acknowledged the perception that board 
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appointments are given to the politically connected. 
It shouldn’t be somebody just because he is politically known, because I know there is 
a perception that most of them (board members within companies) it is who you know 
in terms of who gets appointed to be part of that board. It is typically based on skill as 
well because you don’t want somebody sitting there and who is not actually what we 
are looking for (3:59:217). 
 
The skills and competencies are ranked first as criteria for board appointments. This 
is because of the expectation that board members should have the ability to give 
advice and provide strategic direction to the company. This finding concurs with the 
notions expressed by Hanson and Song (2000), the IoD (2009) and Malherbe and 
Segal (2001). Although board committees vary, the most common committees in 
organisations are the nomination committee, audit committee, risk committee, 
remuneration committee and ethical committee (IoD, 2009). Board members are also 
expected to serve on committees in specialised areas, thus their expertise in a 
certain field is important. 
6.7.2 Board composition 
The board is considered independent and balanced when it comprises of the CEO, 
inside and outside directors as well as independent directors (Carter et al., 2003; 
IoD, 2009; Ruigrok et al., 2007). This combination generates a best fit for financial 
value and increases board independence (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Carter et al., 
2003). This understanding is also shared by the mining industry. 
We have the CEO and the finance executive as the part of the board, but the other 
board members are obviously independently appointed and obviously based on 
credentials, qualifications, whatever they bring on the table (3:57:213). 
 
Some responses by participants suggest that there seems to be issues of diversity 
on the board. For example, the participant below mentioned that 80% of the board in 
his company is African (meaning Black South African). This suggests that 
representation in the mining industry and board diversity is attributed to black versus 
white and not different racial representation. 
And in fact, even recently our board is actually more than 80% African, for example.  
But we do have governance issues in place as well. In fact, recently we have 
appointed an executive on risk and compliance just to focus on governance issues 
(5:55:115).  
As indicated above, it seems that the mining industry views the term HDSA in 
connotation to black candidates. When they asked to depict their board composition 
217 
 
in terms of HDSA representation, they usually defend their representation using 
black people statistics. 
I would say yes because the Chairperson of the board is a black lady Ms [name of 
chairperson] is our Chairperson and I think in that board there is about three, it’s her 
and two black colleagues. So I think it’s fairly diverse I think so. But I still think we need 
to make one or two appointments and that would be okay (10:4:53). 
 
…for instance on our board we have got hotshots, especially black females (1:58:91). 
 
The three responses below suggest that their boards have transformed. Participants 
claim that they have exceeded the 40% and 50% targets and have exceeded the 
mining charter targets. 
I said we have already exceeded more than 40% meaning you have gone beyond your 
scorecard already there. But being a global company that we are the whole issue of 
making sure that we deal with the HDSA is already underway… the gender issue is the 
one that needs to be looked at because I think we have one female on the board 
(9:33:55). 
 
On our board I think we have exceeded that, because what is driving everything is 
what is required and the targets that you set. Now at the board I think we have got 
enough like individuals to be fully representative.  So the targets are set and then each 
and every individual is given those targets and those targets are measured on a 
quarterly basis and they are part of your performance contract which should be 
measured and which is going to be linked to your performance bonus (1:71:47). 
 
In terms of our board, we are more than 50% HDSA, in terms of our Exco we are 
around 40% we are really above the Mining Charter requirement (9:15:33). 
 
Indeed for a candidate to be considered suitable for the board he or she must have 
expertise in a specialised field. Expertise is required for board member to participate 
in board committees, as well as having the ability to provide input into the strategic 
direction of the company. It was an important finding that HDSAs seemed to be 
associated with only black individuals and in other instances women. Three 
participants claim to have diversified boards and HDSA representation on the board 
of directors. Others claim they have exceeded the scorecard target and are working 
hard to address the gender aspect on the board.  




6.8 BARRIERS TO TRANSFORMATION 
The most common barrier identified in the mining industry is the existence of racial 
tensions, particularly those of colour between black and white. 
6.8.1 Racial issues and tensions 
It is clear that transformation has been contextualised as the inclusion of blacks 
where they are underrepresented and could sometimes mean the exclusion and 
discrimination against the white racial group. 
I read an article the other day, the Department of Home Affairs that they are not 
representative of the demographics. What they actually said, there are not enough 
white people in the Department of Home Affairs (2:40:141). 
 
Now we are coming up with also things like paying a premium that is now 
discriminating from whites. You as a black individual, to attract you we give you more 
money than the white individual (1:35:49). 
 
The participant below warned that transformation should not be about replacing a 
certain colour with another as this will complicate social problems. This participant 
also stressed that the talent management programme will not be focusing on colour. 
What are we turning them into, because now we are complicating the social problems.  
That is why we have to be big and make sure about it, look at the demographics of the 
country.  Not build negative dynamics within the company for yourself by trying to push 
a particular agenda because of colour.  So we are not going to use colour that much.  
But at the same time you need to look into it to say you can't just have 100% Africans 
(5:4:27). 
 
We focus too much on…right now we have just launched the talent management 
programme for this company. Bearing in mind that it is failing …we are going to attend 
to everyone in the system not as per colour.  But obviously you do have a challenge of 
how do you balance out how many Africans do you have.  But what do you do when 
you have more especially we are as a result of a joint venture.  Are you going to say, I 
have inherited this organisation with so many Africans, so many whites, and now I am 
going to give these people the other people of another colour voluntary or severance 
packages so that I can have an African? You can't do that (5:3:27). 
 
 
Another thought that was revealed from one participant is that white people are 
undermining black people in workplaces. This participant alleged that mind-sets 
about what blacks can do and cannot do, have not changed amongst white people. 
This causes tensions and lack of trust between colleagues. 
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So if you think about transformation in terms of mind-set, yes white people can irritate 
you and what I’ve learned is that not only will they irritate you because they will irritate 
you because they undermine you but because you are black. We have to stop being 
timid you know (8:19:135). 
 
This participant stated that the black people’s quality of your work is deemed inferior 
and thus critiqued. Also that black people are considered to need more training than 
the white counterparts. This participant alleged that their work is critiqued in terms of 
grammar and language and not about the content of the work. 
I think, we have to stop, we have to understand that sometimes when you are being 
critiqued on your work, that is on your work and we also have to be strong ourselves. 
There is no white person that will understand this, but I will tell them well.   Because it’s 
like, it’s simultaneously when you are black your work is inferior, you need training so 
when they also hire a white colleague I tell them that , that one  has to go, [he] does 
not understand it, I don’t have time to be explaining the fundamentals to that person 
(8:20:137). 
 
It’s just becomes about the work and that when you do comment about my work you 
commenting to me about my work not because of the colour of my skin.  And if this 
thing, you know we have this thing of circulating documents and - if you are going to 
circulate the document and grammar and correct my grammar, you know rub things 
out and all of that day in and day out I will tell them boet you know what we can sit 
here and have this discussion in Xhosa and then let’s write it in Xhosa.  Because I’m 
giving it to you this is a draft; I’m still going to clean it up for grammar and all those 
things.  Off course I’m not going to give you something that doesn’t make sense.  But if 
I’ve omitted a coma there or and then you are going to come back with the document 
you know having inserted commas, I will ask him lets communicate in Xhosa 
(8:41:141). 
 
On the other hand, another participant was concerned that transformation targets do 
not provide security measures for non-HDSAs. For example, white people who do 
not fall under an HDSA category (namely, white males) are uncertain about what the 
future holds for them, thus some might not even consider leaving a company 
because they are not certain of other opportunities in other companies.   
The other thing is a lot of white people are afraid and entrenched (2:30:113). So we 
find a lot of the older white people feeling they are not going to get another 
opportunity… so they are reluctant to leave (2:30:113). 
 
 
Tensions caused by colour or race are common reasons for the slow pace of 
transformation in the mining industry. It is indicated above that the limited 
opportunities for non-HDSAs build tensions amongst colleagues in an organisation. 
On the other hand the HDSAs, particularly blacks feel that that they are undermined 
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in the workplace. They are being criticised for the quality of work based on colour. 
Non-HDSAs feel that they do not belong in organisations due to the limited 
opportunities provided for them. 
6.8.2 Education 
All participants in the study agreed that the lack of skills caused by the low quality of 
education contributes to the minimal transformation in mining companies. For 
example, there is a criticism that the education system does not produce 
matriculants that are ready to be accepted for mining qualifications in higher 
education. 
I think to start, skills and education is a big barrier to transforming. It’s a huge barrier 
because, while you want to continue conducting business you need to have a skilled 
workforce (6:63:35). 
 
It is thus a concern that not all HDSAs have the necessary skills, qualifications and 
experience that make them suitable for positions in the mining industry. 
6.8.3 War for talent 
The war for talent is a result of limited or scarce skills amongst HDSAs. As such, 
there is a high HDSA turnover, thus making it difficult for mining companies to retain 
HDSAs. As explained earlier, as soon as an HDSA receives an offer elsewhere they 
leave the company. 
…another barrier by the way I must say it is that there is a big shortage of skills out 
there because there is a war for talent. You would find that in certain levels especially 
in mining there is a good guy who is another mine and to attract that guy you must pay 
him more money. And you will find that you attract him here and seven months later he 
gets attracted elsewhere. So there is a shortage of talent particularly the black 
engineers. And I think statistically it has been proven that there isn’t too many of them 
in the country in terms of mining. I am talking mining in particular. There might be a lot 
of them in the system but they are not yet ready to take the position (10:9:45). 
 
Although the mining industry claims that an HDSA gets attracted by another 
company for higher financial rewards, the DMR holds another view. The DMR 
argues that HDSA turnover is caused by other issues and suggests that the 
occurrence of racially discriminatory exercises in the mining industry impacts 
harmfully on the progress towards the attainment of an equitably transformed place 
of work. It was also stated that the lack of investment in HDSA skills development by 
the industry has created an inadequate pool of expertise necessary to effect 
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meaningful gender and racial representation. As a result, retention of the few skilled 
HDSAs in companies has proven to be a challenge. 
6.8.4 Lack of mentorship 
A lack of, or the selected mentorship for HDSAs, acts as a barrier to transformation. 
Since mentorship provides guidance on how to approach certain aspects of the work 
environment.  
And I think for me when you talk about what are the barriers to transformation in terms 
of employment equity, for me that is the biggest barrier [refers to a lack of mentorship]. 
That there is [an] inadequate mentorship of black junior, middle, and senior managers. 
There are a few cases where you get that people are being mentored and you can 
actually see that mentorship is based on an individual (6:69:37). 
 
So one of the barriers is the fact that you don’t have enough mentors who are like the 
people that you are trying to empower.  Because it is, sometimes very difficult to 
empower people or advise people when you don’t really understand where you are 
coming from or where they are coming from when you can't relate… that is why I am 
saying it is a human relations issue because you must be able to relate before you 
mentor (4:13:78). 
So those are part of the debates that we have.  And someone may say, in order for me 
to meet my targets I need to increase my budget by 5%, because if I increase my 
budget by 5%, then I can get an extra individual who is not part of the complement to 
shadow as part of succession.  But now this individual is not adding any value, he is 
learning.  Now this individual [the mentor] is now having to do two jobs now to mentor, 
train you, at the same time do his job (1:50:77).  
 
From the above quotes it is clearly revealed that mentorship in the mining industry is 
selective, discriminatory, limited and can be time consuming and hinder effective 
performance due to time required for effective mentorship to take place. 
6.8.5 Non-stakeholder engagements 
Again, there seem to be no strategic efforts to collaborate and realise transformation 
between the mining industry and government. The mining industry and government 
seem not to be working together. Though it could be encouraging that there is an 
acceptance from the mining sector that there are no strategic efforts from mining 
companies and government to work together to realise transformation. 
Going back to your question about previously disadvantaged communities, they are 
going to stay with us for a long time as long as the leadership of both business and, 
and government has the lead, it is a weak leadership and it is not… “strategic”, but it is 




From the section above, it can be concluded that the barriers to transformation are 
racial tensions and issues between black and white in mining companies, the 
education system, a war for talent as a result of limited skills possessed by HDSAs, 
a lack of appropriate mentorship, and lastly, the fact that there are no effective and 
strategic collaboration efforts between the mining industry and government hinder 
and delay real transformation.  
6.9 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides the results of the research conducted in Phase 2. The main 
themes identified were the interpretation of transformation, transformation and 
legislation, transformation and key stakeholders, transformation in the mining 
industry, the challenges faced by mining companies in transformation, board 
transformation and the barriers to transformation. The next chapter provides the 
conclusions and recommendations of the study, and finally, suggestions for future 




 CONCLUSION, SUMMARY AND CHAPTER 7  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to conclude this research by means of a concise review of 
the findings and summary of the research results. The research objectives stated in 
the first chapter of this study will be evaluated to determine whether they were 
achieved. This chapter also offers the theoretical and academic contribution related 
to understanding the concept of transformation, board diversity and transformation 
progress in the mining industry, as well as factors impeding transformation targets. 
The research contribution, as well as recommendations for stakeholders in the 
mining industry regarding future research is made. The limitations of the study 
conclude this chapter. 
7.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 1: BOARD COMPOSITION AND PROFILES 
The first objective of the study was addressed by the research that took place in 
Phase 1.  
The first objective of the study was: 
• To investigate board composition and the board member’s profiles of JSE 
listed companies in the South African mining industry.  
The data comprised of the 2011 annual reports of 56 JSE listed mining companies. 
Board composition was analysed by means of board size and positions represented 
on board level in mining companies. The board profiles of board members were 
analysed according to their demographic profiles and career backgrounds. 
Demographic profiles considered race, gender, nationality and age of board 
members, whilst career backgrounds considered the career experience and 
functional background of board members. 
7.2.1 Board composition: Summary of results, findings and conclusions 
Findings regarding the board structure showed that all 56 mining companies in the 
study followed a structured one-tier single board system that consists of a balance of 
power, and a mixture of executive and non-executive directors interrelating in a 
committee. This structure follows the recommendations of the King Report for 
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companies to assume the role of corporate control and monitoring as described by 
Jensen & Meckling (1997), and discussed in Section 3.5.1.1. The structure of the 
boards of mining companies furthermore applied with the principles of the agency 
theory as the majority (33.4%) of board positions were held by independent non-
executive directors, followed by non-executive directors (21.5%) as depicted in 
Section 5.3, and Tables 5.4 and 5.5. This finding is in accordance with previous 
studies of governance, discussed in Section 3.5.12, which found that board 
independence is reflected by a mixture of independent and non-executive 
independent directors to produce best fit for financial value (Carter et al., 2003; IoD, 
2009; Ruigrok et al., 2007). This finding illustrates the balance of power on the board 
of JSE listed mining companies, thus it can be deducted that boards in the mining 
industry were independent. 
The findings regarding CEO duality demonstrated that all 56 mining companies 
made a distinction between the CEO and chairman position, as depicted in Section 
5.3 and Table 5.4. This practice is beneficial and is in line with several studies (Daily 
& Dalton, 2003; IoD, 2009; Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). It is 
described in Section 3.5.16 that one person should not concurrently hold the CEO 
and board chairperson positions. However, it was concerning that nine companies 
did not have a CEO, one company did not have a chairman, 13 companies did not 
have a financial director and 50 companies did not have a company secretary on 
their board. It was also an important finding that 47 out 54 (87%) chairman positions 
were non-executive directors, whilst seven (13%) of the chairman positions were 
held by executive directors. The industry thus seems to follow IoD’s (2009) 
recommendation that ideally chairpersons should to be non-executive as described 
in Section 3.5.14. 
Regarding board size, the mean scores of board sizes across industry categories of 
mining companies showed that mining company boards have a minimum of seven 
directors and a maximum of 13 directors. On average, a JSE listed mining company 
has nine members (as discussed in Section 5.3 and Table 5.6). Although the 
research for the ideal board size is inconclusive, as explained by various authors 
(Raheja, 2005; Yeh & Taylor, 2008), there is consensus that it should prevent 
managerial domination and connect the organisation to external sources (Goodstein 
et al., 1994; Herman, 1981; Miller-Millesen, 2003) as noted in Section 3.5.1.2. For 
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the purposes of this study, the aim was not to determine if board size had an effect 
on the connection of the organisation to external resources, or if it prevented 
managerial domination. But the board independence conclusion reached in the 
board structure section, shows that there was a connection between mining 
companies with external sources, and managerial domination was not the case, as 
33.4% of board positions were independent non-executives and 21.5% non-
executives. Findings also indicate that the cumulative results of board size in the 
mining industry show that there is a correlation between board size and financial 
performance. Indeed, the mean scores of board members employed by mega 
companies is 13; followed by a mean of nine members for large companies and a 
mean of seven members for small companies. This finding supports the study of 
Zahra and Pearce (1989), discussed in Section 3.5.2.1, which found that companies 
with larger board sizes had higher financial returns than companies with smaller 
ones. This is in contrast to other studies (Daily et al.,1999; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 
1996) that suggested that small boards enhance organisational financial 
performance and are conducive for efficiency in decision making (Randoy, 2006) as 
discussed in Section 3.5.2.1.  
7.2.2 Demographic profiles and career backgrounds of directors: Summary of 
results, findings and conclusions 
This section highlights the key findings related to the profiles of directors in the South 
African mining industry. Findings have been summarised according to demographic 
profiles and career backgrounds. Demographic profiles considered race, gender, 
nationality and age of board members, whilst career backgrounds considered career 
experience and the functional background of board members. Career experience 
focused on relevant mining experience, board experience and experience on current 
board. Functional background considered the educational background of directors, in 
terms of qualification fields and qualification levels. 
The need for HDSA representation is encouraged by the Mining Charter and is made 
apparent in clear scorecard targets (DMR, 2010) and calls for board diversity 
(Erhardt et al., 2003; Jackson, Joshi & Erhardt, 2003; Ruigrok et al., 2007; Singh & 
Vinnicombe, 2004), as discussed in Sections 2.7.2 and 3.5.2. The industry should 
have achieved at least a 40% representation by HSDAs on board positions by 2014, 
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as shown in the scorecard presented in Section 2.7.2. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 showed 
the racial demographic profiles of directors and showed which races were better 
represented in each size category. Findings indicate that there has been an 
improvement in the racial disparity, particularly between the Black and White racial 
groups. However, slow progress in the representation by Asian, Indian and Coloured 
groups is a concern. Findings indicate that the majority of board positions (63.4%) 
were occupied by the White group, followed by the Black group (30.4%). The 
remaining 6.2% was distributed among Indians (2.4%), Coloureds (2%) and Asians 
being the minority with 1.8% representation (discussed in Section 5.5.1). This finding 
partly confirms the studies of Miller and Triana (2009) and Krus et al. (2012), as 
discussed in Section 3.5.2, that racial minority non-white males continue to struggle 
to enter the boardroom. This demonstrates a reliance on the “old boys’ network” as 
described by Davidson (2002). Thus, a conclusion is made in support of Shabangu 
(2010) (discussed in Section 3.5.2.2) that the South African mining industry is still 
racially and ethnically defined.  
Arguments have been put forward for a significant female presence on the board of 
directors, as described by Daily et al. (1999) and Sweetman (1996) (discussed in 
Section 3.5.2). Common reasons that were supplied, included the female 
contribution of creativity, innovation and their marketplace knowledge. As shown in 
Section 5.5.2, the findings indicate that by 2011, the gender aspect in the mining 
industry had not been addressed, as males occupied the majority of board positions 
(87.2%). As depicted in Section 5.5.2 and Table 5.23 only mega companies showed 
some progress in addressing gender challenges with a 21.5% female representation 
on their boards. Other industry sizes showed less than 13% female representation. It 
was also a major concern that 13 out of 56 companies had 100% male domination 
on their boards, while not even one company had more than 30% female 
representation on its board. Whilst it could be accepted that White male 
representation on boards represented 59.5% in 2011, it was concerning that White 
females only represented 4% of the board composition in the same year. This is a 
concern, as white females are considered to be HDSAs as described by Participants 
1, 2 & 4 (discussed in Section 6.3.1). A conclusion can be drawn from this finding 
that it cannot be entirely accepted that white women are given preference in the 
mining industry as claimed by Shabangu (2010) (discussed in Section 2.6.13). It was 
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interesting to note Black male representation at 22.7% and Black female 
representation at 7.7%, while Indians and Coloureds (combined genders) each had 
less than 5% representation, as described in Sections 5.4 and 5.5 and Table 5.23. 
These findings are in accordance with the conclusions of Daily et al. (1999), Karr 
(1991) and Powell & Butterfield (1994), as discussed in Section 3.5.2, who 
suggested that the glass ceiling could be a contributor to this stance. For this reason, 
it is thus concluded that further research could be beneficial to determine possible 
causes for the continued male domination on the board of directors.   
Further, findings indicate that 72.5% of board positions were filled by South Africans 
whilst 27.1% were held by foreign nationals and the remaining 0.4% by those with 
dual nationality (discussed in Section 5.5.3). Mega companies had almost equal 
distribution between foreign (49.2%) and local (50.8%) nationals represented on 
boards. This was anticipated, as the majority of mega companies are foreign-owned 
companies. As discussed in Section 3.5.2, Carter et al. (2003) regard board diversity 
as the percentage of females, previously disadvantaged and foreign nationals on the 
board of directors, in combination with a highly visible effort to demonstrate the 
absence of discrimination. From the findings discussed above, conclusions can be 
made that that efforts are implemented to include foreign nationals on the boards of 
directors of mining companies to improve independence. Thus, nationality 
representation in mining companies prove to support studies of Randøy et al. (2006) 
(discussed in Section 3.5.2.2), of encouraging foreign nationals on boards. 
Krus et al. (2012) and Strauss (2002) reported about the older ages of board 
members (discussed in Section 3.5.2.2). The average age for directors in the mining 
industry was 53.82 (SD =10.2); the youngest director was 28 years old and the 
oldest was 78 years old. Only four directors (almost 1%) were younger than 30 years 
of age, while 276 directors (60%) were aged between 41 and 60 years (discussed in 
Section 5.7). Previous research of Carter et al. (2003) and Daily et al. (1999), 
discussed in Section 3.5.2.2, showed that age diversity is needed to acquire new 
knowledge and innovative ideas. It is thus a concern that less than one per cent of 
directors were under the age of 30. This finding offers a conclusion that boards 
remain occupied by aging directors as found by Krus et al. (2012) and Strauss 
(2002), as discussed in Section 3.5.2.2. 
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Past studies by several authors (Daily et al., 1999; Hillman et al., 2002; Kesner, 
1988; Lear, 1994) stated that a business background is still one of the primary 
criteria for an invitation to board participation (discussed in Sections 3.5.2.2 and 
3.5.3.1). Legal and financial backgrounds were also regarded as suitable. Findings 
indicate that the prevalent qualifications that most board members possess, were in 
finance (almost 30%), business (11%), engineering (18%) and law (10%). This 
finding confirms the recommendation offered by various researchers (Burke, 1997; 
Gillies, 1992; Mattis, 1993), as discussed in Section 3.5.3.2, that an understanding of 
the business arena, as well as a legal and financial background are suitable for 
entering the boardroom. As described in Section 5.8.2, directors showed the lowest 
representation in mathematical sciences, history and entrepreneurship, although it 
was suggested by Wiersema & Bantel (1992) in Section 3.5.3.2 that educational 
diversity should be motivated. The majority of directors (70.2%) possess 
postgraduate qualifications and the financial director positions showed the highest 
dominance of postgraduate qualifications (88.4%) (discussed in Section 5.8.3). This 
is in accordance with Gillies and Mattis (1992) (discussed in Section 3.5.3.2). It is 
thus concluded that an advanced education is deemed attractive to be invited to join 
a board. 
Regarding career experience, Arfken et al. (2004) and Wahid (2010), (discussed in 
Section 3.5.2), argued that board experience has the ability to enhance quality 
decisions. The average years of board experience was 8.97 years (SD =7.47). The 
majority of directors (42.2%) had less than five years of board experience (discussed 
in Section 5.8.4). The average years of mining experience of a director was 15.95 
(SD =13.13). Mining experience of directors showed more representation in the less 
than five years category, with 32.4% of the directors falling in this category 
(discussed in Section 5.8.5). It is thus inferred that substantial mining and board 
experience provides a better opportunity for selection to a board appointment. 
Another important finding regarding career experience was that the average years of 
experience on the current board was 4.85 (SD = 4.65). Experience on current board 
of directors showed more representation in the less than five years category, with 
66.8% representation in this category (discussed in Section 5.8.6). It can thus be 
concluded from this finding that it is in par with the recommendation of IoD (2009) 
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that experience on the current board should not exceed five years (discussed in 
Section 3.5.2).  
7.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES:  PHASE 2 
The last four objectives of the study were addressed by the research that took place 
in Phase 2. These objectives of the study are to: 
• Report on the criteria employed to appoint members serving on boards of mining 
companies listed on the JSE.  
• Report on the progress towards, and determine the current status of 
transformation within the South African mining industry, measured against EE 
scorecard targets.  
• Investigate current challenges experienced and initiatives undertaken in this 
industry, in terms of transformation, and finally  
• Identify barriers to transformation in the mining industry. 
Phase 2 of the research comprised of in depth interviews with ten senior executives 
in the mining industry in an effort to obtain opinions about the above-mentioned 
objectives using a semi structured interview guide included in Appendix C. Interview 
schedules and profiles of participants can be seen in Appendix A. The following 
sections provide the conclusion and summary of results regarding each objective. 
7.3.1 Research objective 2: Criteria employed to appoint members serving on 
boards of mining companies listed on the JSE 
Participants were asked to provide the criteria that are used when appointing board 
members. As discussed in Section 3.5.3.2, previous studies revealed that the 
characteristics for attaining directorship include a strong track record, business 
networks, an understanding of the business arena and an advanced education. This 
is in line with past studies that identified key characteristics as leadership qualities, 
objectivity, diplomacy and tact, communication competence, intelligence and integrity 
(Burke, 1997; Gillies, 1992; Mattis, 1993). Participants 1, 3 and 4 (discussed in 
Section 6.7.1) confirmed that for a candidate to be considered suitable for the board, 
he or she must have expertise in a specialised field and show the ability to provide 
input into the strategic direction of the company. Findings from these responses 
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confirm the studies of Basinger & Butler (1985) and Lorsch & MacIver (1989) as 
discussed in Section 3.5.3.2. It was an important and a concerning finding that the 
term HDSA seems to be associated with only black individuals, and in other 
instances with women. Participants 1, 5, 9 and 10 claim to have diversified boards, 
referring to black people and/ or women representation (discussed in Section 6.7.2). 
It is thus concluded that it seems companies associate conformance with black 
representation and women. This finding is also evidenced by transformation statistics 
discussed in Section 5.5.1, that Asians, Coloureds and Indians are less represented 
in boards of mining companies.  
7.3.2 Research objective 3: Progress towards, and status of transformation 
within the SA mining industry, measured against EE scorecard targets 
In light of understanding the progress and status of transformation, the interviewer 
asked participants to provide their understanding of transformation, the legislation 
driving transformation, and the key stakeholders of transformation (discussed in 
Sections 6.2 to 6.4), to determine how this understanding differs or supports the 
existing literature. This information was necessary, as it offers an effective 
contribution in literature regarding the meaning and understanding of transformation 
as discussed by participants in this study. 
   Interpretation of transformation 7.3.2.1
As discussed in Section 6.2.1, Participant 1 interpreted transformation as culture 
change. This view supports the interpretation of transformation by Schoeman (2010), 
Selby and Sutherland (2006), and Engdahl and Hauki (2001). It is described in 
Section 2.4, that transformation is about culture change regarding new values, and 
providing equitable resources and opportunities. The views of Participant 1 
highlighted that transformation is not about race and colour, and cannot be regarded 
as a white individual being replaced by a black individual who hasn’t got the required 
competencies.  
Transformation was also interpreted as changing mind-sets, and can be 
accomplished by acknowledging that historical imbalances should be addressed and 
innovative ways should be sought to accept policies that encourage transformation 
(discussed in Section 6.2.2). This finding offers an added perspective for the 
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meaning of transformation and supports the views of Engdahl and Hauki (2001) 
discussed in Section 2.4.  
Thirdly, as discussed in Section 6.2.3, transformation is about the creation of 
opportunities and ensuring equity and fairness for employees in the workplace, by 
ensuring fair and equitable hiring procedures with fair and equitable employee 
treatment in organisations. This finding was recommended by Schoeman (2010) and 
Levy and Merry (1986). As discussed in Section 2.4, structural, but radical change 
was needed in the creation of opportunities for all.  
Section 6.2.4 describes transformation as the valuing of diversity and differences 
and mirroring the demographics of the country, and creating a sense of belonging for 
mining industry entrants as reiterated by Participant 4. This finding confirms a 
perspective described by Schoeman (2010), discussed in Section 2.4 that diversity in 
institutions should be encouraged.  
Comments made by Participants 3 and 6, as described in Section 6.2.5, offer 
statements that transformation is seen as a vehicle to make things right and achieve 
social justice, given the inequalities of the country. This finding confirms the study of 
Esterhuyse (2003) that transformation is a moral obligation (discussed in Section 
2.4).  
An important finding and contribution for this study as described in Section 6.2.6 by 
Participants 2 and 3, indicates that transformation cannot be achieved in a short 
space of time but it is a process that will take time to realise. It thus can be 
concluded that systems should allow a cultural change process to take place. This 
finding is in line with Rungan et al. (2005), discussed in Section 2.7.1.1, that there 
should be realistic expectations from mining companies. 
   Reporting on legislation driving transformation 7.3.2.2
Transformation is enforced through legislation in South Africa and the mining 
industry regulation and statutory frameworks are discussed in Section 2.5. A key 
finding regarding legislation is that the industry displays “buy-in” for the concept of 
transformation. Participants also indicated that they partly adhered to the scorecard 
through EE plans and reporting. However, transformational definitions and terms of 
references were confusing and there is an overall negative perception regarding the 
industry’s conformance. The broad legislation framework seems to be a critical 
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subject in the mining industry, as all participants raised concerns on this issue 
(discussed in Section 6.3.1). These views support the research findings offered by 
Rungan et al. (2005) (discussed in Sections 2.7.1.1 and 2.4.2) that legislation for the 
mining industry needs to be marginalised and key definitions provided.   
The negative perceptions regarding slow transformation in the mining industry 
showed mixed responses. This is demonstrated by the finding that 80% of 
participants indicated that transformation was facilitated and those not complying 
should be held accountable and exposed. The other 20% acknowledged that the 
mining industry has only recently started taking enforcement seriously (discussed in 
Section 6.3.4). This finding indicates that the majority of participants (80%) included 
in the study did not welcome the results of the Mining Charter Impact Assessment 
completed in 2009 (discussed in Section 2.6.1.3) which stated that mining 
companies do not want to transform.  
   Progress made in transforming the mining industry 7.3.2.3
Transformation targets were stated in Section 2.7.2, and these targets need to be 
achieved by 2014. The nine elements of the mining scorecard are used (depicted in 
Figure 2.4) and comprise of specific targets that mining companies need to adhere 
to. Although the focus of this study was on EE targets, participants of the study 
included some of the elements of the mining scorecard in their responses, as shown 
in Section 6.6. 
Findings of this research reported in Section 6.6, showed that transformation in the 
mining industry is supported by five initiatives, namely, entry level jobs are offered to 
HDSAs, staff development initiatives are undertaken, staff retention efforts are made 
to retain competent personnel, community engagements and outreach projects are 
undertaken and some collaborative efforts are done with stakeholders. Participants 
4, 5 and 9 (discussed in Section 6.6.1) showed pride in staff recruitment practices 
that include entry-level positions being offered to graduates for the opportunity to 
develop skills and gain experience through graduate programmes or management 
development programmes. Staff development initiatives are provided where 
members of staff are awarded bursaries to further their education. As part of staff 
development, the training of staff, fast-tracking of HDSAs, especially women, and 
talent pool identification is carried out (responses from Participants 2, 3, 9, 6 & 10). 
233 
 
However, it was alarming that only Participant 10 mentioned that a talent pool has 
been identified in their company. Participant 3 mentioned that their company went 
further to introduce personal change programmes to encourage the acceptance of 
diversity (discussed in Section 6.6.2.2). Staff retention efforts involve the provision of 
scarcity allowances to skilled HDSAs; Participant 1 mentioned that a black candidate 
would be given more money than a white individual as an attraction incentive. In 
addition, housing benefits are provided to employees by means of discounted bonds. 
Community engagement and outreach projects are conducted by mining companies 
that participate in school learner development by means of bridging schools, extra 
classes for mathematics and science, ABET basic education programmes for 
community members, bursaries and learnerships, and community training and 
development projects (discussed in Section 6.6.4). This last initiative involves efforts 
to cooperate with key stakeholders, such as municipalities, to get community 
projects off the ground (discussed in Section 6.6.4), however the participants have 
reported some challenges in dealing with municipalities and discussed in detail in 
Sections 6.5.2 and 6.8.5.  
7.3.3  Research objective 4: Challenges of transformation in the South African 
mining industry  
Descriptive findings in this research revealed the seven specific challenges to 
transformation in the South African mining industry as: the recruitment of suitable 
candidates, mining not always suitable as a career choice, operational challenges, 
role of government, spirit of transformation, war for talent, and the debate about the 
nationalisation of mines (discussed in Section 6.5).  
Participants stated that the inability to recruit suitable HDSA candidates due to a lack 
of skills, as well as a lack of the necessary qualifications and experience, is still an 
issue and is the limiting factor for HDSAs. This finding is affirmed by 90% of 
responses from nine participants (discussed in Section 6.5.11). This finding confirms 
the conclusions of Sapa (2010) discussed in Section 1.1, and Esterhuyse (2003) 
discussed in Section 2.3.1, that HDSAs generally do not have suitable skills to 
occupy top positions in the mining industry. Participant 2 highlighted that the 
shortage of skills in the mining industry is in engineering fields, technical and 
artisanal skills. However, Participant 5 disagreed with remarks about the 
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unavailability of skills by arguing that ample skills are available in the country, as 
evidenced by the graduates being produced by the universities, and the high 
unemployment rate among the educated youth. This participant stated that skills are 
available and that mining companies are not doing enough to exploit those skills. 
These views support statement made by Shabangu (2010), discussed in Section 
2.6.13 that mining companies show an intransigence to transform. It can be 
concluded that ineffective leadership for driving transformation and the inability to 
identify and manage a talent pool could be the main reasons for challenges in 
appointing suitable candidates, as highlighted by Esterhuyse (2003) in Section 2.3.1. 
The recruitment of women, especially in middle to senior management positions, 
also remains a problem. Three out of ten (Participants 2, 7, 3 and 8) as discussed in 
Section 6.5.1.1, stated that qualified and experienced women (particularly black 
people) were hard to recruit due to the qualifications and experience needed at the 
applicable level. This finding differs from recommendations made by Daily et al. 
(1999) and Erhardt et al. (2003), discussed in Section 3.5.2.2, which suggest that the 
pool of women with the ability and knowledge to serve in senior roles is larger than 
reported, and accessibility and availability cannot be used as a defence for less 
representation of women in senior roles (Sweetman, 1996). This finding supports 
statements by Shabangu (2010) that there is a lack of motivation to develop HDSA 
women (discussed in Section 2.6.1.4). It can thus be concluded that mining 
companies can implement effective strategies to identify and train suitable 
candidates for mining positions. 
As discussed in Section 6.5.12, geographical challenges in recruiting local, 
compared to migrant labour, were experienced by the mining industry due to low 
willingness from the local community to assume labour intensive or lower skills jobs 
in mining. Participants 5 and 6 stated that local candidates and communities 
discriminate against non-local candidates when they are employed. This finding is in 
line with research done by Shabangu (2009) which highlighted the tension between 
communities, migrants and mining companies, as discussed in Section 2.7.2.3. 
The role of government in facilitating transformation was questioned by all the 
participants (discussed in Section 6.5.2). For example, some participants criticised 
the education system for not producing suitable matriculants who are eligible to enrol 
for mining-related qualifications in tertiary institutions. Rural schools were reported 
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as not having sufficient facilities, for example, there are no libraries, no laboratories 
and none of the equipment required for experiments, to prepare the learners for 
tertiary education or even employment. When mining companies made alternative 
arrangements to accommodate HDSA learners, for example, with bursaries and 
finances for bridging courses, some learners still failed to obtain the desired 
outcomes, or even dropped out from University (discussed in Section 6.5.2.1). The 
government was also criticised for creating a culture of dependency through the 
social grants system to unemployed youth. Participant 5 alleged that the youth 
blames apartheid but are not willing or capable to improve their education (discussed 
in Section 6.5.2.2). This finding presents an additional challenge of transformation. 
Further findings, discussed in Section 6.5.2.3, offered views about inconsistent 
mining legislation which caused confusion for the mining companies due to dissimilar 
policies. For example, there are differing definitions for the term ‘HDSA’ in BBBEE, 
Mining Charter and MPRDA documents. This finding confirms the concerns raised 
by Esterhuyse (2003), discussed in Section 2.3.1, and Rungan et al. (2005) in 
Section 2.4.2, regarding the broad legislative framework. Responses by Participants 
3, 6 and 8 suggested that there was no collaboration and dialogue between the 
mining sector and government due to a lack of trust and suspicions (discussed in 
Section 6.5.2.4). This is in line with research of Limptlaw et al. (2005) (discussed in 
Section 2.3), which states that there is a lack of dialogue and partnership between 
the mining industry and stakeholders. This finding also confirms conclusions by 
Esterhuyse (2003) that ineffective leadership renders transformation impossible 
(discussed in Section 2.3.1). 
Findings confirmed the view of Limptlaw et al. (2005) (discussed in Section 2.3) that 
employment in the mining industry is not always considered a suitable career choice; 
this is due to adverse working conditions, such as health and safety risks, and 
working underground which results in female employees being subjected to gender 
stereotyping as the machinery and equipment are still conventional and not designed 
for women (discussed in Section 6.5.3).   
Descriptions by Participants 5 and 6, discussed in Section 6.5.3.3, confirmed 
Dansereau’s (2010) findings (discussed in Section 2.7.2.4) that social problems are 
created by the housing schemes for employees. For example, when mining 
companies build houses for mineworkers near the mining operations to conform to 
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government requirements regarding decent and housing living conditions (discussed 
in Section 2.7.2.4), mineworkers often have second families and are at times 
subjected to garnishee orders because they are unable to support two families.  
Findings reported that the spirit of transformation is not entrenched within the mining 
industry due to gender stereotyping and the inability to embrace cultural diversity 
(discussed in Section 6.5.4.1). Findings as demonstrated by Participant 6 indicate 
that gender stereotype is not only a challenge underground but it also extends to the 
board of directors. This finding confirms literature studies of board governance and 
diversity by Erhardt et al. (2003) (discussed in Section 3.5.2.2) which reports sex 
bias, stereotyping and tokenism on boards where women serve. Added to gender 
stereotyping, it was found that there exists age stereotyping which is a cultural 
diversity challenge. Older men still find challenges in accepting authority, particularly 
from women (see Section 6.5.4.2). On the other hand mentorship in the mining 
industry appears to be selective, discriminatory, limited and can be time consuming 
and hinder effective performance due to time required for effective mentorship to 
take place, this was confirmed by Participants 4 and 6 in Section 6.5.4.3.  
Findings of the study showed serious concern about HDSA turnover due to the war 
for talent, even though the HDSAs are attracted with premiums and lucrative 
remuneration packages (discussed in Section 6.5.5). This confirms the study of 
Engdahl and Hauki (2001), discussed in Section 2.3.1, that it is difficult to retain 
talented employees due to the war for talent. However, it was reported in Sections 
6.5.6.2 and 6.8.1 by Participants 4 and 6 that the feelings of alienation that are 
experienced by black people made them to leave the company. This finding confirms 
studies of Engdahl and Hauki (2001) that many black people leave organisations out 
of frustration due to feelings of alienation, distrust in their abilities and difficulties to 
reach their full potential (discussed in Section 2.3.1). The responses of Participant 2 
showed another important finding, namely the lack of, or limited opportunities for 
non-HDSAs which causes anxiety and fear among non-HDSAs about the future of 
their careers in mining organisations. This participant generalised that feelings of 
reverse apartheid are being experienced by the white people which is believed to be 
a major contributor to racial tensions in the mining industry (discussed in Section 
6.5.4.3). This finding confirms a challenge identified by Selby and Sutherland (2004), 
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discussed in Section 2.4, that white managers believe that EE has led to a 
breakdown of the psychological contract between them and their employers. 
Finally, although the call for nationalisation, discussed in Section 2.3.1, caused what 
was referred to as “investor uncertainty” by Gordhan (2011), in Section 2.3.2, 
findings indicate that the debate about the nationalisation of mines demonstrated 
opposing views by seven participants who deem nationalisation, if implemented, to 
be an absolute disaster. Supportive views for nationalisation were offered by 
Participant 2 and 4 who revealed that transformation was slow in the mining industry. 
Some participants would like the nationalisation of mines to be defined and clarified 
and would like more information (discussed in Section 6.5.6). This finding offers 
conclusions that nationalisation of mines could be supported, provided it is clearly 
defined and is beneficial to the South African economy.  
All these findings support Limpitlaw et al. (2005)’s findings, discussed in Section 2.3, 
that gender inequality, the impact of benefits at community level, dialogue and 
partnership facilitation between the mining industry and stakeholders were the prime 
challenges. More recently, the CEE Annual report (2012 and 2013), as well as 
studies by Landelahni and Mpofu (2010) identified low top management 
representation by HDSAs (discussed in Section 2.3.1) as challenges. Findings 
discussed above offer specific challenges.  
7.3.4 Research objective 5: Barriers to transformation in the mining industry 
Participants in the study were requested to identify the barriers to transformation in 
the mining industry, with the view that the identified barriers would enable the 
effective formulation of recommendations of the study. The first barrier of 
transformation that was identified was the racial tensions between black and white 
mining employees (discussed in Section 6.8.1). As indicated by Participants 1, 2, 
and 5, the process of transforming HDSAs is seen as disadvantaging non-HDSAs, 
more specifically, white males. This brings anxiety and fear among non-HDSAs and 
builds tensions amongst colleagues in the organisation as described by Participant 
2. This finding is in line with studies of Selby and Sutherland (2006), discussed in 
Section 2.4, of the breakdown of the psychological contract with existing white 
employees and increased loss of memory due to a lack of commitment. Racial 
tensions were also described by Participant 8 in Section 6.8.1, especially as blacks 
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feel that they are being undermined in the workplace and being unfairly criticised for 
the quality of their work. This finding also confirms studies by Selby and Sutherland 
(2006), discussed in Section 2.4, on increasing distrust and racial tensions amongst 
employees. 
The second barrier to transformation that was identified was the quality of education. 
As discussed in Section 6.8.2, all participants of the study agreed that the lack of 
skills was caused by the quality of education which contributes to the minimal 
transformation in mining companies. This finding offers an important contribution to 
literature that government cannot just regulate and monitor transformation progress, 
but should also be an effective agent of change. It can thus be recommended for 
government to pay attention to rural schools by providing access to resources and 
the necessary support to provide quality education. This act can ensure that school 
leavers are enrolled for mining qualifications at tertiary institutions. 
The third barrier to transformation that was identified, was the war for talent due to 
scarce skills, which resulted in high HDSA turnover (discussed in Section 6.8.2). 
Participants 1, 2, 7 and 10 claimed that an HDSA gets attracted by another company 
for higher financial rewards (discussed in Section 6.5.5). However, as discussed in 
Section 2.6.1.3, the DMR (2009) argued that HDSA turnover is caused by the 
occurrence of racially discriminatory exercises in the mining industry which impacts 
harmfully on the progress of transformation. DME also stated that the lack of 
investment in HDSA skills development by the industry has created an inadequate 
pool of expertise necessary to effect meaningful gender and racial representation. As 
a result, retention of a few skilled HDSAs in companies has proven to be a 
challenge. These findings are in line with conclusions made by Engdahl and Hauki 
(2001) that many black people leave organisations out of frustration due to feelings 
of alienation, distrust in their abilities and difficulties to reach their full potential 
(discussed in Section 2.3). 
The fourth barrier for transformation that was identified was a lack of appropriate 
mentorship as discussed in Sections 6.8.4 and 6.5.4.3. As described by Participant 
6, mentorship in the mining industry is selective and discriminatory and based on 
race. However, Participants 1 and 4 stated that mentorship is costly and limited and 
can be time consuming and hinder effective performance due to the time required for 
effective mentorship to take place. This finding offers an important contribution to 
239 
 
literature as a barrier to transformation. Thus, conclusions can be drawn that 
effective strategies, such as HR practices and change management activities could 
be applied for effective mentorship to take place. 
The fifth barrier that was identified was no stakeholder engagements between the 
mining industry and government, as described in Sections 6.8.5 and 6.5.2. 
Participant 6 reported the poor relationship between the two was caused by lack of 
trust and suspicion (discussed in Section 6.5.2). Furthermore, Participants 2, 3, 6, 
and 8 described that there seem to be no strategic efforts from mining companies 
and government to collaborate and realise transformation. This finding is in line with 
studies of Selby and Sutherland (2006), described in Section 2.4, that there is 
increasing distrust and a lack of leadership. It can thus be concluded that effective 
collaboration between government and the mining industry would address some of 
the concerns identified in the second barrier (the quality of education). 
During the course of writing a literature review and research results, several 
recommendations were identified. Potential limitations to this research, as well as the 
possibility for future research were identified and are discussed in the section below. 
7.4 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
7.4.1 Research contribution 
This study contributes to the existing body of knowledge about corporate governance 
(board composition and board diversity) and transformation. It also offers new 
knowledge regarding the challenges faced and the barriers to transformation in the 
mining industry. This study provided an analysis for exploration of the board of 
directors’ profiles and board composition. It also offered a description of views by the 
mining industry in driving transformation. 
This study used two phases to describe transformation in the mining industry. 
Demographic profiles and career background of directors on the board provided 
attributes desired at board level which also confirmed and supported literature in 
corporate governance. Board composition provided the structure of the board, board 
size and positions represented on board level. Transformation progress and 
challenges are provided by means of rich descriptions by ten mining executives, 
which enabled for the barriers to transformation to be identified. 
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It was discovered in literature that the boards of directors were still male dominated 
and ethnically and racially defined as discussed in Section 3.5.2. Findings of the 
study confirmed the existing literature and found that males indeed still dominated 
the boards of directors. It was also discovered that racial representation concerns 
have been taken seriously, as it was found that the White racial group did not 
dominate as such, and improvements have been made in the Black category. 
Though this was acceptable, other races, namely, Asians, Indians and Coloureds 
have been neglected and this is a major concern. From this result it was found that 
transformation is directed at blacks only, excluding the other races, including White 
females.  
This current research contributed by determining the average age of a director. It 
described the average age of a director on a mining board as 58 years, and 
concluded that young directors need to be seen on the board. This study examined 
how boards should be structured. The results show that mining companies do not 
follow CEO duality, and the majority of executive chairperson positions were non-
executive. It also indicates that boards were independent, comprising of a balance of 
power with a mixture of executive, non-executive and independent directors, as 
recommended by Carter et al. (2003), IoD, (2009), Ruigrok et al. (2007), and 
discussed in Section 3.5.12. This research addressed board sizes studies limitations, 
and a contribution is made that the larger board sizes were found in mega and large 
companies. This provides for the conclusion that board size has an effect on 
organisational performance. This research also described the criteria for board 
appointments, and confirmed the literature on board diversity which holds that 
business, legal and finance backgrounds were deemed suitable for entering the 
boardroom.  
This study also confirmed the meaning of transformation as interpreted by 
Esterhuyse (2003), Schoeman (2010) Selby and Sutherland (2006) and Engdahl and 
Hauki (2001), discussed in Section 7.2.2.1. This research appreciated the initiatives 
being undertaken to drive transformation in the mining industry, and rejected the 
assumption that mining companies show an intransigence to transform. This 
research contributes to the knowledge by describing that mining companies 
acknowledge that transformation needs to happen. This was reported on initiatives 
such as entry-level jobs for HDSAs, staff development initiatives, community 
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engagement and outreach projects. Another contribution of this research is the 
identification of challenges to transformation in the mining industry. New challenges 
to transformation that contribute to literature are: the recruitment of suitable 
candidates, the role of government, and the uncertainty regarding the nationalisation 
of mines proposition. 
Finally, this research contributed to the body of knowledge and added factors for 
barriers to transformation. Barriers to transformation that have been identified are 
racial issues and tensions, SA’s poor education system, the war for talent (confirmed 
in past studies), the lack of mentorship and non-stakeholder engagements. 
7.4.2 Recommendations for future research 
To respond to the research questions posed in the chapter one, potential future 
research could be recommended. It would be beneficial to conduct studies about the 
transformation status in the mining industry beyond 2014, as the current study 
presents a snapshot between 2011 (annual reports) and 2012 (interviews). Other 
research could be directed to the other elements of the scorecard, such as 
ownership, management control and procurement to determine the transformation 
status in the mining industry regarding all the elements of the scorecard.   
Future research could be directed to the effects of racial diversity on the boards of 
directors regarding organisational performance, as recommended by various authors 
(Erhardt et al., 2003; Miller & Triana, 2009; Wahid, 2010). The extent of gender 
stereotyping, racial tensions and tokenism in organisations could be researched and 
recommendations can be suggested. Additional research could be extended to other 
industries to determine transformational trends and possible best practices could be 
identified. Other research would be beneficial to determine the possible causes for 
HDSA turnover so that meaningful conclusions could be provided.  
7.4.3 Recommendations for the mining industry 
The mining industry should continually engage and collaborate with the government 
in facilitating transformation. Clear targets for each collaborator should be set and 
formalised in an obligatory contract stipulating clear responsibilities. Strategic 
collaborations are therefore encouraged in this regard, as suggested by Participant 
5, discussed in Section 6.8.5. There is a need to improve boardroom statistics 
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regarding racial issues; the immediate focus should be to improve the board 
representation by other racial groups, namely, Asians, Coloureds and Indians and 
not be based on black Africans only. Along with improved racial statistics, gender 
statistics in the boardroom needs to be addressed, and the focus should be on both 
black and white women. Women representation in senior to board level needs to be 
fast-tracked in the mining industry. The lack of suitably skilled and qualified women 
to assume these positions can no longer be accepted as justifiable, as stated by 
Daily et al. (1999) and Erhardt et al. (2003), discussed in Section 3.5.2.2. It is 
recommended that mining companies introduce change management programmes 
as described by Participant 3, in Section 6.6.2.2. These programmes seem to be 
effective to get employees to understand the need for transformation.  Mining 
companies should strive to provide security for non-HDSAs in mining companies, 
and tensions amongst different racial groups cannot be allowed. A sense of 
belonging should be created for all employees. This could be possible if HR best 
practices were implemented to introduce transformation. 
Mentorship programmes for HDSAs should be structured, comprehensive and non-
discriminatory. For effective mentorship to take place, retired professionals could be 
appointed by mining companies on a contractual basis to provide mentorship for 
HDSAs. This could reduce cost implications and enable people to focus on their 
organisational objectives without worrying about the mentor-mentee relationships. 
The board of directors of all mining companies operating in South Africa should 
establish an additional committee for transformation. The main responsibility of this 
committee would be to ensure that transformational goals are adhered to. 
7.4.4 Recommendations for the mining regulator 
It would reduce confusion if the regulator were to define key transformation terms, 
namely, transformation and HDSA and relate it to the SA mining industry, as 
recommended by (Esterhuyse, 2003), discussed in Section 2.3.1 and emphasised by 
participants in Section 6.3.1. It is also recommended for the regulator to review and 
amend the applicable acts in the mining environment, namely, the Mining Charter, 
The BBBEE and the MPRDA of 2002 as recommended by Rungan et al. (2005). In 
addition, new mining transformational targets need to be set for 2018. As soon as 
this is achieved, the regulator needs to raise awareness with key stakeholders 
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regarding new policies, legislation and acts and advise them on targets and the 
implications of non-compliance. It is encouraged that the implementation of the 
transformational goals is monitored and evaluated on an annual basis to ensure 
substantive progress. Additionally, there should be strict and legal enforcement for 
mining companies to adhere to transformation targets and operational consequences 
for non-compliance should be enforced. For example, the licence to operate should 
not be renewed for companies showing a lack for transformation. As such, it is 
recommended that a commission for transformation in the mining sector be 
instituted. It should monitor transformational progress from board level to all levels of 
management. The government should improve the education system in an effort to 
improve the skills shortages. It could start by equipping the rural schools surrounding 
the mining communities with the necessary facilities such as laboratories and 
libraries. Additional classes for mathematics and science should be provided, and 
the local municipalities, together with mining companies should make the necessary 
arrangements about who is accountable for what. This should be clearly stated in a 
contractual arrangement. 
7.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The results of the study are limited to the mining industry and cannot be generalised 
to other industries. However, future research can be extended to other industries to 
compare transformation trends, as discussed above in Section 7.4.2. Also, this study 
presents a snapshot description of board compositions and profiles in 2011; it also 
presents views by mining executives during 2012. It could be that results would be 
different if the research was repeated at another time. A total of 59 mining 
companies were JSE listed in 2011, however, only 56 companies partook in the 
study due to the availability of their annual reports. Another limitation noted was that 
mining companies differed in terms of the presentation of their financial statements in 
their annual reports, for example, some companies referred to turnover as revenue 
or sales. Eleven of the mining companies published their turnover in either US 
dollars, British pounds, or Canadian dollars. However, these turnovers were 
converted to Rands using the average currency exchange rate in 2011, thus, 
turnover figures could be slightly different for those 11 companies. Cost and time 
limitations were also experienced as some of the respondents in the mining industry 
had limited time available to partake in the study. In addition, there was some 
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reluctance to partake in the interviews due to the fact that transformation is a 
sensitive issue in South Africa. The research was done during the intense national 
strikes in the mining industry which resulted in most companies being reluctant to 
participate in the study, however, some saw it as an opportunity to defend their 
companies and to provide the truth about the issues facing the mining industry. 
These participants’ views may not necessarily represent the views of the population 
in the mining industry. 
7.6 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the aim of the study was twofold, firstly to analyse board 
transformation, and secondly to identify the progress made in the mining industry in 
driving transformation. The results indicate that whilst some progress has been 
made in addressing the racial profiles of directors in the mining industry, the focus 
has been on black representation with the unacceptable neglect of other racial 
groups. Gender profiles suggest that even 19 years post-democracy, the mining 
industry is still a male-dominated environment. The challenges of transformation 
were found to be the recruitment of suitable candidates, the undefined role of 
government, mining not always being a suitable career choice, the negative spirit of 
transformation in mining companies, the war for talent, and the uncertainties caused 
by the call for the nationalisation of mines.  
The study showed that there are initiatives being undertaken by mining companies to 
effect transformation, such as entry-level jobs for HDSAs, staff development 
programmes, staff retention programmes and community engagement outreach 
initiatives. The mining industry is undeniably trying to achieve their transformational 
goals, however, not all mining companies show the same level of commitment. 
Furthermore, there is no partnership between the mining industry and government to 
facilitate transformation. As such, the barriers to transformation have been identified 
as racial tensions between black and white employees, the poor SA education 
system, the war for talent due to the scarcity of skills, and high HDSA turnover, a 
lack of HDSA-appropriate mentorship schemes, and no effective and strategic 
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 INTERVIEW SCHEDULES 
 
Company  Interview date Interviewee  Designation 
Company A 10 September 2012 Female, Black Head of Transformation 
Company B 12 September 2012 Male, White Manager: Sustainability 
Company C 17 September 2012 Male, Black Group Human Resources 
and Transformation 
Company D 19 September 2012 Female, Black Chief People Officer: Human 
Resources 
Company E  12 October 2012 Female, Black Executive: Transformation 
Company F 26 October 2012 Female, Black Executive: Human 
Resources 
Company G 26 November 2012 Male, Black Senior Manager: Group 
Transformation 
Company H 05 December 2012 Male, Black Executive: Human 
Resources 
Company I  05 December 2012 Female, Black Sustainable Development 
Manager 





INTERVIEW REQUEST LETTER 
 
  Date: 
 
Executive: Human Resources 
Name of participant 
Company of the participant 
 
I would like to acknowledge your busy schedule as the Executive responsible for transformation…. 
and to sincerely thank you for taking the time to open this email. My name is Violet Moraka. I work 
at Unisa as a full time Lecturer of Strategy in the Department of Business Management.  
 
Given Minister Susan Shabangu’ s adamancy on the Mining Charter conformance, the nationalisation 
debate and the public interest on transformation status in the mining industry, I am hopeful that you 
will be interested to know that I am undertaking a research study on this topic. This research is 
undertaken towards a Master’s degree registered at Unisa under the supervision of Prof Mari Jansen 
van Rensburg. 
 
The title of my research is: “EE scorecard implementation- progress made and barriers to 
transformation by JSE listed companies in the South African mining industry”. The main aim of the 
study is to gain insight into the current status of transformation in the mining industry with 
reference to board appointments. Your views will help us to understand how the mining industry 
deals with barriers to and challenges of transformation, board diversity and finding suitably qualified 
candidates to be represented in all job levels. 
 
In view of the above, I would like to schedule an appointment with you at your earliest convenience 
in order to share experiences in your respective environment. This will provide a better 
understanding of your EE scorecard implementation efforts.  Please advise of the time and date 
which will suit you best during this month. This will only take 45 minutes of your valuable time. 
 
Your participation is completely voluntary and your responses will only be used for the purposes of 
research and will be treated with utmost confidentiality (See enclosed ethical consent). The results 
of the study can be made available to you on request. 
 
 
I am hopeful that you will respond positively to my request and I am looking forward to meeting you. 
Please contact me if you have any queries. 
 
 
Thank you again for your time. 
 
Kind regards, 
Nthabiseng Violet Moraka  
E-mail: moraknv@unisa.ac.za 







Student  : Mrs. Violet Moraka 
Field of study  : MCom: Business Management 
Student number : 46741720 
Supervisor  : Prof Mari Jansen van Rensburg 
1. Background questions 
 
1.1. What is your position in this company 
1.2. How long have you been with this company 
1.3.  What is your functional and educational background 
2. Employment equity questions 
 
2.1. What do you understand by the meaning of transformation in South Africa, specifically for 
companies in the mining industry 
2.2. What does your company understand about the Mining Charter and the Mining Scorecard? 
2.3. Who are the beneficiaries of the Mining scorecard  
2.4. What does your company understand by the term HDSA 
2.5. Do you have an employment equity plan for this year or report for the past 5 years? 
2.6. The mining industry is currently faced by charges of the lack of transformation, is this a case with 
your company 
• If yes, answer the following questions: 
2.6.1 What are the major challenges facing your company in terms of  EE scorecard 
implementation, submitting EE plans and reports? 
2.6.2 What are the barriers to transformation in your company?? 
2.6.3 What initiatives are currently undertaken to address these challenges? 
2.6.4 What is the way forward? 
• If no, answer the following questions: 
2.6.5. What are the successes recorded in your company? 
2.6.6.  Highlight initiatives undertaken? 
2.6.7. What were the challenges faced? 
2.6.8. What is the way forward? 
2.7 Comment on the nationalisation debate of mines 
2.8 Describe your future plans for your company in addressing EE scorecard targets? 
Governance questions 
 
3.1. Comment on the structure of your board. 
3.2. How are board members recruited? 
3.3. Which positions are represented on board level? 
3.4. What is the criteria for board appointment/ criteria for selecting directors. 
3.5. What criteria do you use on appointing the directors as independent, non-executive and 
independent non-executive?  
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3.6. Do you consider EE scorecard on board appointments? 
3.7. Share insight on your board composition. 
3.8. What is the current size of your board? 












FROM: Prof EJ Ferreira 
Department of Business Management 
TO:  Sunette Steyn 
CEMS Ethical Committee 
Prof M Jansen van Rensburg 
Department of Business Management 
RE:  ETHICAL CLEARANCE 
DATE: 21 June 2012 
 
STUDENT: NV Moraka (46741720) 
 
TOPIC: Employment equity scorecard implementation: progress made and 
barriers to transformation by JSE listed mining companies in South Africa. 
 
Dear Prof Jansen van Rensburg 
 
We have reviewed the completed Summary Sheet and are satisfied that it meets the 
methodological, technical and ethical standards as set in the Department of 
Business Management in the College of Economic and Management Sciences and 
that it is in compliance with the UNISA policy on research ethics. 
 
All matters (such as protection from harm, informed consent, right to privacy and 






Prof EJ Ferreira 
On behalf of the Department of Business Management Ethics Committee 
 
 
